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ABSTRACT
This dissertation extends a growing literature on banking and finance by investigating bank
corporate governance, internationalization, and bailouts. The first essay conducts the first
assessment of shareholder activism in banking and its effects on risk and performance.
Activism can create value and be an effective monitoring mechanism for banks, but it may
also be a destabilizing mechanism, as maximizing shareholder value may cause financial
instability. We focus on the conflicts among bank shareholders, managers, and creditors
(e.g., regulators, deposit insurers, taxpayers, depositors). We find activism may generally
be a destabilizing force, increasing bank risk-taking, but creating market value for
shareholders, and leaving operating returns unchanged. This is consistent with the
empirical dominance of the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict, which predicts that activist
shareholders may induce managers to take higher risk to increase returns at the expense of
creditors, given creditors’ difficulty in monitoring and regulatory-induced incentives.
However, during financial crises, the increase in risk vanishes, suggesting activism may
not be a major cause of risk during such times. From a public perspective, creditors
(including the government) may lose during normal times, but not during crises.
In the second essay (co-authored with Allen N. Berger, Sadok El Ghoul, and
Omrane Guedhami), we document a positive relation between internationalization and
bank risk. This is consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk hypothesis –
whereby internationalization increases banks’ risk due to market-specific factors in foreign
vi

markets – over the diversification hypothesis – whereby internationalization allows banks
to reduce risk through diversification of their operations. The results continue to hold
following a variety of robustness tests, including endogeneity and sample selection bias.
We also find that the magnitude of this effect is more pronounced during financial crises.
The results appear to be at least partially explained by agency problems related to poor
corporate governance. These findings suggest that authorities might consider
internationalization as an additional factor in bank supervision and regulation.
In the third essay (co-authored with Allen N. Berger), we investigate whether the
U.S. government bailout of banks during the recent financial crisis, the Troubled Assets
Relief Program (TARP), gave recipients competitive advantages. Using a difference-indifference (DID) approach, we find that: 1) TARP recipients received competitive
advantages and increased both their market shares and market power; 2) results may be
driven primarily by the safety channel – TARP banks may be perceived as safer, which is
partially offset by the cost disadvantage channel – TARP funds may be relatively
expensive; and 3) these competitive advantages are primarily or entirely due to TARP
banks that repaid early. The results of this paper may help explain other findings in the
literature on TARP and yield important policy implications. The costs of the competitive
distortions of bailouts should be weighed against the costs and benefits in terms of lending,
risk taking, financial stability, and the overall effects on the economy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation proposal investigates corporate governance, internationalization, and
government bailouts in banking. The robust findings of three essays add to the banking and
corporate finance literatures.
The first essay in Chapter 2 is the first empirical study to test shareholder activism
as a channel of external corporate governance in banking, complementing internal
governance, regulators, and other external governance structures. We use a unique handcollected dataset on shareholder activism (SEC Filings: 13D and DFAN14A) for all listed
commercial banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US over the period 19942010, we explore several the following research questions: 1) is there a role for shareholder
activism for banking?, and if so, 2) what do activists do to change the focus of the targeted
banks, and 3) are they a stabilizing or destabilizing force?. We focus on three conflicts
arising among bank stakeholders: Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1 (managers take less
risk than desired by shareholders due to risk aversion), Shareholder-Manager Conflict 2
(managers take more risk than desired by shareholders due to overconfidence and/or
hubris), and Shareholder-Creditor Conflict (activists induce managers to take higher risk
to increase returns at the expense of bank creditors (deposit insurers, taxpayers, regulators,
etc.), given creditors’ difficulty in monitoring and regulatory-induced incentives.
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We find that activism is important in banking: about one third of our banks have
some form of activism during the sample period and activists appear to target banks with
agency problems and growth potential that are easy in which to implement changes to
increase value. We find that shareholder activism creates value for shareholders but has
little impact on operating returns and increases bank default risk, consistent with the
empirical dominance of Hypothesis 3, the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. This suggests
that activism may be generally a destabilizing force. However, we find that activism differs
significantly during financial crises, resulting in higher market value and no increase in
risk, suggesting that the shareholder activism may not represent a significant source of risk
during crises. From a public standpoint, government loses during normal times, but not
during financial crises.
The paper contributes primarily to two strands of research. First, it contributes to
the broader literature on shareholder activism by examining activism within one important
industry rather than across a number of very different industries, which reduces the concern
about confounding inter-industry differences. Although researchers point to the
shareholder return benefits resulting from activism, our results suggest that other additional
effects of activism, such the increase in risk, should not be neglected. Second, this paper
also adds to the literature on bank risk and performance by introducing shareholder
activism as a factor influencing risk and performance and sets the groundwork for further
research on shareholder activism in banking. The current topic is important especially from
a government policy perspective because poor governance may aggravate financial system
fragility to shocks and pose systemic risk to the real economy (Laeven and Levine (2009),
Kirkpatrick (2009), G30 Steering Committee on Corporate Governance (2011), Song and
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Li (2012)) and is regarded as a possible important contributing factor to the recent financial
crisis. In addition, shareholder activism may be regarded with skepticism. Our findings
suggest that activists in banking may increase risk and market value at the expense of
creditors and may be a threat to financial stability. These results may have important
implications for the government policies targeting bank governance and regulation of
activism regarding banks.
The second essay, in Chapter 3, offers the first assessment of the role of
internationalization in bank risk using US bank data. We find strong, robust evidence that
the more internationalized the bank, the higher the risk. We use a number of different
measures of internationalization and risk, employ various econometric procedures to
control for potential endogeneity and sample selection biases, and consider different
subsamples of the data. The data persistently suggest that internationalization is associated
with higher bank risk, consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk
hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis. This effect seems to be more pronounced
during financial crises, particularly market crises.
Our finding that internationalization is associated with higher risk raises the
question of why banks internationalize. One potential explanation is higher returns, but our
results seem to contradict this explanation, given that we find lower mean profitability for
internationalized banks. Second, banks may become international as part of a defensive
strategy to follow their important customers abroad by setting up offices in countries where
their home country customers have foreign affiliates to avoid losing their clients’ business
(e.g., Brimmer and Dahl, 1975; Goldberg and Saunders, 1981; Grosse and Goldberg, 1991;
Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996). This strategy might not translate into large enough financial
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benefits to offset the costs of internationalization. A third potential explanation is empire
building by bank managers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986, Roll, 1986,
Stulz, 1990). Managers that grow the bank through international activities may gain higher
salaries and/or more prestige than domestic bank managers. This may occur if there are
significant agency problems in banking, particularly if these agency problems are
intensified by international diversification (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007). We put this
last explanation to test and we find that the positive relation between internationalization
and bank risk is consistently stronger for banks that more likely to have severe agency
problems, supporting the empire-building explanation.
This paper contributes primarily to two related strands of research. First, it adds to
the literature on bank risk by introducing internationalization as a factor influencing risk
and sets the groundwork for further research on bank internationalization. Although some
policymakers, practitioners, and researchers point to the benefits of geographical risk
diversification resulting from the internationalization of banks, our results suggest that this
effect is dominated by other factors. Specifically, our results suggest that the additional
local market risks taken on following international expansion outweigh the benefits of
diversification. Second, this paper contributes to the broader internationalization literature
by examining risk within one important industry rather than across a number of very
different industries with their confounding differences. After controlling for endogeneity
and other possible explanations for our results, we continue to find that bank
internationalization is associated with a higher risk in an industry in which risk is highly
monitored by bank supervisors as well as shareholders and debt holders. These findings
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suggest that authorities might consider internationalization as an additional factor in bank
supervision and regulation.
The third essay, in Chapter 4, conducts an empirical assessment of the TARP
injections on bank competition and investigates whether TARP may have given its
recipients competitive advantages. Our difference-in-difference (DID) regression analysis
yields several important results: 1) TARP recipients did get competitive advantages and
increased both their market share and market power relative to non-TARP recipients,
consistent with the empirical dominance of Hypothesis H1a over Hypothesis H1b and
Hypothesis H2a over Hypothesis H2b. 2) Results point to the likelihood that the positive
market share and market power findings may be driven primarily by the safety channel
(TARP banks may be perceived as safer), which is partially offset by the cost disadvantage
channel (TARP funds may be relatively expensive). Thus, the safety channel and the cost
disadvantage channel are the most important to explain the results. 3). The competitive
advantages are primarily or entirely due to TARP recipients that repaid early, suggesting
that these banks significantly reduced the importance of the cost disadvantage channel and
increased the importance of the safety channel, consistent with Hypothesis H3.
Overall, our results suggest that TARP may have resulted in a possible distortion
in competition, which may have misallocated resources, and may help explain other
findings in the literature on the effects of TARP on bank risk and bank lending. First, our
findings may help explain the results in the literature that TARP increased risk for the large
banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming; Duchin and Sosyura, forthcoming) and
decreased risk for the small banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming). As discussed
above, results in the literature suggest that a nonmonotonic effect of market power on risk
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may have been in effect during the crisis period – higher market power may be associated
with higher risk for banks at high levels of market power, while higher market power may
be associated with lower risk at low levels of market power (Martinez-Miera and Repullo,
2010; Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2013). Given that large (small) banks typically have
higher (lower) levels of market power, TARP may have led to an increase (decrease) in
risk for large (small) banks.
Our results also may help explain the findings in the literature that TARP resulted
in reduced or no change in lending by large banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming;
Duchin and Sosyura, forthcoming) and increased lending by small banks (Black and
Hazelwood, forthcoming; Li, forthcoming). According to the standard structure-conductperformance hypothesis, an increase in market power should lead to a reduced supply of
credit. However, for relationship borrowers, the supply of credit may be increased by larger
market share and larger market power because limits on competition help banks force
implicit contracts with relationship borrowers that result in greater credit availability (e.g.,
Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). This may help explain the increase in lending by
small banks which tend to specialize in relationship lending, and the decrease or no change
in lending by the large banks, which more often engage in transactional lending (Berger,
Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005).
In terms of policy implications, determination about which banks to be bailed out
should rely on a comprehensive analysis of both benefits and costs. Some but not all of
these costs and benefits, competition, risk taking, and lending, may be evaluated based on
our results and those in the literature. Based on the findings for these three effects, any
bailouts may be focused primarily on the small banks, where the effects seem to be less
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distortionary and more toward the public interest, since the increase in market share and
market power is the least, risk may be decreased, and lending may be increased. However,
in regards to the other major benefit of bailouts, increasing the stability of the financial
system, presumably the benefits would be greater for the large banks. However, also the
distortions in competition may be greater, and risk taking and lending implications may be
less favorable. Therefore, policymakers should balance all these different effects.
Chapter 5 summarizes the core findings of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 and discusses the
implications of these results to policy makers and regulators.
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CHAPTER 2
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN BANKING1,2
"Action to improve corporate governance at many financial institutions is seen by us as a matter of urgency”.
Roger Ferguson, Chairman of the G30 Steering Committee on Corporate Governance, February 2011

“Weak and ineffective corporate governance of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) was an
important contributory factor in the massive failure of financial-sector decision-making that led to the global
financial crisis”.
Jean-Claude Trichet, G30 Steering Committee on Corporate Governance, February 2011

“When Wall Street learned that predator Michael Price, president of Heine Securities Corp., had bought 6.1%
of Chase Manhattan Corp., the sign underscored that even the biggest banks are vulnerable….his efforts to
shake up management at New York's venerable Chase Manhattan Corp. make many bank managers nervous.
That's especially true after his toppling of Michigan National Corp.”
Daniel Kaplan, The American Banker, 1995

2.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis raised serious concerns regarding banks’ corporate governance

1

Raluca A. Roman. To be submitted to Journal of Financial Economics.

2

I am deeply grateful to my dissertation committee and the Ph.D. Coordinators: Allen Berger (chair), Jean
Helwege, Eric Powers, Timothy Koch, Omrane Guedhami, and Tanakorn Makaew for valuable guidance and
support. I also thank Chris Anderson, Kin Blackburn, Alexander Borisov, Nicole Boyson, Florentin Butaru,
Michael Carhill, Yongqiang Chu, Sean Cleary, Kim Dasol, Bob DeYoung, Marco Gallo, Zhaozhao He,
Jonathan Jones, Dasol Kim, Paul Koch, Yaron Leitner, David Malmquist, Steve Mann, Martin Melecky,
Chuck Morris, Greg Nini, Mikhail Oet, Michael Pagano, Ajay Palvia, Ning Pu, Chris Rauch, Douglas
Robertson, Hector Perez Saiz, Gheorghe Salahura, John Sedunov, Partha Sengupta, Rajdeep Sengupta, Yan
Shu, Amine Tarazi, Gökhan Torna, Sergey Tsyplakov, Liying Wang, Jide Wintoki, Peter Wong, Xinlei Zhao,
Donghang Zhang, Eddie Zhao, Marc Van Essen, Tina Yang, and participants at the presentations at the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Northern Finance Association Conference, Financial
Management Association, International Finance and Banking Society Conference, Eastern Finance
Association, Southern Finance Association, Southwestern Finance Association, University of South
Carolina, University of Kansas, University of Texas – El Paso, University of Hawaii – Manoa, Villanova
University, Babson College, Seton Hall University, North Dakota State University, Boise State University,
University of Houston – Downtown, Pace University seminars for helpful comments and suggestions. I also
thank Allen Berger, Lamont Black, Christa Bouwman, and Jennifer Dlugosz for data on Discount Window
and Term Auction Facility programs, Chris Rauch for some data help on hedge funds, and Lucian David and
Constantin Roman for excellent research assistance help. I am responsible for all errors in this paper.

8

and their ability to manage such a crisis successfully. A larger question is whether good
governance in banking could have mitigated or avoided the recent financial crisis. Several
papers agree that poor governance was a significant contributing factor to the crisis (e.g.,
Diamond and Rajan (2009), Kirkpatrick (2009), Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2014),
Cheffin (2014)), while others find the opposite (e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011),
Beltratti and Stulz (2012)). There has been also discussion that financial crisis was not
caused by “greedy” bank managers, but by the pressure from shareholders to maximize the
put option value they enjoy from explicit and implicit government insurance (e.g., Armour
and Gordon (2014)). Banking research indicates that corporate governance impacts bank
risk and performance (e.g., Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007), Adams and Mehran (2005),
Laeven and Levine (2009)), however there is no evidence on the specific mechanism of
shareholder activism.
Is shareholder activism beneficial for bank shareholders, creditors, and the public?
Literature on nonfinancials shows that shareholder activism may be able to create value
and be an effective monitoring mechanism (e.g., Clifford (2007), Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and
Partnoy (2008), Greenwood and Schor (2009), Klein and Zur (2009), Boyson and
Mooradian (2012), Bebchuck, Brav, and Jiang (2013)). However, it may also be a
destabilizing mechanism, as it may maximize shareholder value in the short-run, but it may
increase risk-taking (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008), Bebchuck, Brav, and
Jiang (2013)). There is one place where the goal of maximizing shareholder value should
not be taken for granted as it may not be socially optimal: the banking industry. Here, a
single firm’s maximization may spill negative externality to the financial system.
Therefore, it would be important for researchers and policy makers to understand whether
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shareholder activism could be destabilizing, even when what activists advocate may be
individually maximizing from the shareholders’ perspective. To our knowledge, there are
no studies which focus on assessing how shareholder activism affects banks. This omission
from the literature may be potentially serious from a policy perspective due to the
importance of banks for the overall financial stability and real economy.
This paper contributes to the banking literature on bank risk and performance by
introducing shareholder activism as a factor influencing risk and performance, and sets the
groundwork for further research. It also adds to the broader literature on shareholder
activism by examining activism within one important industry rather than across a number
of very different industries, reducing the concern about confounding inter-industry
differences. Our findings suggest that activism in banking may increase risk and market
value at the expense of creditors and may be a threat to financial stability during normal
times. However activists do not seem to increase risk during financial crises. From a public
perspective, creditors (including the government) may lose during normal times, but not
during financial crises. We also add to the debate in the literature on the role of bank
governance around financial crises and show that at least one corporate governance
mechanism, shareholder activism, may not have been a major source of risk during the
financial crisis.3
Understanding the role of shareholder activism in banking is important because
there are several critical peculiarities of banks, which make them different from nonfinancials and can impact their corporate governance and the economy at large. First, bank

3

This is consistent with Beltratti and Stultz (2010), which document that poor bank governance (e.g., lower
shareholder friendliness of the board) was not a major cause for the financial instability during the recent
crisis.
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stability is relatively important to society as a whole as bank failure and distress can have
major impacts on the economy and growth.4 Second, banks are more fragile, vulnerable to
instability than other firms or sectors as they tend to be the most highly levered firms and
subject to runs on their short-term liabilities. Third, banks are inherently opaque as they
are in the business of gathering proprietary information about their customers.5 Banks’
opacity can make information asymmetries between management and other stakeholders
arguably more severe in banking (e.g., Furfine (2001), Morgan (2002), Levine (2004)).
Thus, on the one hand, it may be more difficult for regular shareholders to monitor and
reduce agency problems. But, on the other hand, it may be a bigger role and need for activist
shareholders to act as delegated monitors to cut through this opacity. Finally, regulation
makes banks different from other industries as explicit and implicit insurance may induce
more risk-taking (e.g., Laeven and Levine (2009), Srivastav, Armitage, and Hagendorff
(2013). Prudential supervision and regulation, such as capital requirements, are designed
in part to offset this moral hazard incentive. At the same time, heavy regulation may make
it more costly for activist investors to reduce agency problems in banks and harder to derive
benefits from it (e.g., Levine (2004), Laeven and Levine (2009)). 6 While some other
industries, such as utilities, are also regulated, banking stands out in that the regulation is

4

The recent financial crisis involved a significant decline in bank lending, resulting in the most serious
recession since the Great Depression.

5

There are several reasons why banks are particularly opaque: loan quality is not observable and can be
hidden for long periods; banks can alter the risk composition of their assets more quickly than nonfinancials,
banks can readily hide problems by extending loans to clients that cannot service debt obligations, bond
analysts disagree more often over bonds issued by banks than those issued by nonfinancials (e.g., Furfine
(2001), Morgan (2002)).
6
For example, there are restrictions on who can own bank shares and regulators can limit the capability of
outsiders to buy a significant percent of bank shares without regulatory approval (Barth, Caprio and Levine
(2006)). It is a rule that nonfinancials cannot buy banks. Also, (Prowse (1995, 1997), and Adams and Mehran
(2003) show that, despite active consolidation, there have been very few hostile takeover bids in the banking
industry.
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primarily prudential, to reduce risk taking, rather than setting prices.

The capital

requirements in particular may affect corporate governance by changing the conflicts
among the parties via changing the leverage of the firm.
This paper is the first, to our knowledge, to test shareholder activism7 as a channel
of external corporate governance in banking, and its effects on performance and risk-taking
during both normal times and financial crises. We focus on the conflicts between
shareholders and managers and those between shareholders and creditors (which, in
banking, are more loosely defined to mean all the other financial claimants other than
shareholders, such as: deposit insurers, taxpayers, regulators, depositors, etc.). Using a
hand-collected dataset on shareholder activism (SEC Filings: 13D and DFAN14A) for all
public banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US (1994 to 2010), we analyze
whether there is a role for shareholder activism in banking, what do activists do to change
the focus of the bank, and whether activist investors are a stabilizing or destabilizing force
in banking.
To analyze activism in banking, we consider three conflicts that may arise among
different bank stakeholders, and which may be addressed by activism. The first conflict is
the Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1 caused by the risk aversion of managers. This
suggests that managers take less risk than desired by shareholders, and activists can reduce
agency problems between managers and shareholders and increase returns by inducing
managers to take value-enhancing risk. The second conflict is the Shareholder-Manager

7

Tirole (2006, p.27) defines shareholder activism as “interfering with management in order to increase the
value of the investors’ claims. Gantchev (2013) defines activism as an active monitoring process which often
can take the form of a sequence of the announcement of activist intentions and escalating decision steps of
the activist to bring about change within the company such as demand negotiations, board representation,
and (threatened) proxy fight.
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Conflict 2 caused by overconfidence and/or hubris of managers. This suggests that
managers may take more risk than desired by shareholders, and activists can curtail agency
problems between the two parties and improve performance by correcting the overly-risky
investments by managers. The third conflict is the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict caused
by a moral hazard problem induced by creditors’ difficulties in monitoring banks and
regulatory-induced incentives. This suggests that activists may induce managers to take
higher risk to increase market value at the expense of bank creditors (deposit insurers,
taxpayers, regulators, etc.). This may suggest undesired consequences for bank health and
stability.
The three conflicts among bank stakeholders are used to develop and test our
competing hypotheses. Importantly, each of the three hypotheses may hold simultaneously
for different sets of banks at a given time. All that we can do as researchers is to evaluate
which of these hypotheses has stronger empirical support, i.e., which hypothesis
empirically dominates the other. To address this question, we test empirically the impact
of activism on bank behavior. To run the tests, we use OLS regressions with bank and time
fixed effects and regress measures of market value, operating returns, and default risk on a
dummy for shareholder activism and a set of bank characteristics (including primary
regulator dummies to account for regulatory influence), following prior research on bank
governance (Beltratti and Stutz (2012)) and shareholder activism (e.g., Brav, Jiang,
Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Muller-Kahle (2010)). We lag all independent variables four
quarters to reduce concerns of endogeneity and to give time for activists to have effects.
We have a number of key findings. First, we find that activism is important in
banking: about one-third of the banks (337 unique banks) have some form of activism
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during the sample period (1994-2010), and about 8.5% of banks have activism during each
year. In total, there are 1,204 activist events, with a surge in activism during financial crises,
such as during 2000-2002 and 2007-2009. Also, activists appear to target banks with more
agency problems and growth potential, and where it is easier to implement changes to
increase value. Our regression results are consistent with the empirical dominance of the
Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. Activism creates market value gains for shareholders,
leaves unchanged operating returns, and increases bank default risk. This suggests that
activist shareholders may generally be a destabilizing force, inducing managers to increase
risk in order to increase shareholder returns at the expense of creditors. However, we find
that results are significantly altered during financial crises: the market value increase is
greatest during financial crises and risk does not increase. This suggests that activism was
not a major source of risk during the crises. From a public perspective, creditors, including
the government, may lose during normal times, but not during financial crises.
We perform a variety of robustness checks. First, we check the sensitivity of our
results to alternative proxies of performance, risk-taking, and activism measures. Second,
we employ alternative econometric approaches and standard errors: an event study
employing cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), several other model and error
specifications such as fixed effects, random effects, two-way clusters, Newey-West errors,
and a model using macro variables instead of time fixed effects. Third, to address the
potential endogeneity concerns and sample selection bias, we employ an instrumental
variable analysis, a matched sample analysis using propensity score probabilities, a
Heckman selection model, and an analysis including also Lexis-Nexis news events. The
results are robust to all these checks. Fourth, we conduct subsample analyses based on:
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hedge funds (HF) versus non-hedge funds, regular activism versus proxy fights, excluding
too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, and different bank sizes. Among these results, we find higher
risk when activists are hedge funds or when there is a proxy fight. In addition, we find that
the overall results of activism on returns, operating performance, and risk hold primarily
for smaller banks, although large banks also experience an increase in market value.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present
the related literature. In Section 2.3, we explain the hypotheses. In Section 2.4, we explain
the data and empirical approach and Section 2.5 discusses the empirical results. In Sections
2.6 and 2.7, we describe robustness tests and subsample analyses. In Section 8, we discuss
channels of action for activism, and in Section 2.9, we conclude.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the shareholder activism literature for nonfinancial firms.
Researchers in this literature find that activism can create value and be an effective
monitoring mechanism of publicly listed companies, reducing agency costs and improving
returns. Clifford (2007), Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008), and Greenwood and
Schor (2009) find that activist shareholders can induce positive changes in the companies
they monitor and increase shareholder value. They report significant positive abnormal
returns and positive modest changes in operating returns around the time of the activism.
On the contrary, Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner
(1996), Wahal (1996), Gillian and Starks (2000), Karpoff (2001), and Song and Szewezyk
(2003) find little impact of activism on firm performance or operations. In addition, some
of the shareholder activism literature regarding nonfinancial firms shows that activism
influences risk (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008)). Literature on nonfinancials
15

also shows that activism can increase the probability of CEO turnover (e.g., Parrino, Sias
and Starks (2003), Gopalan (2008), Gallagher, Gardner and Swan (2009), Bharath,
Jayaraman and Nagar (2013), Qian (2011), Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012)). Boyson
and Mooradian (2011) find that governance-related hedge fund activism through
management turnover is associated with favorable stock market reactions. 8 Helwege,
Intintoli, and Zhang (2012) find that voting-with-their-feet techniques can lead to more
forced CEO turnovers. In contrast, Black (1990) and Roe (1994) show that activists can be
unsuccessful in removing entrenched managers.
As discussed in the introduction, the banking industry is one place where the goal
of maximizing shareholder value may not be socially optimal. Here a single firm’s
maximization may spill negative externality to the financial system. There are no studies
which focus on assessing how shareholder activism affects banks and bank stakeholders.
Two papers related to banking, although not focusing on banking, are Li and Xu (2010)
and Sunder, Sunder, and Wongsunwai, (2014) which both focus on nonfinancial firms’
hedge fund activism and effects on target firms’ bank loan contract terms. Li and Xu (2010)
document tighter bank contract terms for the firms after targeting and Sunder, Sunder, and
Wongsunwai, (2014) document that loan spreads increase when activism relies on the
market for corporate control, while loan spreads decrease when agency problems are
addressed.
Our paper is also related to the literature on bank governance and its effects on
performance and risk. First, there are papers that look at the effects of bank governance on

8

Also, several papers (Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Kaplan and Minton
(1994) and Conyon and Florou (2002)) find that the presence of a large shareholder is associated with
management turnover.
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performance. Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007) find that larger cash flow rights by the
controlling owners and stronger shareholder protection leads to higher bank valuation.
Other papers find that board size is positively associated with valuation (Adams and
Mehran (2002, 2003, 2005), Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007), Belkhir (2009)). Second,
there are papers that look at the effects of bank governance on bank risk-taking. Saunders,
Strock, and Travlos (1990) find that shareholder-controlled banks take higher risk than
banks controlled by managers. Also, Laeven and Levine (2009) find that banks with
controlling shareholders are characterized by higher risk-taking and that different aspects
of regulation (e.g., FDIC deposit insurance, capital regulation, and restrictions on
nonlending activies of banks) may induce owners to select a riskier investment portfolio to
compensate for the loss of utility from costly regulatory requirements. Other researchers
find that stock-option-based executive compensation is associated with higher risk taking
(Mehran and Rosenberg (2009), DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2012)). Opposing this, Pathan
(2009) finds that more independent boards, and thus more monitoring of managers, may
reduce risk-taking.
Finally, there are papers that look at the role of bank governance around financial
crises. There are opposing views on whether poor bank governance was a significant
contributing factor to the recent financial crisis. Several papers find that governance was
important. Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2014) find that high shareholdings of lowerlevel management increased banks’ default risk significantly. Diamond and Rajan (2009)
suggest that traders and executives of banks had incentives to take risks that were not in
the best interest of the shareholders, suggesting failure of governance. Kirkpatrick (2009)
suggests that weak governance of banks lead to inadequate risk management, especially
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insufficient risk monitoring through the board, a factor that contributed significantly to the
financial instability during the crisis. Cheffin (2014) suggests that the persistence of the
imperial CEOs in the financial services industry to whom boards would give more and
more freedom plausibly contributed to the market turmoil of 2008. Other papers find that
the governance was not to blame. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that banks with more
shareholder-friendly board structures performed significantly worse during the crises than
other banks and had higher stability risk. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) document that
banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash
bonuses for CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. They suggest that CEOs and
senior executives cannot be blamed for the crisis or poor bank performance during the
crisis, as they could not have foreseen the extremely high risks in some of their bank
investment and trading strategies.
However, there is no study in the literature focusing on how activist shareholders
interact with bank managers and creditors to shape the behavior of banks during normal
times and financial crises. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature.
2.3 Hypotheses Development
Our hypotheses examine the effects of activism on bank behavior: market value, operating
returns, and bank risk. We consider three conflicts arising among bank stakeholders and
which may be addressed by shareholder activism. These correspond to our hypotheses are
shown in Table 2.1 Panel A.
The first conflict is the Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1 (shown in Figure 1,
Column 1). It suggests that managers may be inherently risk-averse as they would like to
preserve or increase their career security and private benefits of controls, so they may take
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less risk than desired by the shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Smith (1985), Hirshleifer and
Thakor (1992)). 9 Even if the managers are risk-neutral, shareholders may wish them to
take more risks than managers to take advantage of the creditors, particularly the deposit
insurer and taxpayers, because they are not charged for the risk and can take the value of
the put option from FDIC. Some researchers also find that the agency problem between
shareholders and managers distorts investment and managers may pursue a “quiet life” to
preserve resources for private benefits, so they may avoid expanding into a profitable new
line of products (underinvestment) or getting rid of unprofitable divisions, both cases
leading to suboptimal investment (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Boot (1992)).10
According to this conflict, activists can curb agency problems between managers and
shareholders, and improve performance by inducing managers to perform better and take
value-enhancing risks (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983),
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen and Smith (1985), Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson
(1998)). Our first hypothesis (H1) and empirical predictions are:
Hypothesis 1 (Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1): Shareholder activism is associated with
better market value, higher operating returns, and more risk-taking by the targeted
banks.
The second conflict between bank stakeholders is the Shareholder-Manager
Conflict 2 (shown in Table 2.1, Panel A, Column 2), which may be caused by
overconfidence and/or hubris of managers (e.g., Roll (1986), Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia
9

Jensen and Smith (1985) show that managers are more likely to minimize risk, and engage in short-term
investments as well as employee growth strategies to increase their compensation and job security.

10

Underinvestment may also be pursued in banking if some of the benefits of investment may go to the bank
creditors.
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(1998), Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Li and Tang (2010)). This conflict suggests
that managers are prone to biases such as hubris, over-optimism, and overconfidence and
thus may underestimate risk and take more risk than is good for shareholders. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986, 1993) also argue that the agency problem between
shareholders and managers distorts investment and that firm insiders have the tendency to
build an empire and expropriate resources for private benefits at the cost of outsiders. Thus,
when a firm has plentiful resources for investment, insiders may overinvest. Activists may
curb agency problems between managers and shareholders, and improve performance by
correcting the over-risky investments by managers and thus reducing risk. Our second
hypothesis (H2) and empirical predictions are:
Hypothesis 2 (Shareholder-Manager Conflict 2): Shareholder activism is associated with
better market value, higher operating returns, and less risk-taking by the targeted banks.
The third conflict between bank stakeholders is the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict
(shown in Table 2.1, Panel A, Column 3). In this conflict, activists may induce bank
managers11 to take higher risk to increase market value at the expense of bank creditors
(e.g., Laeven and Levine (2009), Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2010), Prabha, Wihlborg, and
Willett (2012), Srivastav, Armitage, and Hagendorff (2013)). This is due to the difficulties
of creditors (e.g., deposit insurers, taxpayers, regulators, etc.) to monitor and discipline
banking organizations due to banks’ opaqueness and regulatory-induced incentives. First,
as noted above, banks are opaque, and as a result, creditors might not be able to obtain

11

Managers may be willing to represent shareholders’ interests if they may have a vested interest through
the managerial compensation schemes that align interests (Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman (2010), DeYoung,
Peng, and Yan (2012), Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011)).
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information to assess accurately the bank’s riskiness and monitor on-going bank activities.
Second, several aspects of bank regulation and government safety net protect bank
creditors from losses in case of bank default and may reduce their incentives and ability to
monitor banks: explicit insurance (deposit insurance put option (e.g., Merton (1977),
Karekan and Wallace (1978), Keeley (1990), Gorton and Rosen (1995)) and implicit
insurance (bank creditors expect to be bailed out in case of insolvency because the bank is
considered too-big-to-fail (TBTF), too-important-to-fail (TITF), or a wide-spread
government guarantee is expected in case that many banks face distress (e.g., Acharya and
Yorulmazer (2007, 2008), Brown and Dinc (2011), Duchin and Sosyura (2012), Black and
Hazelwood (2012)). Explicit and implicit insurance induce banks to shift default risk to
deposit insurance funds and taxpayers. 12

13

Our third hypothesis (H3) and empirical

predictions are:
Hypothesis 3 (Shareholder-Creditor Conflict): Shareholder activism is associated with
better market value and more risk-taking by the banks, but not necessarily better
operating returns.
Finally, a last conflict that may arise between bank stakeholders is the ShareholderOther Stakeholders Conflict (shown in Table 2.1, Panel A, Column 4), which may be
caused by overconfidence and/or hubris of the activists. This conflict suggests that

12

However, prudential supervision and regulation, such as capital requirements, are designed in part to offset
this moral hazard incentive.

13
Billett, Garfinkel, and O’Neal (1998) show that deposit insurance reduces the incentive of depositors and
debt holders to monitor banks and increases the incentive of other bank stakeholders to increase risk. Also,
Laeven and Levine (2009) show that deposit insurance intensifies the ability and incentives of shareholders
to increase risk and the impetus for greater risk generated by deposit insurance operates on owners, not on
bank managers.
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activists, similar to managers, can be prone to hubris and overconfidence, which make them
think that they know what is best for the company. Thus, they may induce the bank
managers to take risky decisions that end up not being good for any of the parties, including
bank managers, other shareholders, creditors, and themselves. Activists may induce overrisky investments by managers and at the same time not produce the desired returns and
they may also get out of their position quickly. Our fourth hypothesis (H4) and empirical
predictions are:
Hypothesis 4 (Activist-Other Stakeholders Conflict): Shareholder activism is associated
with worse market value, worse operating returns, and more risk-taking by the targeted
banks.
Each of the four hypotheses can hold simultaneously for different sets of banks at
a given time. We test empirically the impact of activism on bank behavior to try to
understand which of the four hypotheses (Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1, ShareholderManager Conflict 2, Shareholder-Creditor Conflict, Activist-Other Stakeholders
Conflict) empirically dominates or finds more empirical support. Results are reported in
Section 2.5. In Section 2.8, we further explore the channels that activists may use to induce
changes in the target banks.
2.4 Data, Variables and Summary Statistics
2.4.1 Data and sample
The sample consists of all public commercial banks and BHCs in the US for the period
1994:Q1 to 2010:Q4 and our data come from multiple sources.
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Our bank data is sourced from the quarterly Report of Condition and Income (Call
Report) filed by all active commercial banking institutions. Given that the majority of the
public banking organizations are holding companies, data in the Call Report are aggregated
at the bank holding company (BHC) level when the BHC has more than one commercial
bank owned, otherwise the information for the commercial bank is preserved. For
convenience, we will use the term bank to mean either type of entity. We remove bankquarter observations that have missing or incomplete financial data on basic accounting
variables such as total assets and equity. To avoid distortions in ratios that use equity as
the numerator, for all observations with total equity less than 1% of gross total assets
(GTA), 14 we replace equity with 1% of gross total assets (e.g., Berger and Bouwman,
2013). Finally, we normalize all financial variables be in real 2010:Q4 dollars using the
seasonally-adjusted GDP deflator. The resulting sample is then intersected with CRSP and
Compustat using the CRSP-FRB link of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Activist filings (SEC Schedule 13D and DFAN14A) are retrieved by manual
collection from the SEC EDGAR database for the period 1994:Q115 to 2010:Q4 following
a procedure similar to that described in Greenwood and Schor (2009). We restrict our
searches to public US commercial banks and BHCs in the CRSP-FRB file of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.16 Schedule 13D of the SEC requires that investors file within

14

Gross total assets (GTA) equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated
transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). Total assets on Call Reports deduct these two
reserves, which are held to cover potential credit losses. We add these reserves back to measure the full value
of the assets financed.

15
The sample starts in 1994 because the shareholder activism data becomes available online in SEC EDGAR
in 1994.
16

We also performed searches using all SIC Codes relevant for commercial banks 6021, 6022, 6029, 6035,
and 6036 and this gives a higher number of total filings, however a large number of them cannot be ultimately
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10 days of acquiring more than 5% of a voting class of a publicly traded company’s equity
securities. 13D documents the size of the share purchase and the investors’ intentions.17 In
addition, we also include any material amendments in the investor’s purposes from the
initial Schedule 13D reported in Schedule 13D/A. 13D can also be filed for crossholdings
formed when two firms merge or form business alliances (Greenwood and Schor (2009)).
To deal with this problem, we manually screen for such events and/or cross-reference our
initial sample of 13D filings with 13F holding reports (Thompson Institutional database)
and get the activist filings. To the sample of 13Ds and amendments on 13Ds are added the
definitive proxy statements filed by non-management (DFAN14A) as literature suggests
these are another important form of activism (e.g., Dod and Warner (1983), Pound (1988),
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989), Mulherin and Poulsen (1998)). These statements are filed
with the SEC by investors who intend to or are involved in a proxy fight with a company’s
management. Form DFAN14A is defined as “Additional definitive proxy soliciting
materials filed by non-management”,18 and is filed ahead of the annual shareholder meeting
when soliciting shareholder votes. A proxy contest may be initiated with less than a 5%
stake in the target companies’ shares. Activist investors can use the proxy statements as a
tactical instrument to achieve objectives often specified previously in their Schedule 13D.
To be comprehensive, we include both 13D and DFAN14A filings.19 We obtain 3,142 13D

matched to the Call Report, CRSP, and Compustat intersection as they are not covered in at least one of these
databases.
17

See http://www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm

18

http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/forms/edgform.pdf; http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-155.htm.

19

To mitigate the concern that at some very large firms, some investors could have engaged in activism with
a less than 5% stake in the company and these events were not accompanied by Schedule 13D & 13D/A or
DFAN 14A filings, we also collect information about such events through news searches in LexisNexis for
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filings and 369 DFAN14A filings, for a total of 3,511 filings. We discard 1,693 filings that
refer to one of the following situations: filings by a parent holding company that assists
with financing or restructuring or other internal strategies, bank mergers not associated
with activism, or filings by corporate insiders (e.g., CEO, CFO, etc.), which are not true
activist filings. This results in a final sample of 1,818 filings for the period 1994:Q1 to
2010:Q4.
After reading the “purpose of transaction” section of the 13D reports to understand
whether the filer is pursuing an activist strategy, we take out 614 filings with no Item 4 or
passive investment only (where filer says the purchase was only for investment, with no
intention to engage in any form of activism, or if the filing has no Item 4: Purpose of
Transaction). Our final sample of material activist events consists of 1,204 events
corresponding to 337 unique banking organizations which we use in our empirical analysis.
We create the variable ACTIVISM as a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if there
is shareholder activism targeting the bank during a quarter.
We also use data from several other sources for additional control variables: FDIC
Summary of Deposits, Federal Housing Finance Agency website, St. Louis Federal
Reserve website, Thompson Institutional dataset, I/B/E/S, SEC DEF 14A and 10K filings,
and LexisNexis news articles. We end up with a final sample of 27,731 bank-quarter
observations and 1002 unique banking organizations. All bank-specific variables, other
than activism or internal governance, are constructed using the Call Report / Summary of
Deposits for US commercial banks and the WRDS database (including CRSP,
COMPUSTAT, Thomson Institutional Data, I/B/E/S).

our top largest 100 banks in each time period. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these and are discussed
in detail in Section 2.6.3.4 and Appendix B.
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2.4.2. Empirical methodology
To investigate determinants of activism in banking, we use a probit model for targeting as
in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008).

ACTIVISM it = ϕ 0 + ϕ1Controlit − k + Timet + ω it

(2.1)

Where ACTIVISMit is the dependent variable and represents a dummy variable equal to one
if the bank-quarter observation corresponds to a bank i being targeted by an activist
investor during quarter t. Controlit-k is a vector of controls of bank i during quarter t-k, Timet
represents time fixed effects, and ωit is an error term. Standard errors are clustered by the
bank. For controls, we use a broad set of bank characteristics that were previously used
also in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008) in the shareholder activism literature
complemented with other bank-specific variables from the banking literature. For all
independent variables, we retain k=4 to capture 4-quarter effects as in Brav, Jiang, Thomas,
and Partnoy (2008).
To investigate whether activism has a significant impact on bank market value,
operating returns, and risk, we estimate several versions of the following econometric
model:

Yit = β0 + β1ACTIVISMit−k + β2Bank Characteristicit−k +Timet + Banki +εit

(2.2)

where Yit is the dependent variable of interest for bank i during quarter t, ACTIVISMit-k is
shareholder activism dummy for bank i during quarter t-k, Bank Chracteristicit-k is a vector
of controls of bank i during quarter t-k, Timet represents time fixed effects, Banki represents
bank fixed effects, and εit is an error term. The main dependent variables (Yit) are: market
value proxied by TOBIN’s Q – defined as market value of common stock over equity book
value), operating returns proxied by ROA (defined as the ratio of annualized net income to
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GTA), default risk proxied by bank Z-SCORE – calculated as the sum of a bank’s ROA and
Capitalization Ratio (equity capital over GTA) divided by Std_ROA (the volatility of
ROA).20 For all independent variables, we retain k=4 in our analysis and robustness tests
to capture 4-quarter effects.
For controls, we use a set of bank characteristics following prior research on bank
governance and shareholder activism (e.g. Beltratti and Stutz (2012), Brav, Jiang, Thomas,
and Partnoy (2008)). We control for BANK SIZE (the log of GTA), BANK AGE (age in
years of the oldest bank in the BHC), DEPOSITS/GTA (ratio of deposits to GTA),
LOANS/GTA (ratio of loans to GTA), INCOME DIVERSITY (following Laeven and Levine
(2007), constructed as 1 – ((Net Interest Income – Other Operating Income) / Total
Operating Income), OVERHEAD_COSTS (a proxy of the bank’s cost structure determined
as the ratio of overhead expenses to assets as in Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2011)),
FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP (a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is foreign owned) and regulatory
environment. The regulatory environment is an important determinant of bank risk-taking
and individual bank behavior mentioned in the banking literature (e.g., Buch and DeLong
(2007), Laeven and Levine (2009), Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2014) and
Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2014)). We control for the bank’s primary federal
regulator, by including: FRS, OCC, and FDIC dummies if the bank’s primary federal
regulator is the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, respectively. In the regressions, we omit

20

Many researchers use the Z-SCORE as defined here as a measure of bank risk (e.g., Laeven and Levine
(2009), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010), Duchin and Sosyura (2013),
Ongena, Popov, and Udell (2013)).

27

the FRS dummy to avoid perfect collinearity. Our main models are OLS regressions with
bank and time fixed effects.21
2.5 Empirical Results
In this section, we analyze empirically the importance of shareholder activism in banking,
activist objectives, and effects on individual bank behavior (market value, operating
returns, and risk).
2.5.1 Prevalence of activism in banking and determinants
How important is activism in banking? In Table 2.2 Panel A, we find that about one third
of the banks (337 unique banks) in the sample have some form of shareholder activism at
some time during the sample period 1994-2010 and about 8.5% banks have events during
each year. 22 Activism tends to surge during crises periods (2000:Q2-2002:Q3 and
2007:Q3-2009:Q4).23,24 The documented prevalence of activism makes the study of the
effects of activism worthwhile and each of the four hypotheses described in Section 2.3
could hold, however only an empirical analysis of the effects can assess which of them
empirically dominates.

21

We do not control for bank risk because it is an endogenous variable.

22

One fifth of the total 13D filings for banks are non-material events, that is, the filer does not specify a
particular objective or future plans to engage in activism. This latter percentage is slightly smaller than the
results reported in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008), Greenwood and Schor (2009), and Boyson and
Mooradian (2011), for hedge fund activism for non-financials. In their cases, approximately one half of the
activism events, hedge funds do not state specific objectives.
23

These periods were identified as financial crises in Berger and Bouwman (2013).
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The surge in activism during crises may be due to general discontent of investors when all firms in the
market are not doing well. This is consistent also with investors asking for CEO turnover during crises when
performance is lower (e.g., Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012)). For example, when Bank of America’s
share price declined dramatically by 85% during 2008-2009, shareholders blamed Ken Lewis, the CEO and
Chairman, for the decline.
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We also analyze what type of banks are targeted by activists. Table 2.3 reports
results for the probit regressions predicting shareholder activism targeting. Our first model
shown in column (1) includes target characteristics as in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy
(2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010): BANK SIZE, TOBIN’s Q, GROWTH (bank asset
growth), ROA (defined as the ratio of annualized net income to GTA), CAPITALIZATION
RATIO (equity capital over GTA), DIVYLD (dividend yield or the ratio of common
dividend over market value of common stocks), INST OWNERSHIP (percentage of
institutional ownership), trading illiquidity, AMIHUD (calculated as 1000 multiplied by
the square root of the absolute value of market return over the dollar trading value), and
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS (number of analysts covering the entity).25 Column (3) reports
the results when including additional bank specific characteristics: BANK AGE,
BRANCHES / GTA (ratio of branches over GTA), NO_STATES (the log of the number of
states in which the bank has branches), METROPOLITAN (number of metropolitan
markets as a fraction of all markets in which the bank is active), DEPOSITS / GTA, LOANS
/ GTA, CASH_HOLDINGS (ratio of cash holding over GTA), NPL RATIO (the ratio of
bank

nonperforming

loans

to

total

loans),

INCOME

DIVERSITY,

FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP, HHI DEPOSITS (Herfindahl-Hirschman deposits index, a
proxy for the local market concentration), primary regulator dummies, and INCORP_DE

25

Since NUMBER OF ANALYSTS, defined as the number of analysts covering the company from IBES as
in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008), is available for less than two thirds of our sample banks, the
multivariate regression with NUMBER OF ANALYSTS is reported separately in column (2).
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(a dummy equal to 1 if the bank is incorporated in Delaware). 26 , 27 In all models,
independent variables are lagged 4 quarters and models include time fixed effects as in
Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008). In addition, standard errors are clustered by the
bank.
Table 2.3 reveals several interesting results. First, we find that activists tend to
target value banks, banks with low profitability and growth potential: smaller size
(consistent with results for non-financials in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008),
Klein and Zur (2009), Greenwood and Schor (2009), Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy
(2008), Clifford (2008), and Mietzner and Schweizer (2008)), lower TOBIN’s Q and lower
ROA, consistent with Gillian and Starks (2007), low NO_STATES, indicating that they
operate in fewer states, which gives them opportunities to grow more geographically.
Second, we find that activists target banks with more agency problems: banks with more
CASH HOLDINGS, but paying fewer dividends (DIVYLD), symptoms of the agency
problem of free cash flow according to Jensen (1986) and Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and
Partnoy (2008), and banks with more complex organizational structures, that is, with more
branches per dollar of assets (BRANCHES/GTA, ratio of branches over GTA). Finally, we
find that activists seem to target banks in which it is easier to implement changes: having
higher institutional ownership (INST OWNERSHIP) and analyst coverage (NUMBER OF
ANALYSTS), allowing them to get more allies and information to implement changes, and
with higher trading liquidity (indicated by the negative coefficient on AMIHUD, a direct

26

Delaware is known to have less antitakeover provisions which makes firms more likely to become a
takeover target (e.g., Daines (2001).
27

We also tried to run a model which considers regulatory enforcement actions taken by FDIC, FED, and
OCC regulators against banks (data on enforcement actions is limited to 2005-2010), however it could not
be run as there are too few enforcement actions for these publicly listed institutions for the period.
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measure of trading illiquidity with lower values meaning more liquidity) making it easier
for activists to accumulate a high share in a bank in a short period of time without incurring
adverse price changes.28, 29 Finally, targets tend to have fewer deposits and more loans. A
lower reliance on deposits for funding means that banks use more money-market funding,
so that shareholders may have more information about them. The fact that activists target
banks with more loans is consistent with the view that activists may target banks with a
smaller portfolio of securities, and which are less subject to market credit spreads (Beltratti
and Stutz (2012)). The other variables are not statistically significant, suggesting that they
are not important determinants for activism in banking.
Overall, results seem to indicate that activists target banks with more agency
problems and growth potential, which could be easily turned around to increase shareholder
returns.
2.5.2 Activists’ objectives and tactics
What is the nature of activists’ demands in banking? Panel B of Table 2.2 summarizes the
stated objectives that activists provide when they announce their intent to intervene (19942010). The panel classifies the demands into the following seven categories following prior
literature (e.g., Greenwood and Scor (2009)): ENGAGE MANAGEMENT, CAPITAL
STRUCTURE, INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ASSET SALE (STRATEGIC),

28

Results are consistent with Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008) and Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele
(2009), and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) who find that liquid stocks (above median) have a 50% higher
likelihood to be targeted by activists. In addition, it is consistent with the theoretical model of Maug (1998),
in which “liquidity mitigates the free-rider problem in costly monitoring of managers because activist
blockholders can compensate for their monitoring costs through the increased trading profits due to high
liquidity.”
29

It is to be noted that the coefficient on AMIHUD becomes insignificant when included together with
ANALYST due to its collinearity with this latter variable as noted also in Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010).
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STRATEGIC CHANGES, LITIGATION/BANKRUPTCY and PROXY FIGHT. The
categories are not mutually exclusive, so an event can sometimes fall into multiple
categories.
First, ENGAGE MANAGEMENT represents 36.5% of all activist events. This is
the lightest form of shareholder activism and includes events in which the activists try to
help the managers maximize shareholder value by discussions with management and
making suggestions for improvements. They can send letters, phone bank management or
have face-to-face meetings, request company documents or make a general statement that
shares are “undervalued” and might engage in future discussions / meet management etc.
Second, STRATEGIC CHANGES are 35.1% of all events. These include a wide variety of
strategies targeted by activists such as changes in business strategy (operational efficiency,
growth and cost strategies and business line restructuring), M&A, sale of the target
company to a third party, hire an investment bank to explore strategic alternatives, offer to
acquire the company, block a merger and request a higher price, sell the company, etc.
Third, INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE represents 28.1% of all events.
It can include election of activist-selected directors, firing a company officer or board
member, challenging board independence and fair representation, board or executive
compensation issues, a call to declassify the board, remove a poison pill, or question
potential corporate fraud. Fourth, CAPITAL STRUCTURE represents 13.9% of all events.
It includes activism targeting firm’s payout policy and capital structure. This category
includes events in which the activist proposes changes oriented towards the reduction of
excess cash, an increase in firm leverage, or higher payouts to shareholders. This group of
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events also involves issuance of securities by the target banks such as modifying seasoned
equity offerings or proposing debt restructuring.
Fifth, PROXY FIGHT represents 11.6% of all events. It refers to situations in which
the activist solicits proxies from shareholders to elect proposed directors or to adopt a
shareholder proposal. Sixth, ASSET SALE (STRATEGIC) represents 6.5% of all events.
These refer to cases in which activists express their discontent by selling their entire
position in the company. This is consistent with the literature for nonfinancials where some
researchers document that activist investors will sell their stock to cut losses (e.g.,
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2010), Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012)) and their
exit can serve as a governance mechanism (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009),
Edmans and Manso (2011)). Finally, LITIGATION / BANKRUPTCY represents 2.6% of all
events. It involves situations in which the activist files a lawsuit, the target is in bankruptcy,
and/or the activist offers to help with financing and other restructuring options.30 31
2.5.3 Effects of activism
Table 2.4 reports results from regressing measures of market performance (TOBIN’s Q),
operating returns (ROA), and risk (Z-SCORE), on shareholder activism (ACTIVISM). As
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Using a sample of hedge fund activism for non-financials, Greenwood and Schor (2009) report the
objectives of their activists as follows: about a half (45.5%) of the hedge fund activism events include
comments about target being “undervalued” and engage management to improve the value of the firm.
Further, activism agendas related to capital structure, asset sales, and internal corporate governance represent
11.5, 18.1, and 21.9 percent of their full sample, respectively. Our results are qualitatively similar as
composition to Greenwood and Schor (2009).
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In a separate test, reported in Appendix B, we break down our ACTIVISM measure into these seven
different demands that activists declare to try to understand which of these are most important to explain our
results. We find that all channels have an impact on bank behavior, except for ENGAGE MANAGEMENT,
and PROXY FIGHT contributes to the highest increase in bank risk.
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discussed in Section 2.4.2, we use ordinary least square (OLS) models with time and bank
fixed effects.
Column (1) analyzes whether activism creates value for shareholders by using
TOBIN’s Q as a dependent variable. We find that banks with activism experience positive
and significant increases in market value. Activism may be perceived by the market as a
positive signal since activists are expected to provide more monitoring that will curb
agency problems and costs (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)), and thus improve bank
performance.
Column (2) uses ROA as a measure of operating returns. The coefficient estimate
indicates that activism has little impact on the operating profitability of the targets,
consistent with results in Klein and Zur (2009). The difference in sign between Tobin’s Q
and ROA can be due to Tobin’s Q incorporating market-based information and being more
forward-looking than ROA, while ROA may take longer to manifest a positive effect.
Another possibility is that these banks may have a higher market value in the event of
failure because of the prospect of being bailed out.
Column (3) presents results for the risk-taking of banks as a result of activism by
using Z-SCORE as a dependent variable. A larger value for the Z-SCORE indicates less
risk and greater overall bank stability (e.g., Boyd and Runkle (1993), Berger, Klapper, and
Turk-Ariss (2009), Laeven and Levine (2009), Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010),
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Beltratti and Stulz (2012)). We find that activism is
associated with a lower Z-SCORE, and thus, a higher default risk after intervention.32

32

In unreported results, we decompose the Z-SCORE into its subcomponents and we find that the increase in
risk is primarily due to both a decline in the bank capitalization ratio and an increase in the standard deviation
of ROA.
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Looking together at the results for market value, operating returns, and risk, we can
conclude that activism creates market value for shareholders, has little impact on operating
returns, and increases bank risk (lower Z-score). Although all hypotheses may hold to some
degree, our results are most consistent with the empirical dominance of the Hypothesis H3,
the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. This suggests that activists may induce management
to increase risk in order to increase shareholder returns at the expense of bank creditors
(regulators, taxpayers, deposit insurers, depositors etc.) given the difficulty of creditors in
monitoring and regulatory-induced incentives. This shows that activism may be a
destabilizing force, at odds with financial stability.
2.6 Robustness Checks
2.6.1 Alternative measures
We test whether our results are robust to using alternative measures of market value,
operating performance, risk, and activism. In Table 2.45 Panel A, we examine whether our
results for effects of activism on performance are robust to using alternative measures of
market performance: buy and hold return (BUY-AND-HOLD_RET), buy and hold
abnormal return (BUY-AND-HOLD_AB_RET), and SHARPE_RATIO (columns 2-4), while
column 1 repeats the main effect. In each of the estimations (columns 2-4), we find that the
coefficient on the ACTIVISM variable is statistically significant at the 10% level or better.
We thus continue to find consistent evidence of an increase in market performance
associated with activism.
Table 2.5 Panel B column 2 reports the estimation results when using an alternative
measure of operating returns on ACTIVISM, namely return on equity (ROE). We find that
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results are qualitatively similar to our main model (which is repeated in column 1 for
comparison).
In Table 2.5 Panel C, we examine whether our main results continue to hold when
we consider alternative measures of bank risk-taking. We first analyze the sensitivity of
our results to VOLATILITY_STOCK_RET, the volatility of daily returns for each calendar
year in column 2. Second, we use as a measure of risk, the LLA RATIO, or the ratio of loan
loss allowance over GTA, in column 3. Third, we use as a measure of risk, the NPL Ratio,
the bank-level ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans in column 4. Finally, in model 5,
we show the estimation results when using as a dependent variable VOLATILITY ROA,
determined as the standard deviation of ROA over the previous 4 quarters, where ROA is
annualized net income as a percentage of GTA. All regressions include time and bank fixed
effects. In each of the estimations, we find that the coefficient on the ACTIVISM variable
is statistically significant at the 5% level or better. We thus continue to find consistent
evidence of an increase in bank risk associated with activism.
In Table 2.5 Panel D, we consider an alternative measure of ACTIVISM –
NO_ACTIVISM_EVENTS – the number of activist events that a banks has during a quarter
as per 13D and DFAN14A filings. Results using this measure are qualitatively similar to
main findings.
2.6.2 Alternative econometric specifications
In this subsection, we check the sensitivity of the results to the use of alternative
econometric specifications.
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For market performance (Table 2.6, Panel A1-A2), we conduct both daily and
monthly event studies reporting the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and using a
value weighted index.
In Panel A1, we conduct a daily event study using several event windows. The
returns are on average 1.42% for (0, 1) days, 1.79% for (-1, 1) days, 2.26% for (-2, 2) days,
2.89% for (-5, 5) days, indicating that the market reacts positively to the activism events.
In Panel A2, we conduct a monthly event study using several event windows. We
find positive and significant CARs for all periods, with the highest returns being achieved
by investors for longer time windows up to 3 years: That is, returns are on average 4.22%
for (0, 3) months, 4.88% for (0, 6) months, 6.77% for (0, 12) months, 8.93% for (0, 24)
months and 13.11% for (0, 36) months. Returns are also positive and significant for the (1, 12) months window. Overall, our results in this event study confirm that shareholder
activism creates value for shareholders.
Panels B and C of Table 2.6 report results from alternative econometric
specifications for operating returns, and bank risk. Column (2) of each these panels reports
the results when using a simple OLS model without time and bank fixed effects. Column
(3) reports results when using a specification with time fixed effects only. Column (4)
reports results when using a bank random effects model. Column (5) uses regression
specifications with Newey-West (1987) standard errors and time fixed effects to control
for residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Column (6) implements two-way
clustering models by firm and time as suggested in Thompson (2006) and Cameron,
Gelbach and Miller (2006). These models allows for correlations among different banks in
the same quarter and different quarters in the same bank, for example, and calculates
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standard errors that account for two dimensions of within-cluster correlation. The results
in all models of Table 2.6, Panels B, and C, using ACTIVISM as a dependent variable,
confirm our earlier evidence. More specifically, we find that ACTIVISM leads to higher
market value, unchanged operating returns, and more risk.33
2.6.3 Endogeneity
In this subsection, we carry out several tests to address the problem of potential
endogeneity of our ACTIVISM variable, which could bias our findings. For example, it may
be possible that activism and the bank key outcomes (market value, operating returns, and
risk) may be simultaneously driven by certain unobservable bank-level characteristics.
Also, our key independent variable (ACTIVISM) could be improperly measured due to
difficulty to observe and/or quantify its magnitude. Finally, there might be a potential
causal link from our outcome variables for market value, operating performance, and bank
risk, to ACTIVISM, as bank market value, operating performance, and risk, may affect
ACTIVISM involvement. In the main analysis, we attempt to alleviate some of these
concerns by lagging the ACTIVISM variable. To more directly address the endogeneity
concerns, we perform several sets of tests discussed below.34
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In unreported results, to address the potential concern that time fixed effects may not capture the full impact
of macroeconomic variables during our sample period, we also try models that include the percentage change
in national GDP growth, percentage change in the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) real estate index,
and interest rate spread instead of time fixed effects. The results confirm our prior findings.
34

In addition to the tests discussed in this section, to alleviate the concern about potential endogeneity
stemming from potentially omitted correlated variables, we also try saturating the main regressions with a lot
more bank level controls, including several other corporate governance mechanisms, and results are
consistent. These results are presented in detail in the online Appendix B.
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2.6.3.1 Instrumental variables analysis
It is possible that the endogeneity may be the result of reverse causality that runs from bank
behavior for market value, operating performance, and bank risk to activism. For example,
banks with a poor performance and a higher risk, might be more likely to be targeted by
activists and this bias may invalidate the interpretation of the coefficient on ACTIVISM.
We use instrumental variable techniques (two-stage least squares (2SLS)) to extract the
exogenous component of bank activism in assessing the influence of activism on market
value, operating performance, and bank risk. We use as an instrument, % BUSY
ACTIVISTS, the percentage of busy activists in the financial services industry (SIC codes
between 6000 and 6999) based on number of activist campaigns (13D filings) and proxy
fights (DFAN 14A filings). Busy activists are those with five or more campaigns and/or 2
or more proxy fights at the same time and are likely to generate more activism.35 The results
of the IV regressions are reported in Panel A of Table 2.7. The first-stage regression
indicates that our instrumental variable is positively and significantly related to activism.
We perform two tests to check the suitability of the selected instrument. First, we conduct
the Kleibergen-Paap under-identification test to evaluate the rank condition. We find that
the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level (rk LM = 544.718
with a p-value less than 0.001), indicating that the model is well identified. Second, using
an instrument that is weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable can lead
to large inconsistencies in the coefficient estimates. To examine the relevance of our IV,
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In unreported results, we also tried tests with three instruments: % BUSY ACTIVISTS, AMIHUD, the
Amihud (2002)’s measure of illiquidity since liquid stocks were found by Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) to be
more likely to be targeted by activists, and % ACTIVISM OF OTHERS (N-1), the average level of activism
for the other (N-1) banks in the industry following the logic in Laeven and Levine (2009) for cash flow and
we obtain consistent results.

39

we conduct an F-test of the excluded exogenous variable in the first stage regression, in
which the null hypothesis is that the instrument does not explain the variation in the
ACTIVISM. We reject this null hypothesis at the 1% level (F = 3605.728 with a p-value
less than 0.001). The IV second stage regression estimates indicate that ACTIVISM is
associated with better market performance, little impact on operating returns, and higher
risk, consistent with our earlier evidence.
2.6.3.2 Propensity score matching (PSM) analysis
Another potential concern with our results is that perceived market value, operating
performance, and bank risk differentials between banks targeted by activists and those that
are not targeted may spuriously reflect bank characteristics rather than activism
characteristics. To control for this, we use the propensity score matching (PSM) analysis.
PSM models match observations based on the probability of undergoing the treatment,
which in our case is the probability of being targeted by activists.
In our case, PSM estimates the effect of activism on a bank’s market value,
operating performance, and risk, by comparing the bank’s current behavior with the
behavior that the bank would have observed if activists had not targeted it. This quasiexperiment is conducted by matching each targeted bank with a non-targeted bank sharing
similar characteristics as indicated by their propensity scores. To estimate a bank’s
propensity score (or probability of being targeted), we use a probit model in which the
dependent variable is a dichotomous activism measure that takes a value of 1 if the bank
has activism and 0 otherwise and the independent variables are all bank characteristics
from the main specification and year fixed effects. We use a nearest-neighbor matching
with n=5 with replacement, which matches each targeted bank with, respectively, the 5
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banks with the closest propensity scores.36,37 Regression results are reported in Table 2.7
Panel B and are qualitatively similar to the main models, with the only exception being that
the coefficient of activism in the ROA equation is negative and significant.
2.6.3.3 Heckman selection model
Another potential concern with our results is that perceived risk differential found may
reflect selection bias. For example, our results may reflect differences in bank
characteristics between those targeted by activists and those not targeted rather than the
impact of activism per se on market value, operating performance, default risk, and
leverage risk. We address this issue by using Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure to
control for selection bias induced by banks being targeted by activists by incorporating the
activism decision into the econometric estimation. In the first step, we determine whether
the bank has activism using a probit estimation. The dependent variable in the first step is
our ACTIVISM dummy. The explanatory variables are the instrumental variable used in the
IV estimation and all control variables from our main specification. In the second stage,
the TOBIN’s Q, ROA, and Z-SCORE are the dependent variables and we include all the
variables from the main regressions, the activism variable, and the self-selection parameter
(lambda or inverse Mills’ ratio).
The results are reported in Panel C of Table 2.7. While controlling for potential
self-selection bias, the results of the two-step estimation model continue to confirm that
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In unreported tests, we compare the means of the bank characteristics used in the selection models across
the samples of targeted banks and other banks to assess the effectiveness of our propensity matching
procedure. Reassuringly, the distributions of the bank characteristics are statistically indistinguishable at
conventional levels.
37

In unreported results, we also do a nearest-neighbor matching with n=10 and obtain consistent results.
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ACTIVISM is associated with better market performance, little impact on operating returns,
and higher risk. In the selection equation, the instrumental variable is positively related to
ACTIVISM. In the outcome equation, the ACTIVISM variable enters significantly positively
on TOBIN’s Q and negatively on ROA, and Z-SCORE, consistent with our prior results.
2.6.3.4 Including Lexis Nexis News
Given the amount of capital that is needed to acquire a 5% stake in a large-cap company,
we worry that the previously collected filings may bias the sample toward smaller targets.
At very large firms, some pension funds may engage in activism with a less than 5% stake
in the company. To incorporate activism events that were not accompanied by Schedule
13D or DFAN 14A, we collect information about such events through news searches in
LexisNexis for our top 100 banks in each time period in terms of total assets using a general
search with the company current name and any previous names (where information is
available) and any and various combinations of the following keywords: “activism” or
“activist investor” or “dissident investor” or “activist shareholder” or “group of concerned
shareholders” or “shareholder activism” or “hedge fund activist” or “hedge fund activism”
or “institutional activism” or “activist campaign” or “investor campaign.” This generates
96 events, the majority (~85%) of which, has a pension fund as an activist.38 We add these
new events to our sample and incorporate them in our ACTIVISM variable and re-estimate
our results to understand whether our results may be impacted by these investors with stake
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We impose no limitation to the percentage of shares owned as many times this information is not available
in the LexisNexis news. In few cases, we are able to retrieve the ownership from the DEF 14A report when
the shareholder appears in the Shareholder Proposals section and for those cases the share ownership is small,
many times < 1%.

42

less than 5% that may behave as activists. The results are robust to these tests and are
presented in detail in Appendix B.
2.7 Effects of Activism: Subsample Analyses
2.7.1 Hedge fund (HF) or not
Not all activists may be alike. Some may be more aggressive such as hedge funds compared
to mutual funds, pension funds, individuals, or other types of shareholders. Hedge funds
might have the pressure to deliver short-term results via asset sales and increased cash
payouts, while other minority investors may be more interested in long-term results.
To differentiate between hedge fund activists and other types of investors, we use
a list of commonly known hedge funds in Bloomberg Markets Magazine39 and Wikipedia
to identify hedge fund activists among the filers in the 13D and DFAN14A material events.
We then complement the list with manual searches on Google and fund internet website to
understand if the filer is a hedge fund or not.40
We

break

down

the

ACTIVISM

dummy

into

HF_ACTIVIST

and

NON_HF_ACTIVIST to take into account the two types of activists (Table 2.8 Panel A).
We conduct a test for the equality of the coefficients (HF_ACTIVIST and
NON_HF_ACTIVIST). The regression results reveal that HFs tend to improve the bank
market value more when looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, however the t-test
reveals that the difference is not statistically significant. When looking at the earnings
(ROA), it appears that HFs do not significantly impact ROA, while the non-HF investors

39
http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/rJWUURETpDOE,http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/rEpa5X
EFo000, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_hedge_funds#Other_notable_hedge_fund_companies.
40

We recognize that this search process may be imperfect, but we are confident that almost all (if not all)
activists that are hedge funds are classified adequately.
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tend to negatively impact ROA. In regards to risk-taking, both HF and non-HF investors
are driving the bank to take on more risk, but hedge funds tend to lead to a higher bank
risk. Results are consistent with the main analysis and suggest that HF activists may have
a more positive influence on banks’ changes compared to non-HF investors, though the
increase in risk remains a potential concern.
2.7.2 13D versus DFAN 14A
We next break down the ACTIVISM dummy into DFAN14A, a more aggressive activism
form, and 13D filings, to take that into account whether aggressiveness of filings makes a
difference for our findings. The results in Table 2.8 Panel B show that our main results
continue to hold for the two types. However, the coefficient for DFAN14A is larger for the
default risk.
2.7.3 Excluding TBTF banks
Next, we exclude too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks from our sample (Table 2.8 Panel C) to
understand whether our results may be caused by the banks that are too big to fail. We
define TBTF as a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 in all quarters when the banks
has GTA greater or equal to $100 billion, which were subject to the stress tests (SCAP) in
2009.41 We find that our results are not driven by TBTF banks.
2.7.4 Bank size
We further re-estimate our main regressions by bank size to understand whether results are
dominated by a particular size class. Table 2.8 Panel D reports effects of activism by bank
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This definition of too-big-to-fail is also used in Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010).
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size: SMALL, MEDIUM and LARGE. SMALL represents banks with GTA up to $1 billion,
MEDIUM represents banks with GTA exceeding $1 billion and up to $5 billion, and
LARGE represents banks with GTA exceeding $5 billion. The regression results indicate
that results only hold strongly for the small banks, suggesting that activists have a lesser
influence on the larger banks. However, we find that activists do increase the market value
of large banks, without affecting their operation or risk.
2.7.5 Activism effects during financial crises
We also study whether effects of activism may be different during financial crises. Under
normal circumstances, banks may take more risk as a result of activism. However, during
financial crises, banks already have been taking a lot of risk and are under more heightened
scrutiny by regulators, so that it may be harder for activists to get them to take more risk,
so these risk-taking incentives are muted. Alternatively, consistent with a limited liability
effect, in the presence of financial distress (high bank leverage or capital) and low
demandable deposits (Calomiris and Kahn (1991)) during crises, there may be an increase
in moral hazard and adverse selection problems for banks and activists can take advantage
of it and induce bank managers to take risky decisions in an attempt to “gamble for
resurrection”.
We re-estimate our regressions to take into account the financial crises and
understand whether the effects may be different during financial crises versus normal
times. For testing this, we use the following modified model:
....

Yit = γ 0 + γ 1 ACTIVISM it − k + γ 2 ACTIVISM it −k x FINANCIAL _ CRISESt −k +
+γ 3 Bank Characteristicit −k + Timet + Banki + ε it
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(2.3)

FINANCIAL_CRISES is a dummy variable equal to 1 whenever there is a banking crisis or
a market crisis. We follow Berger and Bouwman (2013), and identify three financial crises
(the credit crunch (1990:Q1-1992:Q4), the bursting of the dot.com bubble and September
11 terrorist attack (2000:Q2-2002:Q3), and the subprime lending crisis (2007:Q32009:Q4)). We exclude FINANCIAL_CRISES alone from the model because time fixed
effects absorb the direct effects of FINANCIAL_CRISES. The interaction term between
FINANCIAL_CRISES and ACTIVISM captures the differential impact of activism on bank
behavior during financial crises, and the sum of (γ 1 + γ 2 )captures the total effect of
activism during financial crises.
We report the results in Table 2.9. The results reported in Panels A suggest that
activism has a significantly different effect during crises versus normal time periods. Thus,
we find higher market value, but there is no increase in risk, suggesting that it may be
harder for activists to get banks to take more risk during crises, so risk-taking incentives
are muted. Therefore, activists do not seem to increase risk during financial crises. Because
some authors discuss about poor governance being a contributing factor to the subprime
crisis, we also conduct the crises regressions by focusing on the subprime crisis only. In
this sense, we rerun regressions over the 2006-2010 period and report the results in Panel
B. We find again a higher market value, but no increase in risk, suggesting that the effects
of activism during crises are muted. 42 This also adds to the debate on the role of bank
governance during financial crises and shows that at least one corporate governance
mechanism, shareholder activism, was not a major cause of risk during the financial crisis.
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In unreported results, we also rerun the results using the three individual crises and we find that results
hold tightly for the last two financial crises: the dot-com bubble and the recent subprime lending crisis.
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We find that during a crisis, activists raise market value without increasing risk or
income. There are two possibilities to explain this: either 1) it may be the case that risk did
not go up, but market value went up because operating revenue will go up in the following
years or 2) government interventions during the crises such as TARP (The Troubled Asset
Relief Program), Discount Window (DW), and Term Auction Facility (TAF) may offset
the increase in risk. In Panel C we report the results when considering separately the effects
of the three government intervention programs and use the dummies TARP, DW, and TAF,
for whether a bank received TARP capital support, discount window loans and/or Term
Auction Facility (TAF) funding during the crisis. We find that the risk is decreasing
primarily for the banks that received TARP, but the other programs do not seem to have an
important effect.43 Therefore, the government, in its role as a creditor, may lose during
normal times, but not during financial crises.
2.8 Channels of Action for Activists and Actual Outcomes
Finally, we conduct an analysis to better understand the channels through which activists
may act.
2.8.1 Channels predictions
As shown above, our results are generally consistent with the empirical dominance of the
Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. In this conflict, activists may induce bank managers to
take higher risk to increase market value at the expense of bank creditors (e.g., depositors,
deposit insurers, taxpayers, regulators, etc.) due to banks’ opaqueness and regulatoryinduced incentives. This leads to the prediction that shareholder activism is associated with
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In unreported results, we also look at the effects of activism on operating revenue up to 2 years for the full
sample, however we do not find a significant increase in operating revenue.
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better market value and more risk-taking by the banks, but not necessarily better operating
returns. In this section, we explain how activist investors can make targeted banks better
or worse and change the focus of the banks in the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. We
consider three potential channels of action: Internal Corporate Governance, Capital
Structure, and Strategic Direction, as shown in Table 2.1 Panel B.
One channel activists may use is to induce changes in the Internal Corporate
Governance of the targeted banks.
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Activists may increase pay-for-performance

sensitivity for managers to better align the interest between managers and shareholders
(Brav, Jiang, Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010)). Although there is
no clear prediction in regards to CEO/board turnover and CEO pay, activist shareholders
can force out management if it has conflicting views to the shareholders in regards to how
the company should be run or the bank is poorly run and/or can change the board
composition by nominating themselves or other members elected by them to the board to
be able to better implement their proposals (e.g., Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003), Gopalan
(2008), Brav, Jiang, Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010), Qian (2011),
Boyson and Mooradian (2011), Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012), Bharath, Jayaraman
and Nagar (2013)).45 Besides exerting discipline over managers, activists can also make
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For example, in April 1999, Lawrence Seidman, activist investor of South Jersey Financial Corp was
involved in a proxy contest seeking to elect two directors to the company's board and an agreement was
reached between the company and Seidman, which permitted Seidman and a second proposed nominee to
become directors of the company. Similarly, in October 2007, Financial Edge Fund, activist of Alliance
Bancorp Inc of Pennsylvania, met with the Company’s CEO, Dennis Cirucci, to discuss the company’s
dismal financial performance and the need for management to dramatically enhance shareholder value and
design compensation and benefit plans that are tied to financial performance and shareholder value metrics.
45

Changes in the board composition that lead to an increase the number of outside directors with equity
ownership may also increase the willingness of managers to accept a takeover bid (Brook, Hendershott, and
Lee (2000)) and changes leading to a higher proportion of independent outside directors may increase bid
premiums offered for target banks (Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2000)) if activists consider getting the
company taken over.

48

changes to bank executive compensation, by curtailing the executives’ base pay (Brav,
Jiang, Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010), Hartzell and Starks
(2003)), however the prediction is unclear for the total compensation.46
A second channel that activists may use is to change bank Capital Structure.
Activists can reduce agency problems of free cash flow in banks by reducing cash holdings
and increasing dividend payouts to shareholders or repurchasing shares (e.g., Brav, Jiang,
Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010), Clifford (2009).47 Activists can
also induce management to hold a lower level of equity capital to improve bank’s asset
choice, which may favor higher returns to shareholders (e.g., Calomiris and Kahn (1991)).
A lower level of equity capital can also offer debt discipline and alleviate agency problems
of free cash flow, which may increase returns to shareholders (e.g., Jensen, (1986), Jiraporn
and Gleason, (2007)).
A third channel to induce change in the target banks is to change the Strategic
Direction of the bank. 48 Thus, activists may induce management to engage in more
investments in risky assets in order to improve performance (e.g., commercial real estate
loans, more M&As). In addition, although there may not be a clear prediction for takeovers,

46
DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2012) find that bank CEOs respond to risk-taking incentives by taking more
risk, and bank boards use executive compensation incentives to reinforce or support increased risk taking.
47

For example, in November 2007, Seidman Lawrence, activist investor of MassBank Corporation demands
higher dividends for shareholders, in the form of both quarterly and special payments and recommends
accelerated share repurchases, including a possible Dutch auction. In a similar example, in August 1998,
Seidman Lawrence, activist of 1st Bergen Bancorp believes the profitability of the company's business can
be improved by re-deploying certain assets and better utilizing its excess capital.
48
For example, in December 1997, Lawrence Seidman, activist of Wayne Bancorp requested that company's
board consider acquisition/merger discussions with potentially interested commercial banks to maximize
shareholders' value. Similarly, in August 2005, Lawrence Seidman, activist of Interchange Financial Services
Corporation, states that because Mr. Abbate, the CEO of the bank was unable to grow EPS, or hold the line
on the net interest margin and it is time for someone else to take the reins of the company. He strongly
encourages management to hire an investment bank and solicit bids from potential acquirers.
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activists may make the bank a takeover target if it increases shareholders’ value (e.g., bank
can take advantage of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) or too-important-to-fail (TITF) policies).
Literature on nonfinancials shows that returns to investor activism are driven by activists’
success at getting target firms taken over, in which case they can get a takeover premium
(e.g., Greenwood and Schor (2009)). The effects on divestitures of bank divisions and costs
are ambiguous, however these can be used as a preparatory step to make the bank look
good on the books before becoming a takeover target so that activists can get a higher
premium. 49
We test empirically the impact of the activism on the three channels described
above and try to understand which of the channels are most important to explain the main
results. The empirical results are presented in Table 2.10 Panels A and B.
2.8.2 Channels of action for activists
In Table 2.10 Panel A, we conduct a change analysis which considers all banks
targeted by activism and means changes in their Internal Corporate Governance50, Capital
Structure, and Strategic Direction channels, 8 quarters (2 years) before the activism and 8

49

Activists can also induce more divestitures if they can create value for shareholders (e.g., Brav, Jiang,
Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Gillian, Kensinger and Martin (2000), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999)).
50
All Corporate Governance variables are manually collected for the target banks from DEF 14A proxy
statements, 10K annual reports, and 8K quarterly reports. CEO TURNOVER is a dummy equal to 1 if the
CEO changes from 1 year to the next as per DEF 14A and 10K annual filings. CEO/BOARD TURNOVER is
a dummy equal to 1 if CEO or another board member changes as per 8K quarterly filings. To construct this
latter variable, we look at the 8K information contained in “Item 5.02 - Departure of Directors or Certain
Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain
Officers”. Search keywords include one of the following commonly mentioned phrases to indicate executive
turnover: dismiss, dismissed, dismissed for cause, employment ceased, fire, fired, appointment revoked,
eliminate, position eliminated, position change within company, let leave, not re-elected, expiration of
employment agreement etc. We eliminated cases involving death (deceased), health based resignations, and
mandatory retirement. In regards to the CEO compensation variables, these are manually collected from the
DEF 14A and 10K annual filings. EQUITY BASED-COMPENSATION/CEO TOTAL COMPENSATION is
the sum of total restricted stock grants and stock options granted to the CEO divided by CEO Total
Compensation. CASH BONUS/CEO TOTAL COMPENSATION is total cash bonus granted to the CEO
divided by CEO Total Compensation.
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quarters (2 years) after the activism to account for the fact that some outcomes of activism
could take a longer time period. We find that all three channels play an important role in
the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict.
First, in terms of Internal Corporate Governance, we find that shareholder
activists in banking are successful at both changing the CEO and inducing changes in the
boards (CEO TURNOVER and CEO/BOARD TURNOVER), which may help mitigate some
of the agency problems between management and shareholders. We also find a higher payfor-performance sensitivity after activism as indicated by the statistically significant results
on EQUITY BASED-COMPENSATION/CEO TOTAL COMPENSATION, consistent with
the prior prediction of the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict that activists may induce more
alignment with shareholders to increase market value. In regards to CASH BONUS/CEO
TOTAL COMPENSATION, we find that this declines perhaps due to the fact that it is not
directly tied to the shareholders’ value. There is no significant effect on the CEO total pay.
Second, in terms of Capital Structure, we find that shareholder activism leads to
more STOCK REPURCHASES and a lower CAPITALIZATION RATIO, although there are
no significant effects on either cash holdings or dividend yield paid. Finally, in terms of
Strategic Direction, we find that shareholder activism leads to more investments in risky
assets as indicated by the COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOANS (the ratio of bank
commercial real estate loans over GTA) and REAL ESTATE LOANS (the ratio of bank real
estate loans over GTA) 51 , and also riskier funding as indicated by the increase in the
NONDEPOSIT FUNDING (ratio of bank nondeposit funding over GTA). As for banking
organizations becoming a takeover target (TAKEOVER TARGET), the actual takeover rate
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Prior literature in banking suggests that real estate loans, and in particular commercial real estate loans
was a factor that contributed significantly to the recent crisis (e.g., Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2013).
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is about 10%, suggesting that activists in banking may be quite successful at getting the
banks acquired. This may increase these banks’ government safety net by getting them
acquired by larger institutions and/or stepping into the TBTF umbrella52 and may also lead
to significant premiums for the activists when successful (as indicated in Greenwood and
Schor (2009)). Also, we find that activism in banking leads to a reduction in costs and
acquisitions and an increase in divestitures of banks in the BHCs, potentially designed to
make the banks more attractive targets on the market for strategic alternatives such as
takeovers. To sum up, all channels seem to play an important role in explaining the
Shareholder-Creditor Conflict.
2.8.3 Actual outcomes
In Table 2.10 Panel B, to better understand what actual actions the target firms take
in response to the activist’s requests, we follow Greenwood and Schor (2009) and collect
news data on what happened after each event by conducting searches in Lexis-Nexis for
each target – activist pair and also researching the NIC banking organization history up to
two years after the activism events. We classify the outcomes into four broad outcomes
(the three from Panel A, Internal Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, and Strategic
Direction, plus an additional one named Other which could not be adequately fit into the
others). These comprise of thirteen subcategories. The classifications are not mutually
exclusive: for example, if a target gives board seats to the activist and also repurchases
shares, this company will have two outcomes represented. We include the number of

52

Several researchers find that bank M&As may serve as a mechanism to increase the financial safety-net
benefits to shareholders and lead them to shift risk to the safety-net, thus exposing taxpayers (who guarantee
the safety-net) to potentially greater losses (e.g., Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995), Carbo-Valverde, Kane,
and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2012), Srivastav, Armitage, and Hagendorff (2013)).
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unique banks that fall under each category and also the percentage out of all target banks
and that of all target banks that were found to have news about the outcomes.
For about 49.26% (166) of the target banks (generally smaller), no additional news
are found about outcomes except that, in some cases, we find a reiteration of some of the
13D filings by the activist. For the other 50.74% (171) banks, we find information about
outcomes. The first category of outcomes comprises events that relate to changes in the
Internal Corporate Governance of the target banks. In a very large number of cases (63),
the activist is granted seats on the board either for himself or his nominees, while in 19
cases, the activist is not successful to get board seats (he may withdraw his solicitation for
seats or suffer a proxy fight defeat). In 14 cases, the CEO is changed, and in 7 cases,
company by-laws are changed (e.g., remove a poison pill, de-stagger the board, or change
in a majority voting rule).
The second category of outcomes comprises events that relate to changes in the
Capital Structure of the target banks. In 15 cases, the target announces that it repurchases
shares and/or makes changes to the dividends paid out to shareholders. In another 21 cases,
the activist induces the bank to raise capital or helps the bank with financing options, in
most cases accompanied by the target acquiring another institution.
The third category of outcomes comprises events that relate to changes in the
Strategic Direction of the target banks. In 37 cases, the target is acquired and in 5 cases
there is announcement that the company hired an investment banker to explore strategic
alternatives and solicit potential buyers. In 7 cases, there are news which indicate that
activist was not successful to get the company acquired. In one case, a spin-off is
announced and in another 10 cases there are news about target acquiring other institutions.
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The last category of outcomes, called Other comprises events that could not be
adequately fit into the other three categories. In 49 cases, the activist and the target sign
either a settlement or a standstill agreement. With a settlement, the target may be able to
extract some concessions from the activists (e.g., board seats) that it was unlikely to have
obtained if the original slates had gone to a vote. Moreover, the company management is
able to save face by not officially "losing" the proxy contest. At the same time, the activists
often can get everything they asked for and appear reasonable, which can only enhance
their options in future negotiations. The standstill agreement is very similar, expect it is
usually giving various concessions to the activist with the only restriction that the company
does not want the activist to take over control53 and/or become a takeover target. In 45
cases, the activist cuts position below 5% ownership, and this outcome can occur also
immediately after the company becomes a takeover target.
To summarize, ex-post classifications of activism based on the outcomes reveal that
CEO and board changes, takeover target outcomes, capital changes and agreements
between the activist and target bank are the most frequent mechanisms that activists use in
banking to induce changes and increase market value.
2.9 Conclusions
Sound corporate governance of banks is critical for the economic growth and development,
and poor governance may exacerbate the financial system vulnerability to shocks. This
paper is the first empirical study to test shareholder activism as a channel of external

53

As per the Change in Bank Control Act of 1978, a position of 10% ownership is considered a controlling
position and regulatory approval may need to be obtained. Most of the activists have less than 10% stake in
a bank.
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corporate governance in banking, complementing internal governance, regulators, and
other external governance structures.
Using a unique hand-collected dataset on shareholder activism for all public
commercial banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US over the period 1994:Q12010:Q4, we have the following findings: 1) We find that activism is important in banking:
about one third of the public banks (337 unique banks) have some form of activism during
the sample period. 2) Activists appear to target banks with agency problems and growth
potential that are easy in which to implement changes to increase value. 3) We find that
shareholder activism creates value for shareholders but has little impact on operating
returns and increases bank default risk, consistent with the empirical dominance
Hypothesis 3, the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict which predicts that activists may induce
higher risk to increase market value at the expense of bank creditors. This suggests that
activism may be generally a destabilizing force. 4) However, we find that activism differs
significantly during financial crises, resulting in higher market value and no increase in
risk, suggesting that activism was not a major source of risk during the financial crises.
Therefore, the creditors (including the government) may lose during normal times, but not
during financial crises.
The paper contributes primarily to two strands of research. First, it contributes to
the broader literature on shareholder activism by examining activism within one important
industry rather than across a number of very different industries, which reduces the concern
about confounding inter-industry differences. Although researchers point to the
shareholder return benefits resulting from activism, our results suggest that other additional
effects of activism, such as the increase in risk, should not be neglected.
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Second, this paper also adds to the literature on bank risk and performance by
introducing shareholder activism as a factor influencing risk and performance and sets the
groundwork for further research on shareholder activism in banking. The current topic is
important especially from a government policy perspective because poor governance may
aggravate financial system fragility to shocks and pose systemic risk to the real economy
(e.g., Laeven and Levine (2009), Kirkpatrick (2009), G30 Steering Committee on
Corporate Governance (2011), Song and Li (2012)) and is regarded as a possible important
contributing factor to the recent financial crisis. In addition, shareholder activism may be
regarded with skepticism.54 Our findings suggest that activists in banking may increase risk
and market value at the expense of creditors and may be a threat to financial stability. These
results have important implications for the government policies targeting bank governance
and regulation of activism regarding banks. Regulators may keep a close watch on activists
because they may increase bank risk during normal times. However activists do not seem
to increase risk during financial crises. This adds to the debate on the role of bank
governance during financial crises and shows that at least one corporate governance
mechanism, shareholder activism, may not have been a major cause of risk during the
financial crisis (e.g., Beltratti and Stultz (2010)).
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Some authors argue that activists should be subject to more rigorous public scrutiny and accountability
(Weber (1922, 1947)). Anabtawi and Stout (2008) argue that an increase in shareholder power should come
with an increase in fiduciary responsibility. In the banking industry, this concern may be even more acute.
Moreover, shareholder activism has received increased attention in light of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act as well as recent SEC rulings which increase the rights of the investors.
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Table 2.1 Hypotheses and Potential Channels

Panel A: Hypotheses and Main Effects
Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 4

Variable

ShareholderManager
Conflict 1

ShareholderManager
Conflict 2

ShareholderCreditor
Conflict

ActivistOther Stakeholders
Conflict

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Main Effects

Predicted Sign

Predicted Sign

Predicted Sign

Predicted Sign

+

+

+

-

+

+

?

-

-

+

-

-

Market Value/Performance
TOBIN's Q
Operating Returns
ROA
Default Risk
Z-SCORE

Panel B Potential Channels for Shareholder Activism in Banking
Variable

Creditor-Shareholder Conflict

Potential Channels

Predicted Sign

Internal Corporate Governance
CEO/Board Turnover

?

CEO Pay

?

CEO Pay-for-performance Sensitivity

+

Changes in By-laws

+

Capital Structure
Dividend Payout

+

Stock Repurchases

+

Cash Holdings

-

Capital Ratio

-

Strategic Direction
Risky Assets

+

Cost Reduction/ Efficiency

-

Divestitures/Spin-Off

-

Acquisitions

+

Takeover Target

?
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Table 2.2: Shareholder Activism (1994-2010) – Events by Year and Demand
Panel A reports the number of activism events per year based on information in 13D and DFAN14A filings
and Item 4 – Purpose of Transaction section. Panel B reports the number of activist demands for each year
in our sample period, classified in seven well-defined categories shown below. The categories are considered
non-exclusive, so an event can sometimes fall into multiple categories at a time. The sample period runs from
t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for the detailed definitions of the variables.
Panel A: Distribution of Shareholder Activism - Events by Year
Year

All Types of Activism
(Material Events)

No Unique Banks
w/ Material Activism

Total Unique
Banks

% Banks with
Activism

1994
1995

10
29

7
19

391
392

0.018
0.048

1996

57

25

401

0.062

1997

75

49

442

0.111

1998

76

42

472

0.089

1999

82

47

459

0.102

2000

91

42

445

0.094

2001

97

46

446

0.103

2002

73

41

435

0.094

2003

70

41

440

0.093

2004

53

28

455

0.062

2005

42

32

443

0.072

2006

91

40

451

0.089

2007

93

34

428

0.079

2008

103

39

402

0.097

2009

84

42

382

0.110

2010

78

41

374

0.110

Total

1204

337

1002

Average = 0.085

58

Panel B: Shareholder Activism by Type of Demand & Year
Year

1. Engage
Management

2. Strategic
Changes

3. Internal
Governance

4. Capital
Allocation

5. Proxy
Fight

6. Asset
Sale

7.
Litigation/
Bankruptcy

1994
1995

1
10

7
21

3
5

1996

10

30

15

1

12

2

4

1997

20

44

18

5

3

4

4

1998

29

37

18

1

6

6

2

1999

32

32

20

4

9

3

2000

25

28

28

8

16

3

2001

48

43

20

31

1

6

4

2002

17

15

18

41

4

6

1

2003

22

34

18

13

3

7

1

2004

11

26

17

10

4

1

3

2005

14

21

11

6

3

1

2006

35

24

29

4

18

7

5

2007

48

12

37

6

17

11

3

2008

41

14

32

9

35

8

1

2009

41

17

30

11

11

9

2

1

2010

36

18

19

17

1

2

Total

440

423

338

167

140

78

31

%

36.5%

35.1%

28.1%

13.9%

11.6%

6.5%

2.6%
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Table 2.3: Antecedents of Shareholder Activism
This table reports probit estimates for the shareholder activism of banks using determinants previously
identified for non-financials and additional ones specific to banks. The main activism measure (ACTIVISM)
is a dummy equal to 1 in all quarters in which the bank has activism. SIZE is the log value of gross total
assets (GTA). TOBIN's Q is a measure of financial performance determined as market value of common
stock over equity book value. ROA is the ratio of annualized net income to gross total assets (GTA).
GROWTH is the growth rate of GTA. CAPITALIZATION RATIO is equity capital over gross total assets
(GTA). DIVYLD is the dividend yield, defined as (common dividend + preferred dividends)/(market value
of common stocks + book value of preferred). INST OWNERSHIP is the proportion of shares held by
institutions. AMIHUD is the Amihud (2002)’s measure of trading illiquidity determined as the yearly average
(using daily data) of 1000*sqrt(|return|/dollar trading volume). NUMBER OF ANALYSTS is the number of
analysts covering the company. AGE is age (in years) of the oldest bank owned by the BHC.
BRANCHES/GTA are the ratio of total bank branches over GTA. NO_STATES is the log of the number of
states in which the bank has branches. METROPOLITAN is a dummy equal to 1 when the majority of bank
deposits (50% or more) are in MSA areas. DEPOSITS/GTA is total deposits over GTA. LOANS/GTA is a
measure of the composition of bank assets determined as total loans over GTA. CASH_HOLDINGS is cash
holdings divided by GTA. NPL is the ratio of nonperforming loans and loans in default to GTA.
INCOME_DIVERSITY is 1 minus the absolute value of the ratio between the difference between net interest
income and other operating income and total operating income. FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP is equal to 1 when
foreign shareholdings exceed 50% of total bank ownership. HHI is bank concentration, measured by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for bank deposits. OCC is a dummy equal to 1 for banks supervised by OCC.
FDIC is a dummy equal to 1 for banks supervised by FDIC. INCORP_DE is equal to 1 if the bank is
incorporated in Delaware. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters and all regressions include time
fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by the bank. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010.
Appendix A provides definitions for all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Dummy of being targeted

(1)
Marg. Prob

(2)
t-statistic

Marg. Prob

(3)
t-statistic

Marg. Prob

t-statistic

BANK SIZE

-0.005**

(-2.136)

-0.014***

(-3.327)

-0.003

(-1.242)

TOBIN's Q

-0.159***

(-2.086)

-0.131***

(-1.528)

-0.200***

(-4.788)

GROWTH

-0.000

(-1.306)

-0.000

(-1.232)

-0.000

(-0.812)

-0.319***

(-4.013)

-0.272***

(-3.150)

-0.278***

(-4.438)

ROA
EQRAT

-0.028

(-0.255)

-0.058

(-0.624)

-0.065

(-0.759)

DIVYLD

-0.260**

(-2.163)

-0.116*

(-0.987)

-0.213**

(-2.044)

INST

0.036***

(2.924)

0.022*

(1.724)

0.023**

(2.274)

-0.008*

(-2.309)

-0.003

(-0.583)

-0.007**

(-2.536)

0.001**

(2.022)

AMIHUD
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS

-0.000

(-0.716)

BRANCHES / GTA

0.038***

(3.918)

NO_STATES

-0.010**

(-2.260)

0.003

(0.318)

-0.052**

(-2.415)

0.026

(1.482)

0.081**

(2.417)

NPL RATIO

0.055

(0.429)

INCOME_DIVERSITY

-0.010

(-0.856)

BANK AGE

URBAN
DEPOSITS / GTA
LOANS / GTA
CASH_HOLDINGS
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FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP

-0.022

(-1.609)

HHI DEPOSITS

0.063

(1.478)

OCC_SUPERVISOR

0.011

(1.638)

FDIC_SUPERVISOR

0.006

(1.131)

INCORP_DE

0.008

(1.234)

21,999

0.084

No. obs. & Pseudo-R-sq

22,492

0.047
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14,879

0.067

Table 2.4: Effects of Shareholder Activism (Main Effects)
This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and financial performance (TOBIN’s Q),
operating returns (ROA), and risk (Z-SCORE). We define the activism measure (ACTIVISM) as a dummy, which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank
had material activist events. TOBIN's Q is a measure of financial performance determined as market value of common stock over equity book value. ROA is
operating net income over GTA. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk and it is determined as A (ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA, with a larger
value indicates lower overall bank risk; BANK SIZE is the log value of Total Assets. AGE is age (in years) of the oldest bank owned by the bank holding company.
DEPOSITS/GTA is a measure of the composition of bank liabilities determined as total deposits over GTA. LOANS/GTA is a measure of the composition of bank
assets side determined as total loans over GTA. INCOME_DIVERSITY is the Leaven and Levine (2009)’s measure of income diversity defined as 1 minus the
absolute value of the ratio between the difference between net interest income and other operating income and total operating income. FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP
is a dummy variable set to 1 when total foreign shareholding exceeds 50% of total bank ownership. OCC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for national
banks that are supervised by OCC. FDIC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for state non-member banks that are supervised by FDIC. FRS is a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 for state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. We use an OLS model with time and bank fixed effects. All independent
variables are lagged 4 quarters. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all
variables utilized in the regressions. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.

62
Independent Variables
ACTIVISM
BANK SIZE
BANK AGE
DEPOSITS / GTA
LOANS / GTA
INCOME DIVERSITY
OVERHEAD COSTS

TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.007***
(3.976)
-0.011*
(-1.923)
-0.009
(-1.196)
-0.048**
(-2.281)
0.078***
(4.407)
0.021**
(2.191)
650.989***
(2.854)

-0.000
(-1.214)
-0.001***
(-5.775)
0.000
(1.308)
0.001
(1.090)
0.003***
(7.912)
0.002***
(8.500)
-3.420***
(-2.759)

-4.317***
(-3.208)
1.072
(1.173)
6.799**
(2.534)
-8.323**
(-2.292)
19.273***
(6.757)
5.526***
(3.134)
-25,295.554***
(-2.955)

0.028***
(2.679)
-0.008***
(-3.417)
0.003
(1.079)

-0.001
(-1.030)
-0.000
(-0.187)
0.000
(0.577)

-15.558***
(-2.632)
-1.998
(-1.183)
4.171***
(2.761)

1.162***
(12.945)

0.012***
(7.094)

-6.633
(-0.470)

Time fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed effects

Yes
22,821
0.875

Yes
23,965
0.604

Yes
23,801
0.472

FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
OCC SUPERVISOR
FDIC SUPERVISOR
INTERCEPT

Observations
R-squared
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Table 2.5: Alternative Measures
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and their financial performance, operating
returns, and risk. We show models with alternative measures. ACTIVISM is a dummy which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist
events. We use an OLS model with time and bank fixed effects. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010.
Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Different Measures of Market Performance
TOBIN'S Q

BUY-AND-HOLD_RET

BUY-AND-HOLD_AB_RET

SHARPE RATIO

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.007***
(3.976)

0.028**
(2.529)

0.023**
(2.157)

0.711***
(5.346)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Independent Variables
ACTIVISM
Controls
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Time fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed effects

Yes
22,821
0.875

Yes
23,842
0.563

Yes
23,842
0.572

Yes
23,842
0.593

Observations
R-squared

Panel B: Different Measures of Accounting Performance
ROA

ROE

(1)

(2)

-0.000
(-1.214)

-0.001
(-0.820)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Time fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed effects

Yes
23,965
0.604

Yes
23,965
0.630

Independent Variables
ACTIVISM

Observations
R-squared

Panel C: Different Measures of Bank Risk-Taking
Independent Variables
ACTIVISM

Z-SCORE
(1)

VOLATILITY _STOCK_RET
(2)

LLA RATIO
(3)

NPL RATIO
(4)

VOLATILITY ROA
(5)

-4.317***
(-3.208)

0.006***
(3.139)

0.001***
(3.035)

0.003**
(2.439)

0.001**
(2.403)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed effects

Yes
23,801
0.472

Yes
23,933
0.549

Yes
23,965
0.607

Yes
23,965
0.462

Yes
23,963
0.533

Observations
R-squared

Panel D: Different Measures of Activism (Number of Activism Events)
TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.003***
(5.205)

0.000
(0.774)

-1.645***
(-5.390)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed effects

Yes
22,819
0.875

Yes
23,963
0.604

Yes
23,799
0.472

Independent Variables
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NO_ACTIVISM_EVENTS

Observations
R-squared

Table 2.6: Different Econometric Approaches
This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and their financial performance, operating
returns, and risk. We show models with alternative measures. ACTIVISM is a dummy which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist
events. Panel A shows using an event study (EVENTUS) the compound abnormal returns round activism events for several time windows, daily windows of
(0,+1), (-1,+1), (-2,+2), and (-5,+5) and monthly windows of (0,3), (0,6), (0,12), (0,24), (0,36), (-1,12). Panels B, C and D show alternative econometrical models
for operating returns (ROA), and bank risk (Z-SCORE): OLS, OLS with Time and Bank Fixed Effects (FE), Simple OLS, Time fixed effects (FE) only, Random
Effects (RE), model with two-way clusters (bank and time), and model with Newey-West standard errors. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. The
sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions.
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Market Performance (Event Studies)

Panel A.1: Market Performance (Event Study) – Daily
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Market Adjusted Returns, Value Weighted Index
Days
(0,+1)
(-1,+1)
(-2,+2)
(-5,+5)

N
915
915
915
915

CAR
1.42%
1.79%
2.26%
2.89%

t-test
8.302
8.542
8.370
7.200

p-value
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

Panel A.2: Market Performance (Event Study) – Monthly
Market Adjusted Returns, Value Weighted Index
Months
N
939
(0,+3)
939
(0,+6)
939
(0,+12)
939
(0,+24)
939
(0,+36)
939
(-1,+12)

CAR
4.22%
4.88%
6.77%
8.93%
13.11%
7.68%

t-test
4.799
4.196
4.271
4.061
4.902
4.670

p-value
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

Panel B: Operating Performance (ROA)
Dependent Variable: ROA
Independent Variables
ACTIVISM
Controls

OLS w/ FE

Simple OLS

Time FE Only

RE

Newey-West

Two-way Clusters

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.000

-0.001***

-0.001***

-0.000

-0.001***

-0.001***

(-1.214)

(-6.773)

(-7.393)

(-1.259)

(-4.167)

(-5.276)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Effects

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Bank Effects

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Observations

23,965

23,965

23,965

23,045

23,045

23,045

R-squared

0.604

0.157

0.297

0.294
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Panel C: Bank Risk-Taking (Z-SCORE)
Dependent Variable: Z-SCORE
Independent Variables
ACTIVISM

OLS w/ FE

Simple OLS

Time FE Only

RE

Newey-West

Two-way Clusters

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-4.317***

-5.920***

-5.647***

-3.570*

-6.176***

-6.069*

(-3.208)

(-4.042)

(-3.888)

(-1.678)

(-3.280)

(-1.733)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Effects

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Bank Effects

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Observations

23,801

23,801

23,801

22,915

22,915

22,915

R-squared

0.472

0.056

0.122

0.0998

0.05489119

0.121

Table 2.7: Endogeneity Treatments
This table reports the regression estimates with endogeneity treatments of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and strategic
consequences such as financial performance (TOBIN’s Q), operating returns (ROA), and their risk taking behavior (Z-SCORE). We define the main activism
measure as a dummy which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk
and it is determined as A(ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall bank risk. ROA is operating net income over GTA. We use an OLS
model with time and bank FE. Panel A reports results when using a 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) estimation that controls for endogeneity of activism. We use
as instrument % BUSY ACTIVISTS, which is the percentage of busy activists, that is, activists with five or more campaigns and/or 2 or more proxy fights at the
same time. Panel B reports models using a propensity score matched sample. Panel C shows the results Heckman’s two-step treatment effect model used to correct
the self-selection in activism. The selection (activism) equation uses a ACTIVISM dummy as a dependent variable and uses the same instrument as in the
instrumental variable analysis. The outcome equation uses TOBIN’s Q, ROA, and Z-SCORE as dependent variables. We include all control variables from the main
specification in all panel specifications. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A
for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Instrumental Variable Analysis

68

IV Analysis (First Stage)
Dependent Variable: ACTIVISM
Independent Variables

(1)

% BUSY ACTIVISTS

0.044***
(5.397)

Controls

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Bank Fixed Effects

Yes
23,963
0.219

Observations
R-squared
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic

544.718***

Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic

3605.73***

IV Analysis (Second Stage)
Independent Variables
ACTIVISM
Controls

TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.080***
(3.869)

-0.002
(-1.169)

-50.260***
(-3.174)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed Effects

Yes
22,819
0.875

Yes
23,963
0.604

Yes
23,799
0.472

Observations
R-squared

Panel B: PSM Analysis
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Independent Variables
ACTIVISM

TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.006**
(2.252)

-0.000**
(-2.052)

-4.883**
(-2.310)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed Effects

Yes
4,701
0.897

Yes
4,958
0.668

Yes
4,958
0.548

Observations
R-squared

Panel C: Heckman Selection
Heckman Analysis (Selection Equation)
Dependent Variable: ACTIVISM (Probit)
Independent Variables

(1)

% BUSY ACTIVISTS

0.047***
(26.020)

Controls

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Bank Fixed Effects

No
23,962
0.111

Observations
Pseudo R-squared

Heckman Analysis (Outcome Equation)
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TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

ACTIVISM

0.008***
(4.479)

-0.000
(-1.351)

-4.664***
(-3.437)

LAMBDA

0.004***
(5.567)

-0.000*
(-1.701)

-1.576***
(-3.002)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed Effects

No
22,818
0.875

No
23,962
0.604

No
23,798
0.472

Independent Variables

Observations
R-squared (or Pseudo)

Table 2.8: Subsamples Analysis for Effects of Activism
This table reports the subsamples regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and strategic consequences:
financial performance (TOBIN’s Q), operating returns (ROA), and risk taking behavior (Z-SCORE). We define the main activism measure as a dummy, which takes
a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk and it is determined as A (ROA)
+ A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall bank risk. ROA is operating net income over GTA. We use an OLS model with time and bank FE.
All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. Panel A reports results separately for hedge fund activists and non-hedge funds activists. Panel B reports results
separately for more aggressive activism (DFAN14A) versus less aggressive activism (13D). Panel C looks at effects of activism using a sample that excludes TBTF
banks. Panel D reports effects of activism by bank size: SMALL, MEDIUM and LARGE. SMALL represents banks with GTA up to $1 billion, MEDIUM represents
banks with GTA exceeding $1 billion and up to $5 billion, and LARGE represents banks with GTA exceeding $5 billion. GTA equals total assets plus the allowance
for loan and the lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A details on the
definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Hedge Fund or Not
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TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

HF_ACTIVIST

0.010***
(5.689)

-0.000
(-0.333)

-9.628***
(-4.854)

NON_HF_ACTIVIST

0.008***
(3.698)

-0.001***
(-3.242)

-3.619**
(-2.420)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Independent Variables

Controls
Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

22,821
0.875

23,965
0.604

23,801
0.472

Observations
R-squared
t-stat for equality of coefficients:
HF_ACTIVIST = NON_HF_ACTIVIST

0.663

1.758*

2.474**

Panel B: Effects by 13D vs. DFAN14A

Independent Variables
DFAN14A
13D
Controls

TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.006*
(1.656)

-0.000
(-0.368)

-14.864***
(-4.336)

0.010***
(6.479)

-0.000*
(-1.721)

-4.867***
(-4.351)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed Effects

Yes
22,821
0.875

Yes
23,965
0.604

Yes
23,801
0.472

1.179

0.200

Observations
R-squared
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t-stat for equality of coefficients:
DFAN14A = 13D

2.886***

Panel C: Excluding Too-big-to-fail (TBTF)

Independent Variables
ACTIVISM

TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.003**
(1.964)

-0.000*
(-1.748)

-5.902***
(-4.289)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed Effects

Yes
19,716
0.883

Yes
20,736
0.607

Yes
20,579
0.476

Observations
R-squared

Panel D: Effects by Bank Size

Independent Variables

SMALL
Observations
R-squared (or Pseudo)
MEDIUM
Observations
R-squared (or Pseudo)
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LARGE
Observations
R-squared (or Pseudo)

TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.005***
(2.649)
9,678
0.935

-0.000
(-0.598)
10,431
0.629

-2.852*
(-1.688)
10,311
0.529

-0.001
(-0.400)
8,147
0.795

-0.000
(-0.877)
8,376
0.631

-7.677***
(-3.494)
8,345
0.517

0.026***
(4.185)
4,996
0.792

0.000
(0.075)
5,158
0.597

5.083
(1.380)
5,145
0.511

Yes

Yes

Yes

ALL SIZE GROUPS
Controls
Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 2.9: Shareholder Activism during Financial Crises
This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and strategic consequences: financial
performance (TOBIN’s Q), operating returns (ROA), and their risk taking behavior (Z-SCORE) during crises versus normal times. We define the main activism
measure (ACTIVISM) as a dummy, which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure
of financial risk and it is determined as A (ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall bank risk. ROA is operating net income over
GTA. We use an OLS model with time and bank FE. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. FINANCIAL_CRISES variable construction follows Berger
and Bouwman (2013). FINANCIAL_CRISES 55 is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for a crisis period and it includes both market (those originated in the
capital markets) and banking crises (those originated in the banking sector). Panel A reports effects of activism during financial crises for the full sample. Panel B
reports effects of activism during the subprime financial crisis (2006-2010). The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for details
on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Effects during Financial Crises (Full Sample)
TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.003
(1.408)

-0.000**
(-2.015)

-9.885***
(-6.337)

ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES

0.009***
(2.771)

0.000
(1.578)

12.263***
(5.171)

(ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES)
t-stat (ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES = 0)

0.012***
4.443

0.000
0.332

2.378
1.179

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed effects

Yes
22,821
0.875

Yes
23,965
0.604

Yes
23,801
0.472

Independent Variables
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ACTIVISM

Observations
R-squared

55

Banking crisis is the recent subprime lending crisis and market crises are the Russian debt crisis plus LTCM bailout in 1998, and the bursting of the dot.com
bubble plus September 11. Normal times is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for all time periods that are not financial crises.

Panel B: Effects during the Subprime Financial Crisis (2006-2010)
TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

ACTIVISM

-0.003
(-1.490)

-0.002***
(-4.443)

-9.941***
(-3.499)

ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES

0.010***
(3.608)

0.002***
(4.258)

10.821***
(3.361)

(ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES)
t-stat (ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES = 0)

0.007***
3.250

0.000
1.421

0.880
0.400

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed effects

Yes
7,535
0.896

Yes
7,786
0.628

Yes
7,757
0.633

Independent Variables

Observations
R-squared
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Panel C: Effects during Recent Financial Crisis (2006-2010) – TARP, Discount Window, and Term Auction Facility

This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and financial performance (TOBIN’s Q),
operating returns (ROA), and risk taking (Z-SCORE) during crises versus normal times and considers impact of TARP, Discount Window and TAF support. We
define the main activism measure (ACTIVISM) as a dummy, which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. The bank-level
Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk and it is determined as A (ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall bank risk. ROA is operating
net income over GTA. We use an OLS model with time and bank FE. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. FINANCIAL_CRISES variable construction
follows Berger and Bouwman (2013). FINANCIAL_CRISES 56 is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for a crisis period and it includes both market (those
originated in the capital markets) and banking crises (those originated in the banking sector). Panel A reports effects of activism during financial crises. The sample
period runs from t = 2006 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Independent Variables
ACTIVISM
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ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES
TARP * ACTIVISM
TARP * ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES
DW* ACTIVISM
DW* ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES
TAF * ACTIVISM
TAF * ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES

TOBIN'S Q
(1)

ROA
(2)

Z-SCORE
(3)

-0.000
(-0.176)
0.008*
(1.907)
-0.007
(-1.587)
0.008
(1.141)
0.005
(1.325)
-0.015***
(-2.603)
0.011
(1.278)
0.021**

-0.000
(-0.723)
-0.001
(-1.262)
0.002***
(3.652)
-0.000
(-0.704)
-0.001*
(-1.835)
0.001*
(1.900)
-0.002***
(-3.074)
0.001

-7.688***
(-3.865)
4.308
(1.418)
-6.582
(-1.398)
16.669***
(2.810)
3.981
(1.069)
0.376
(0.071)
-4.458
(-0.582)
-4.160

56
Banking crisis is the recent subprime lending crisis and market crises are the Russian debt crisis plus LTCM bailout in 1998, and the bursting of the dot.com
bubble plus September 11. Normal times is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for all time periods that are not financial crises.

Controls
Time fixed effects
Bank Fixed effects
Observations
R-squared

(1.987)
Yes
Yes
Yes
22,821
0.875

(0.969)
Yes
Yes
Yes
23,965
0.604

(-0.513)
Yes
Yes
Yes
23,801
0.473
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Table 2.10: Potential Channels and Actual Outcomes of Action for Activists
This table reports channels for the effects of activism: Internal Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, and Strategic Direction. The sample includes the banks
that are targeted by activists and the sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Panel A, presents a change analysis which investigates changes in means in the
channels’ components, by comparing them 8 quarters (2 years) before the activism with 8 quarters (2 years) after the activism events to account for the fact that
some outcomes for activism could take a longer time period. Panel B follows Greenwood and Schor (2009) and is based on Lexis Nexis news collected about what
happened after each activism event.

Channel

Panel A: Potential Channels of Activism (Change Analysis)
Before Activism
After Activism
(Quarters: t-8, t-1) (Quarters: t+1, t+8)

Variable

Difference in Means
After - Before

N

Mean

Mean

Difference

t-stat

5735
5735
5735
5701

0.08
0.157
13.183
0.131

0.095
0.194
13.229
0.119

0.015**
0.037***
0.046
-0.012***

2.031
3.928
1.285
-2.817

5700

0.151

0.167

0.016**

2.071

6843
6845
6845
6845

0.022
0.400
0.040
0.093

0.022
0.453
0.040
0.091

0.000
0.053*
0.000
-0.001***

0.419
1.652
-0.321
-2.383

Risky Assets: COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOANS
Risky Assets: REAL ESTATE LOANS
Risky Financing: NON-DEPOSIT FUNDING

6845
6845
6845

0.241
0.473
0.152

0.251
0.483
0.158

0.010***
0.010**
0.006**

3.028
2.39
2.251

OVERHEAD COSTS

6845

0.061

0.035

-0.026***

-2.827

Internal Corporate Governance
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CEO TURNOVER
CEO/BOARD TURNOVER
LOG(1+CEO TOTAL PAY)
CASH BONUS/CEO TOTAL PAY
CEO Pay-for-Performance: EQUITY-BASED
COMPENSATION/CEO TOTAL PAY
Capital Structure
Dividend Payout (DIVYLD)
STOCK REPURCHASES
CASH HOLDINGS
CAPITALIZATION RATIO
Strategic Direction

Strategic Direction (cont.)
DIVESTITURES (BHCs have banks acquired by
other institutions)

~5% increase from 14% (46/337) up to 2 years before activism to 19% (64/337) of the BHCs have
banks acquired by other institutions up to 2 years after shareholder activism.
~1% decrease from 12% (41/337) organizations making acquisitions up to 2 years after activism to
13% (44/337) organizations making acquisitions up to 2 years before activism.

ACQUISITIONS
TAKEOVER TARGET (the organization - BHC or
commercial bank - is acquired by another institution)

~10% (37 /337) of the organizations become takeover targets up to 2 year after shareholder.

Panel B: Outcomes of Activism (Lexis-Nexis News)
Outcome
No News
News:

Number of Unique Banks
166
171

% of All Banks
49.26%
50.74%

% of Banks with News

Changes of CEO
Board Seats Granted to Activist and/or his Nominees
Activist Is Not Granted Board Seats/Withdrawal/Proxy Defeat
Changes in By-Laws: Staggered Board, Poisson Pill etc.
Capital Structure:
Shares Repurchased / Dividend Policy
Capital Raise / Financing Agreement
Strategic Changes:

14
63
19
7

4.15%
18.69%
5.64%
2.08%

8.19%
36.84%
11.11%
4.09%

15
21

4.45%
6.23%

8.77%
12.28%

Takeover of the Target Completed
Activist Wants to Sell the Company and Does not Succeed
Announcement that Company Hires IB for Strategic Alternatives
Divestiture or Spinoff Completed or Announced
Acquisitions of Other Institutions
Other:
Settlement / Standstill Agreement
Activist Cuts Position Below 5%

37
7
5
1
10

10.98%
2.08%
1.48%
0.30%
2.97%

21.64%
4.09%
2.92%
0.58%
5.85%

49
45

14.54%
13.35%

28.65%
26.32%

Corporate Governance:
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CHAPTER 3
INTERNATIONALIZATION AND BANK RISK57,58
3.1 Introduction
Economists generally believe that diversification into activities with returns that are not
highly correlated with those of the existing portfolio reduces risk. However, this might not
always be the case. If the diversification is into activities with higher risk, it could increase
overall portfolio risk even if the returns on the activities are not highly correlated with those
of the existing portfolio. The recent global financial crisis has reinvigorated the debate on
the benefits of financial integration. During this crisis, risk seemed to be contagious across
countries, suggesting that diversification across international borders may not have been
effective. As also observed during the crisis, bank risk can have a first-
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order effect on financial and economic stability (Laeven and Levine, 2009). To mitigate
the destabilizing potential of such risk,national and international organizations have
focused on implementing regulations to limit bank risk and avoid future financial crises.59
Much of the focus of such reforms has been on constraining banks’ risk within one country.
However, Houston, Lin, and Ma (2012) and Ongena, Popov, and Udell (2013) suggest that
banks may engage in regulatory arbitrage, circumventing strict domestic regulations by
taking more risk abroad. This raises the question of how bank internationalization affects
the risk of individual banks. This is the question we address in this paper.
The literature identifies a number of other determinants of bank risk, including bank
capital (e.g., Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Holmstrom and
Tirole, 1997; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2011; Mehran and Thakor, 2011; Berger and
Bouwman, 2013), regulation and other government interventions (e.g., Laeven and Levine,
2009; Black and Hazelwood, 2013; Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck, 2014; Duchin
and Sosyura, 2014), competition (e.g., Keeley, 1990; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Berger,
Klapper, and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010), bank size (e.g.,
Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011; Bhagat, Bolton, and Lu, 2012),
and governance (e.g., Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990; Laeven and Levine, 2009;
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch, 2014).
However, to our knowledge no prior study focuses on the direct link between
internationalization and bank risk.60 Further, prior work has little to say about the effects

59

Examples include the Dodd-Frank requirement that systemically important financial institutions in the U.S.
receive additional supervision from the Federal Reserve and the Bank for International Settlements’ Basel
III capital and liquidity standards.

60

A partial exception is Buch, Koch, and Koetter (2013). However, their focus is different – on risk and
market power in an international context. As a side result, they find a weak negative relation between
internationalization and risk for German banks. We find a very different result for U.S. banks.
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of bank internationalization during financial crises. In addition, there is no research to our
knowledge that examines agency problems in explaining bank internationalization
decisions. This paper aims to fill these gaps in the literature.
There is also a literature that considers the effect of internationalization on
nonfinancial firm risk. There are two opposing views in this literature. On the one hand,
Hughes, Logue, and Sweeney (1975), Rugman (1976), Agmon and Lessard (1977),
Amihud and Lev (1981), and Michel and Shaked (1986) document a lower risk for
multinational corporations (MNCs) relative to purely domestic corporations. The most
cited argument for the observed lower risk is the diversification benefit of generating cash
flows in different countries. On the other hand, Bartov, Bodnar, and Kaul (1996) and Reeb,
Kwok, and Baek (1998) find a higher risk for these MNCs due to greater volatility of cash
flows. The most commonly advanced arguments for the observed higher risk are: foreign
exchange risk (Solnik, 1974; Eun and Resnik, 1988; Black, 1990), political risk (Mahajan,
1990; Burgman, 1996; Cuervo-Cazurra, Maloney, and Manrakhan, 2007), increased
agency problems and difficulties in effectively monitoring managers abroad (Lee and
Kwok, 1988), and the presence of asymmetric information due to competition and
unfamiliarity with the foreign markets (Reeb, Kwok, and Baek, 1998). These factors can
offset the benefit from the diversification of MNCs’ cash flows. Finally, Kwok and Reeb
(2000) find that the effect of internationalization on the risk of MNCs might vary with
home and host market conditions.
In contrast to the literature on nonfinancial firms, this paper focuses on banks
because bank risk is a central issue affecting financial stability, business cycle fluctuations,
and economic growth (Laeven and Levine, 2009). This paper also contributes to the

82

broader literature on internationalization by examining risk within one important industry
rather than across a number of very different industries with their confounding differences.
To investigate the impact of internationalization on bank risk, we first consider a
simple model of an international bank’s portfolio with two risky assets: a single foreign
asset with expected return
expected return

and standard deviation

and standard deviation

, and the bank invests proportion

and a single domestic asset with

. The correlation between the two assets is

in the foreign asset. Our (inverse) measure of risk

is Z-score. Z-score is defined as the sum of a bank’s mean return on assets and mean
capitalization ratio divided by the standard deviation of return on assets. We assess the
impact of the degree of internationalization, captured by
partial derivative of Z-score with respect to

, on Z-score by computing the

. We cannot unambiguously sign this

derivative, but we use Matlab to gain insight as to how the sign varies with different values
of the underlying parameters. Most findings are consistent with intuition.
From this model, we develop two hypotheses on the impact of internationalization
on bank risk. The diversification hypothesis suggests that international banks may have
lower risk because they diversify their portfolios (e.g., DeLong, 2001; Amihud, DeLong,
and Saunders, 2002; Laeven and Levine, 2007). For example, if asset returns are not highly
correlated across countries (

is low), internationally diversified banks may be safer

because they are less exposed to domestic shocks (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Demsetz and
Strahan, 1997) as long as the risk of the foreign asset is not too high relative to the risk of
the domestic asset (i.e.,

is not too large relative to

).
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and

is not too low relative to

Alternatively, the market risk hypothesis suggests that international banks may
have higher risk due to market-specific factors that make foreign assets relatively risky
(i. e. ,

high relative to

correlation

and/or

low relative to

), unless this risk is offset by a low

(e.g., Winton, 2000; Amihud, DeLong, and Saunders, 2002). Foreign

market conditions may cause international banks to face greater risks on their foreign
assets. As in the nonfinancial firm risk literature, foreign exchange risk may make foreign
assets riskier to the extent that they are not denominated in the home currency (e.g.,
Brimmer and Dahl, 1975). Further, local competition in the foreign markets may affect the
time it takes for a new entrant to establish market share and to create lending relationships
(e.g., Berger, Klapper, and Udell, 2001; Chari and Gupta, 2008). Another important factor
is the local culture (e.g., Li and Guisinger, 1992), since it takes time to learn the local
market’s language, preferences, and informal institutions. Other market factors include the
degree of regulatory, monetary, and legal complexity (e.g., Berger, Buch, DeLong, and
DeYoung, 2004; Alibux, 2007), the degree of economic and political instability (e.g.,
Shapiro, 1985; Brewer and Rivoli, 1990), and the extent of market imperfections and
asymmetric information problems in the foreign countries (e.g., Buch and DeLong, 2004;
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins, 2006). In addition, there may be operational diseconomies
associated with monitoring from a distance, consistent with the home field advantage
hypothesis of Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell (2000).
Importantly, both the diversification hypothesis and the market risk hypothesis may
hold simultaneously for different sets of banks. All that we can do as researchers is
determine which of these hypotheses has stronger empirical support, i.e., which hypothesis
empirically dominates the other. To address this question, we use virtually all (15,988)
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U.S. commercial banks for the period 1989:Q1 to 2010:Q4, and evaluate whether
international or purely domestic banks have more risk. We find that international banks
have much higher risk than purely domestic banks. In addition, we document that a greater
marginal degree of internationalization within the subset of internationalized banks is
associated with higher risk. These results are consistent with the empirical dominance of
the market risk hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis.
To ensure the robustness of our findings, we re-run our analyses using alternative
proxies for bank internationalization and risk, alternative samples, and alternative
estimation methods. We also address potential endogeneity issues using an instrumental
variable estimation and a propensity score matching analysis. In each of these checks, we
find evidence supporting our main findings.
In additional analyses, we examine the impact of internationalization on the three
components of Z-score – mean return on assets, mean capitalization ratio, and standard
deviation of returns – to identify the sources of the higher risk of internationalization. We
find that internationalization is associated with a higher volatility of bank earnings, which
might reflect higher risks that international banks face in the foreign markets. We also find
that internationalization is associated with lower mean profitability, consistent with prior
empirical evidence that banks’ foreign operations are generally relatively inefficient (e.g.,
Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell, 2000). In addition, internationalization is associated
with higher capitalization, perhaps designed to offset part of the higher risks from the other
sources.
We also examine publicly listed banks and banks in listed bank holding companies,
since this subsample allows us to examine market-based risk measures. We find that listed
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international banks have higher market risk as measured by higher standard deviations of
stock returns and lower Standard & Poor’s credit ratings than their purely domestic
counterparts, consistent with market participants being aware of the higher risk of
international banks. We also separately examine financial crisis periods and non-crisis
periods to investigate whether internationalization affects risk differently during financial
crises. Our results suggest that the relation between internationalization and risk is stronger
during financial crises. Finally, we find that the positive relation between
internationalization and bank risk is more pronounced in banks that are more likely to
suffer from agency problems related to poor corporate governance, supporting an empirebuilding explanation for the main results.
In the remainder of this chapter, Section 3.2 presents a simple model of an
international bank’s portfolio. Section 3.3 describes the data, variables, and summary
statistics. Section 3.4 presents the main results and Section 3.5 provides the robustness
tests. Section 3.6 discusses additional analyses. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 A Simple Model of an International Bank’s Portfolio
Assume that an international bank has a simple portfolio with two risky assets: a
foreign asset with expected return
expected return

and standard deviation

and standard deviation

and a domestic asset with

. The correlation between the two assets is

and the bank’s ratio of foreign assets to total assets is

, which ranges from 0 to 1.

The expected return of the portfolio is:
=

+ 1−

The variance of the portfolio is:
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.

(3.1)

=

+ 1−

+2

The standard deviation of the portfolio
=

1−

.

(3.2)

is:

+ 1−

+2

1−

.

(3.3)

Our (inverse) measure of risk is Z-score. Z-score for an international bank is:
+

=

⁄

,

(3.4)

where ⁄ represents the mean Capitalization Ratio.
We rewrite Z from equation (3.4) as:

+ 1−

=

+ 1−

+2

+

⁄

.

1−

(3. 5)

We attempt to assess the impact of internationalization on risk, that is, the effect of
the foreign assets ratio,

, on the Z-score:
/

We show in Appendix C that
/

=

!

! 1−

−
−

+ 1−
!
!

!
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.

can be written in terms of the basic parameters as:
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(3.7)
/

.

We cannot unambiguously sign this derivative, but we use Matlab to solve equation
(3.7) by entering the following parameters and conditions:
∈ !0,1",

∈ 0,1 ,

∈ !−1,1",

∈ 0,1 ,

∈ 0,0.5 , / ∈ 0,0.5 .

We consider starting values of 0 for

, 0.1 for

,

,

,

∈ 0, 0.5 ,

(3.8)

, and K/A, and -1 for

, and

increments of 0.1 for all.
The effect of higher

on

depends crucially on both

the foreign asset (i.e., magnitudes of

compared to

and

and the relative risk of
compared to

). There

are two clear-cut cases in which the correlation and the relative risks intuitively point to
reduced or increased risk from more investment in the foreign asset.
Case 1 – Negative correlation and relatively low foreign asset risk:
;

>
<

<

> 0;

>

.

Case 2 – Positive correlation and relatively high foreign asset risk:
;

≤ 0;

.

The findings are as follows. In Case 1, we find that

/

is mostly positive:

75,876 positive solutions, 28,667 negative solutions, and 1 zero solution. This is intuitive
and suggests that for most, but not all values, more of the foreign asset reduces overall
portfolio risk when the correlations of returns are negative and the foreign asset is relatively
safe.
In Case 2, we find that

/

is mostly negative: 90,194 negative solutions, 4,832

positive solutions, and 14 zero solutions. This is intuitive and suggests that for most, but
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not all values, more of the foreign asset increases overall portfolio risk when the
correlations of returns are positive and the foreign asset is relatively risky.
We also consider other possible cases in which there is either positive correlation
>0;

with relatively low foreign asset risk (

correlation with relatively high foreign asset risk (

<

≤ 0;

;
>

>
;

) or negative
<

, as well

as cases in which the mean and standard deviation relations go in the opposite directions
and find mixed results.61
The model suggests our two hypotheses regarding the effects of internationalization
( ) on bank risk ( ): the diversification hypothesis and the market risk hypothesis. The
diversification hypothesis that international banks have lower risk (

is not too low relative to

is not too large relative to

and

). This is best exemplified by Case 1. The market risk

hypothesis that international banks have higher risk (

/

specific factors make the foreign asset relatively risky (i.e.,
low relative to

> 0) will hold

is low) as long as the foreign

if asset returns are not highly correlated across countries (
asset is not risky relative to the domestic asset (i.e.,

/

< 0) will hold if markethigh relative to

unless they are offset by a low correlation

, and/or

. This is best

exemplified by Case 2.

To briefly summarize, in Case 3, positive correlation and relatively low foreign asset risk, /
is
positive for most parameter values. In Case 4, negative correlation and relatively high foreign asset risk,
/
is mostly negative. In Case 5, relatively high foreign asset return and relatively high foreign asset
risk, /
is mostly negative. In Case 6, relatively low foreign asset return and relatively low foreign asset
risk, /
is mostly positive.
61
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3.3 Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics
3.3.1 Sample banks
We acquire bank data from quarterly Call Reports, which contain financial
information on all banks in the U.S. Our raw data cover the period 1986:Q1 to 2010:Q4,
although our risk measure starts in 1989:Q1 because of the lag structure of our model. We
adjust the data to be in real 2010:Q4 terms using the GDP price deflator. Our initial dataset
comprises 1,069,609 bank-quarter observations. We omit observations that do not refer to
commercial banks according to the Call Reports Indicator, which leaves 969,053
observations. We next remove any bank-quarter observations with missing or incomplete
financial data on basic accounting variables such as total assets and equity, as well as
observations that have missing or negative data for income statement variables such as
interest expenses, personnel expenses, and non-interest expenses, resulting in 964,150
bank-quarter observations. Following the procedure in Berger and Bouwman (2009), we
further refine our sample by excluding observations with i) gross total assets (GTA)62 less
than or equal to $25 million and ii) no outstanding loans or deposits (i.e., entities not
engaged in deposit-taking or loan-making, which are required for banks to be considered
commercial banks). These screens leave us with a final sample of 778,664 bank-quarter
observations for 15,988 commercial banks over the entire sample period. Finally, to avoid
distortions in ratios that contain equity, for all observations with total equity less than 1%
of total assets, we replace equity with 1% of total assets.

62

Gross total assets (GTA) equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated
transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). Total assets on Call Reports deduct these two
reserves, which are held to cover potential credit losses. We add these reserves back to measure the full value
of the assets financed.
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3.3.2 Bank variables
3.3.2.1 Measures of risk
As noted, our main (inverse) measure of bank risk is Z‐Score, with larger values

indicating lower overall bank risk (e.g., Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Laeven and Levine, 2009;

Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma, 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). It is calculated as the sum of
a bank’s mean ROA (net income over GTA) and mean Capitalization Ratio (equity capital
over GTA) divided by Stdv. ROA (the volatility of ROA). In our main analysis, we compute

Z‐Scores over a 12-quarter period, following a methodology similar to Berger, Klapper,
and Turk-Ariss (2009) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010).

We also employ several alternative measures of bank risk. We take the log of the
12-quarter Z-score. We also construct Z-score over 8 quarters and 20 quarters. We use
Stdv. ROE, the standard deviation of ROE over 12 quarters, where ROE is net income over
total equity. We also use the Sharpe Ratio, calculated as the risk-adjusted rate of return on
equity (mean ROE/Stdv. ROE), following Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010). In
addition, we use NPL Ratio, the nonperforming loans ratio, a measure of financial stability
calculated as the bank ratio of nonperforming loans (past due at least 90 days or in
nonaccrual status) to total loans (e.g., Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss, 2009), and LLA
Ratio, the ratio of the loan and lease loss allowance to total loans.
3.3.2.2 Measures of internationalization
We construct several measures of bank internationalization, following Cetorelli and
Goldberg (2012). Our main measure is Foreign Assets Ratio, the ratio of a bank’s foreign
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assets to GTA.

6364

A larger Foreign Assets Ratio indicates a higher degree of

internationalization, while a ratio of 0 indicates that a bank has purely domestic operations.
We also specify three alternative measures of internationalization. The first is Bank
Internationalization Dummy, which takes the value 1 if Foreign Assets Ratio is positive,
and 0 otherwise. The second is Foreign Loans Ratio, the ratio of a bank’s foreign loans to
the total loans of the bank. The third is Foreign Deposits Ratio, the ratio of foreign deposits
to total deposits.
3.3.2.3 Control variables
To isolate the role of internationalization in bank risk, we employ a number of
control variables for bank characteristics shown to affect a bank’s risk outcome. We first
control for Income Diversification. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) and Baele, De
Jonghe, and Vander Vennet (2007) find that a greater reliance on non-interest income is
linked to more volatile returns. Stiroh (2006) finds a negative link between total bank risk
and diversification of revenue. 65 We follow Laeven and Levine (2007) and construct
Income Diversification as 1 – |(Net Interest Income – Other Operating Income)/(Total
Operating Income)|.66

63

Due to data limitations, we are only able to capture the assets in the foreign offices of U.S. banks, not the
foreign assets in domestic offices. We also lack information on host countries where foreign offices of U.S.
banks operate.
64

Our data for the foreign assets is sourced from the Call Report, where this data is already converted into
U.S. dollars, (eliminating the need for conversion from other currencies).
65

In a study of European banks, LePetit, Nys, Rous, and Tarazi (2008) find that increased non-interest income
exposure is positively linked to risk. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) also find that an increased share of volatile
non-interest activities outweighs the diversification benefits. Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010) use a
diversification index and find that diversification reduces risk.
66

In unreported results, we also run our regression analysis using a measure of asset diversification, which
is calculated as 1 – |(Net Loans – Other Operating Assets)/(Total Earning Assets)|. The relation between
internationalization and risk does not change.
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Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), we include Size, measured as the
log of GTA, since prior research shows that bank size is an important determinant of
international competitive success (e.g., Hirtle, 1991), and that risk varies with bank size.
In particular, prior work shows that larger banks have a greater capacity to absorb risk (e.g.,
Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck, 2014), economies of scale in foreign exchange
management (e.g., Minh To and Tripe, 2002), and more stable earnings (e.g., De Haan and
Poghosyan, 2012). Alternatively, larger banks may take on higher risk due to safety-net
policies that can put them under the “too big to fail” umbrella (e.g., O’Hara and Shaw,
1990).
Our third control is the public status of the bank, Listed, since prior research shows
that this factor affects risk (e.g., Nichols, Wahlen, and Wieland, 2009; Barry, Lepetit, and
Tarazi, 2011). Banks that are publicly traded could have different risk behavior because
they tend to be more informationally transparent, and are subject to more monitoring from
capital markets. We construct Listed as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a bank is listed
or is part of a bank holding company that is listed, and 0 otherwise.
Fourth, we control for membership in a bank holding company, BHC. Such
membership is expected to help a bank strengthen its position because the holding company
is required to support its affiliates by injecting capital as needed. Consistent with this view,
Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) find that bank loan growth depends on bank holding
company membership. We construct BHC as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the bank
is part of a bank holding company, and 0 otherwise.
Our fifth control is Overhead Costs, which captures the bank’s operating cost
structure. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find that banks with high overhead costs
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are less stable. We construct Overhead Costs as the ratio of total bank operating expenses
to GTA.
Finally, we control for the effect of the regulatory environment on bank risk (e.g.,
Laeven and Levine, 2009; Berger and Bouwman, 2013). We control for potential
differences in bank stability owing to a bank’s primary federal regulator with three proxies.
We include FED and OCC, dummies that equal 1 if the Federal Reserve or the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, respectively, is the bank’s primary federal regulator. We
omit FDIC, a dummy that equals 1 if the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is the
bank’s primary federal regulator, to avoid perfect collinearity.
3.3.3 Summary statistics
Figure 3.1 plots the evolution of the numbers of U.S. commercial banks with
foreign assets, foreign loans, and foreign deposits over our sample period (1989:Q1–
2010:Q4). There is a decline in the number of international commercial banks with foreign
assets, from 181 in 1989:Q1 to 53 in 2010:Q4, which could be due to the consolidation of
the banking sector.67 However, the total number of unique international banks over our
entire sample period is 390, which is much larger than the number at the beginning of our
sample period due to new entries and switches. A similar pattern obtains in the evolution
of internationalization ratios in Figure 3.2, with Foreign Assets Ratio declining from 0.23%
to 0.05%, Foreign Loans Ratio declining from 0.16% to 0.05%, and Foreign Deposits
Ratio declining to a lesser degree, from 0.35% to 0.18%.

67

Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) report in their Table II that the number of global banks was 247 in 1985,
170 in 1995, and 107 in 2005. Our numbers are slightly lower because we focus only on commercial banks,
whereas Cetorelli and Goldberg include all banks in the Call Reports.
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In Figure 3.3, we find that despite the decline in the number of international banks
and internationalization ratios, there are increases in the dollar amounts of their foreign
activities, foreign assets, foreign loans, and foreign deposits. Thus, the decline in the ratios
was primarily due to domestic assets, loans, and deposits growing faster than
corresponding foreign quantities over the sample period.
Figure 3.4 compares the risk (Z-score) of international commercial banks with
purely domestic peers. This figure also depicts crisis periods, with banking crises (crises
originating in the banking sector) represented by dark gray shaded areas and market crises
(crises originating in capital markets) by light gray shaded areas following the definitions
in Berger and Bouwman (2013) (discussed in more detail in Section 3.6.3). The figure
shows that the mean Z-score of international banks is lower than that of purely domestic
banks each year in the sample, with the exception of a short period prior to the recent
subprime mortgage crisis. This is generally consistent with the empirical dominance of the
market risk hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis. Comparing financial crises with
normal time periods, the figure also reveals a steeper decline in the mean Z-score for
international banks during financial crises. These raw data are generally consistent with a
stronger dominance of the market risk hypothesis during crises.
Table 3.1 provides definitions and summary statistics for our variables. In terms of
risk, commercial banks have a mean 12-quarter Z-score of 36.053, indicating that the
average bank is very far from default, a mean Stdv. ROE of 0.035, and a mean NPL Ratio
of 0.016. The internationalization measures indicate that on average 0.1–0.3% of U.S.
commercial banks’ operations are international, with some banks having very intense
foreign operations during some of the bank-quarters (unreported). In terms of bank
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characteristics, the average commercial bank has a level of Income Diversification of 20%,
and a Size of 11.9 (mean GTA of $0.968 billion). About 15% of the commercial banks are
listed or part of a listed bank holding company (Listed) and about 70% are owned by a
bank holding company (BHC). Also, the average commercial bank has Overhead Costs of
1.62. Finally, 10.6%, 30.9%, and 58.5% of the banks have the FED, the OCC, and the
FDIC as their primary regulator, respectively.68
Table 3.2 presents correlations among the key variables. Banks with higher Foreign
Assets Ratios exhibit lower Z-scores, suggesting that, consistent with Figure 4, these banks
have a higher likelihood of default. Furthermore, international banks tend to have more
Income Diversification, are larger (Size), are more likely to be publicly listed (Listed), are
less likely to be members of bank holding companies (BHC), and have higher overhead
costs (Overhead Costs). Banks that internationalize are also more likely to have the FED
or the OCC as their primary regulator, likely because they tend to be among the larger
banks that are either state-chartered members of the Federal Reserve or nationallychartered.
3.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we empirically analyze the effect of internationalization on bank
risk. We first perform univariate tests that compare the risk of international versus purely
domestic banks. We then conduct multivariate regressions with control variables included.
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These percentages do not sum up to exactly 100% due to rounding.
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3.4.1 Univariate analysis
We compare the means and medians of our measures of bank risk (Z-score, Stdv.
ROE, Sharpe Ratio, NPL Ratio, and LLA Ratio) for the international bank and domestic
bank subsamples in Table 3.3. The results in Panel A indicate that the mean (median) 12quarter Z-score is 28.69 (20.24) for international banks compared to 36.16 (28.41) for
domestic banks. These differences, which are statistically significant at the 1% level,
support the view that banks with international operations are riskier, consistent with the
empirical dominance of the market risk hypothesis.
This result continues to hold using alternative measures of risk. For instance, the
mean (median) logarithm of the 12-quarter Z-score is 0.35 (0.33) lower, the mean (median)
8-quarter Z-score is 7.40 (9.05) lower, and the mean (median) 20-quarter Z-score is 6.90
(6.88) lower for international banks. Moreover, the standard deviation of ROE is larger for
international banks than their domestic peers, with the difference in the mean (median) of
0.0049 (0.0053). The Sharpe Ratio is smaller for international banks compared to domestic
peers, with the difference in the mean (median) of -0.49 (-0.72). We also find that the ratio
of nonperforming loans (NPL Ratio) and the ratio of loan loss allowances (LLA Ratio) are
higher for international than domestic banks, with the difference in the mean (median) of
0.0106 (0.0060) and 0.0128 (0.0068), respectively. All of these differences are statistically
significant, except for the mean difference of the Sharpe Ratio. Each of the findings above
suggests that international banks are riskier, consistent with the empirical dominance of the
market risk hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis.
Furthermore, Panel B compares the means and medians of 12-quarter Z-score for
international banks and domestic banks by different bank size categories to mitigate the
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potential concern that our results are driven by a particular bank size group. We define
small banks as having GTA less than $1 billion, medium-sized banks as having GTA
between $1 billion and $5 billion, and large banks as having GTA greater than $5 billion.
All size thresholds are measured in constant 2010:Q4 dollars. The results indicate that the
mean (median) 12-quarter Z-score is 10.13 (8.85) lower for small international banks,
14.98 (10.50) lower for medium international banks, and 6.71 (5.13) for large international
banks. All differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, our preliminary
evidence provides consistent support for the view that international banks are riskier than
purely domestic banks, consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk
hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis.
3.4.2 Regression analysis
To examine the relation between internationalization and bank risk in a multivariate
setting, we estimate several versions of the following model:
,-./0,12345,1 = 6 + 75 ⋅ 9:;<=:>;-?:>@-A>;-?:0,123 + 7 ⋅ B?:;=?@.0,123 + C1
+ D0,12345,1

(3.9)

where Risk is bank risk as measured by Z-score and the other proxies outlined in Section
3.3.2.1, Internationalization is bank internationalization as measured by the proxies
discussed in Section 3.3.2.2, Controls is the vector of bank control variables described in
Section 3.3.2.3, ω denotes time fixed effects, and ε is an error term. Because risk is likely
correlated within a bank over time, we adjust standard errors for clustering at the bank
level. 69 The risk variables are measured over the k quarters from t-k+1 to t, while the
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We consider alternative ways to adjust the standard errors for possible dependence in the residuals in
Section 3.5.3.
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independent variables are measured in the quarter t-k to ensure that they are predetermined
relative to the dependent variable.70 We use k=12 in our main analysis and consider other
values in Section 3.5.1.
The results are presented in Table 3.4 Panel A. Model 1 reports results from
regressing Z-score on Foreign Assets Ratio (our main internationalization measure) using
ordinary least squares (OLS). After controlling for bank characteristics and time fixed
effects, we find that the coefficient on Foreign Assets Ratio is negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level. This result is also economically material – moving the Foreign
Assets Ratio from 0 to 0.0992 (the mean of the Foreign Assets Ratio for the international
banks in our sample), with all other independent variables held at their means, decreases
Z-score by about 6.752 (from 38.429 to 31.677). This suggests that bank
internationalization is associated with greater bank risk, consistent with the empirical
dominance of the market risk hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis.
In Model 2, we replace Foreign Assets Ratio with Bank Internationalization
Dummy. The coefficient estimate on Bank Internationalization Dummy is negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level. This estimate is also economically material—
moving Bank Internationalization Dummy from 0 to 1 (i.e., the bank internationalizes),
with all other independent variables held at their means, decreases Z-score by about half
from 38.617 to 19.066, again consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk
hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis.

70

Some researchers argue that models with lagged independent variables help attenuate endogeneity
concerns (e.g., Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy, 2010). However, we recognize that endogeneity might still be an
issue. We methodically address this concern in Section 3.5.4.
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In Model 3, we assess the impact of the Foreign Assets Ratio for the subsample of
banks with nonzero Foreign Assets Ratio. We find that international banks with greater
foreign assets ratios are riskier. This suggests that in addition to internationalization status,
the degree of bank internationalization also matters for bank risk.
Models 4 to 8 of Table 3.4 report additional results. In Model 4, we exclude toobig-to-fail entities, defined as banks with GTA greater than $100 billion, consistent with
banks that were subject to stress tests or the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program
(SCAP) and the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). In Model 5, we
exclude the 20 most internationally active banking organizations, defined as entities with
the largest Foreign Assets Ratio in each quarter. In Models 4 and 5, we continue to find
that international banks are riskier, suggesting that our core result is not driven by too-bigto-fail or the most internationally active banks. Next, we report results by bank size to
assess whether our main evidence is concentrated in a particular bank size class, since
previous studies find differences in portfolio composition by bank size (e.g., Berger, Miller,
Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005). In Models 6 to 8, we find that bank internationalization
is associated with higher risk across all size classes.
Turning to the bank controls, we find across nearly all models in Table 3.4 that firm
size has positive coefficients, consistent with larger banks having better risk management
skills and/or greater capacity to absorb losses through risk diversification, consistent with
Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2014). We also find that Listed has positive and
significant coefficients, suggesting that public status is associated with less insolvency risk,
consistent with Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010). We further find that BHC membership
is associated with higher values of Z-score. Next, Overhead Costs enters with negative
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coefficients, consistent with the finding in Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) that banks
with higher overhead costs are less stable. Finally, we find that the regulatory environment
matters for bank risk. Specifically, we find that FED and OCC enter with positive and
statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that Federal Reserve- and OCC-regulated
banks are less risky than FDIC-regulated banks.
For bank holding companies, it might be that the risk of the group is more relevant
than the risk of individual banks. To account for this possibility, we consolidate the
commercial banks in multibank holding companies at the holding company level (BHC)
and re-run all of the regressions. The results, reported in Table 3.4 Panel B, are consistent
with our previous evidence, suggesting that internationalization is associated with greater
risk.
3.5 Robustness Tests
3.5.1 Alternative measures of risk
In Table 3.5, we examine whether our main results are sensitive to alternative
measures of bank risk. Unless specifically stated otherwise, these measures are also
computed over the 12-quarter interval from t–11 to t. In Model 1, we analyze the sensitivity
of our results to using the log of Z-score as the dependent variable. This specification has
the advantage of mitigating the impact of outliers. Next, we compute Z-score over
alternative time intervals. Specifically, the dependent variable is Z-score computed over 8
quarters (from t–7 to t) in Model 2 and Z-score computed over 20 quarters (from t–19 to t)
in Model 3. Next, in Model 4 we use as the dependent variable Sharpe Ratio, the riskadjusted return on equity (mean ROE/Stdv. ROE). In Model 5, we use Stdv. ROE, the
standard deviation of ROE. In Model 6, we use NPL Ratio, the bank ratio of nonperforming
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loans to total loans. Finally, we report regression estimates using LLA Ratio, the ratio of
loan and lease loss allowance to total loans, in Model 7. In Models 6 and 7, we measure
the risk variables at the end of quarter t.71 In each of the specifications, we find that the
coefficient on Foreign Assets Ratio is statistically significant at the 5% level or better in
the direction of internationalization being associated with more risk, reinforcing our
finding of an empirical dominance of the market risk hypothesis over the diversification
hypothesis.
3.5.2 Alternative measures of internationalization
In Table 3.6, we examine whether our findings persist when we consider alternative
measures of internationalization. For ease of comparison, we repeat the results based on
Foreign Assets Ratio, our primary measure of internationalization, in Model 1. We use
Foreign Loans Ratio (the ratio of the bank’s total foreign loans to total loans) in Model 2
and Foreign Deposits Ratio (the ratio of the bank’s foreign deposits to total deposits) in
Model 3. In each of these regressions, the coefficient on the internationalization variable is
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the positive relation
between internationalization and risk is robust to using alternative measures of
internationalization.

71
For Models 1, 4, and 5, the independent variables are constructed as of quarter t–12, since the dependent
variable is computed over t–11 to t. For Model 2, the independent variables are constructed as of quarter t–
8, while for Model 3, the independent variables are constructed as of quarter t–20. Finally, for Models 6 and
7, we lag the independent variables by 1 quarter as the dependent variables only contain contemporaneous
components.
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3.5.3 Alternative econometric specifications and standard errors
Table 3.7 reports results from employing alternative econometric specifications and
alternative standard errors. Model 1 again reports the results from our main specification
to facilitate comparison.
In Models 2 to 5, we use alternative methodologies to correct standard errors for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. In Model 2, we report Newey-West standard errors
to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. In Model 3, we employ Prais-Winsten
standard errors that extend the Newey-West correction by integrating the panel structure
of the data. In Model 4, we make inferences based on the standard errors of the time series
of coefficients to account for cross-sectional dependence (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). In
Model 5, we implement two-way clustering by bank and time to allow for correlations
among different banks in the same quarter and across quarters for the same bank
(Thompson, 2011). The results confirm our earlier evidence: the coefficient on Foreign
Assets Ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases.
3.5.4 Endogeneity and sample selection concerns
In this section, we perform tests to address the potential endogeneity of our
internationalization variable, which could bias our findings. In particular, there could be a
causal link from bank risk to internationalization. For example, banks with risky assets
could have incentives to internationalize to diversify their risks. This may result in
correlation between our internationalization proxy and the error term, leading to spurious
inferences on the effect of internationalization on bank risk. We conduct tests to address
this potential problem as well as the related concern of self-selection bias.
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Instrumental variables. We use instrumental variable (IV) estimation to extract the
exogenous component of bank internationalization in assessing the influence of
internationalization on risk. A proper instrument should satisfy the requirements of
relevance and exogeneity, that is, it must correlate with bank internationalization, but not
be a direct cause of bank risk.
Our instrument is Border State, a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is headquartered in
one of the U.S. states bordering an ocean, Canada, or Mexico, and 0 otherwise.72 Border
State should be positively correlated with internationalization, as banks in border states are
more likely to have foreign operations. Also, the average bank in the sample was
established 62.6 years ago, suggesting that for most cases, the bank choice of state
headquarters location occurred long before the decision to internationalize, suggesting that
the decision to locate in the state is not endogenous.
The IV regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 3.8. To facilitate
comparison, we include the OLS results from Model 1 of Table 4 in the first column. We
report the first-stage regression results in Model 2 and the second-stage results for the 2SLS
estimation in Model 3.
The first-stage regression indicates that our instrumental variable, Border State, is
positively and significantly (at the 1% level) related to internationalization. We perform
two tests to check the suitability of the selected instrument. First, we conduct the
Kleibergen-Paap under-identification test to evaluate the rank condition. We find that the
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level (rk LM = 739.551 with
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These states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.
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a p-value less than 0.001), indicating that the model is well identified. Second, using an
instrument that is weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable can lead to
large inconsistencies in the coefficient estimates. To examine the relevance of our IV, we
conduct an F-test of the excluded exogenous variable in the first stage regression, in which
the null hypothesis is that the instrument does not explain the variation in the Foreign
Assets Ratio. We reject this null hypothesis at the 1% level (F = 720.795 with a p-value
less than 0.001). The second-stage regression indicates that bank internationalization is
associated with greater risk, consistent with our earlier evidence. The IV estimate is much
larger in absolute value terms than the OLS estimate. 73 This suggests that in our main
regressions, OLS may underestimate the causal effect of bank internationalization on risk.
Propensity score matching analysis. To confront the issue of self-selection bias, we
use propensity score matching (PSM) analysis, developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983), closely following Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011).74 We conduct both
a univariate comparison between international and domestic banks and a regression
analysis.
PSM analysis involves matching observations based on the probability of
undergoing the treatment, which in our case is the probability of internationalizing.
Specifically, PSM estimates the effect of internationalization on a bank’s risk by comparing
the risk (Z-score) of banks that expand into foreign markets (treatment group) with the risk
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Documenting a much larger coefficient estimate for IV compared to OLS is consistent with Levitt (1996)
and Berger and Bouwman (2009).

74

As noted by Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011), PSM has important advantages such as: 1) the
ability to produce samples in which the treated and untreated entities are similar, providing a natural
framework to estimate the effects of treatment and firm characteristics; 2) independence from an explicit
functional form (as opposed to Heckman selection models); and 3) the ability to estimate the treatment effects
more directly as well as the ability to alleviate potential nonlinearities related to the treatment effects.
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of banks that have a similar probability of going international, but for which no such event
takes place (control group). This quasi-experiment is conducted by matching each
international bank with one or more domestic banks sharing similar characteristics as
indicated by their propensity scores. The effect of internationalization is calculated as the
average difference between the international group and the matched control group. To
estimate a bank’s propensity score, we use a probit model in which the dependent variable
is Bank Internationalization Dummy, the indicator for whether the bank has positive
foreign assets. The independent variables are bank characteristics from our main model,
our instrumental variable, Border State, as well as time fixed effects.
We use several matching techniques. First, we use one-to-one matching without
replacement, matching each international bank (treated group) to the nearest domestic
(untreated) control bank. This technique ensures that we do not have multiple domestic
banks assigned to the same international bank, which can lead to a smaller control group
than the treated group. Second, we use one-to-one matching with replacement, which
differs in that each treated bank is matched to the nearest control bank even if the latter is
used more than once (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Finally, we use nearest-neighbor
matching with n=2 and n=3 with replacement, which match each international bank with
the two and three domestic banks with the closest propensity scores, respectively.75
We first estimate the internationalization effect on risk as the mean difference
between international banks’ risk and that of their matched domestic peers. We then
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In unreported tests, we compare the means of the bank characteristics used in the selection models across
the international and domestic bank samples to assess the effectiveness of our propensity matching procedure.
Reassuringly, these results indicate that the distributions of the bank characteristics are statistically
indistinguishable between the international and domestic samples at conventional levels.
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perform regressions on the matched samples to control for observable confounders in the
process of estimating the causal effects. Panel B of Table 3.8 reports both univariate and
regression tests.76 In the univariate tests, we report t-statistics for the differences in risk
between the treated and control groups for each of the four PSM techniques. Using one-toone matching without replacement, we find that Z-score is 6.44 lower for international
banks than for the control group. Applying the other three techniques, we obtain differences
in Z-score of 5.96, 6.04, and 6.08, respectively. All differences are significant at the 1%
level.
Turning to the regression analysis, we regress the Z-score on the Foreign Assets
Ratio and all control variables and time fixed effects used in the main regression
specification using only the treated and control banks. In all matched samples (Models 1
to 4), we continue to find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on Foreign
Assets Ratio, consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk hypothesis over
the diversification hypothesis. This evidence helps dispel the competing explanation that
our results above spuriously reflect differences in the characteristics of international banks
and purely domestic banks, rather than the effect of internationalization on bank risk.77

76
The number of banks included is larger than (the number of unique international banks)+(n+1), where n is
the number of matches for each bank. This is because matches are done individually quarter-by-quarter as
characteristics of the banks can change over time and thus a bank can be matched to different banks in
different quarters. For one-to-one matching without replacement, we have 8,886 observations in the treated
group and 8,886 observations in the control group. For one-to-one matching with replacement, we have 8,886
observations in the treated group and 5,835 observations in the control group. For nearest-neighbor matching
with n=2 and replacement, and respectively nearest-neighbor matching with n=3 and replacement, we have
8,886 observations in the treated group (international banks), and 10,219 observations, and respectively
13,960 observations in the control group.
77
In unreported results, we analyze changes in the Z-score when the internationalization status of our sample
banks changes. The results suggest that, on average, banks seem to increase risk when they become
international, but do not decrease risk when they revert back to domestic status. In our analysis we focus on
the full sample of international and purely domestic banks rather than the switches between the two categories
because the small number of switches may not provide a meaningful analysis.
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3.6 Additional Analyses
3.6.1 Z-score decomposition
To shed light on the channels through which bank internationalization affects risk,
we decompose Z-score into its three components: mean ROA, mean Capitalization Ratio,
and Stdv. ROA. In Table 3.9, we report results of regressions of these components of Zscore on Foreign Assets Ratio. The regressions include the same control variables and time
fixed effects as in our main specification.
In Model 1, we find that bank internationalization is associated with lower
profitability as measured by mean ROA, consistent with findings in DeYoung and Nolle
(1996), Peek, Rosengren, and Kasirye (1999), and Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell
(2000). Our result is also consistent with Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013), who find that
bank geographical diversification across U.S. states is detrimental to bank performance. In
Model 2, we find that bank internationalization is associated with increased mean
Capitalization Ratio, which reduces bank risk. To the extent that bank managers are aware
that internationalization is associated with higher risk, they may want to partially offset
this as a precautionary measure with a higher Capitalization Ratio. Similarly, to the extent
that capital market participants and regulators are aware of the higher risks associated with
internationalization activities, they may pressure banks to increase their capital as well. In
Model 3, we find that bank internationalization is associated with increased volatility in
bank profitability as measured by Stdv. ROA, which increases bank risk.
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3.6.2 Listed banks and market measures of risk
In Table 3.10, we investigate whether our main results are sensitive to examining
the subsample of publicly listed banks and those in publicly traded holding companies.
This allows us toanalyze the impact of internationalization on bank risk using several
market-based risk measures. We aggregate banks in the Call Reports at the holding
company level and merge the resulting sample with CRSP to obtain stock returns and with
Compustat to obtain S&P credit ratings. We first employ the 12-quarter accounting Z-score
as above as our dependent variable for this subsample of banks in Model 1. Despite the
dramatic decrease in the number of observations (29,953 listed banks compared to 600,953
in the full sample), our core evidence persists in this subsample of banks.
We construct three measures of bank market risk based on stock returns. First, we
estimate Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model for each bank at the end of each calendar
quarter using daily stock returns over the previous 12 months. Specifically, we regress each
bank’s stock returns on the Fama and French (1993) three factors (Market, HML, and
SMB) and the momentum factor (UMD), and then construct Idiosyncratic Risk as the
standard deviation of the regression’s residuals. Second, at the end of each calendar quarter,
we compute Total Bank Risk as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the
previous 12 months (Esty, 1998). Third, we compute Merton Default Probability as the
normal transform of the distance-to-default measure (Merton, 1974) using bank-level stock
return data from CRSP and financial data from the Call Report.78 We use Idiosyncratic
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We model the market equity value of a bank as a call option on the bank’s assets, where we use the market
value of equity to proxy for the market value of the bank and total liabilities to proxy for the face value of
debt following Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton (2013). The call option on the bank’s assets is given as
follows: (i) EF = EG < 2H I J5 − K< 2H I J + 1 − < 2H EG ; J5 = !@: EG ⁄K + = + .G ⁄2 L"⁄.G √L ;
J = J5 − .G √L, where EF is the market value of a bank, EG is the value of the bank’s total assets, K is the
face value of debt proxied by the total bank liabilities, L equals 1 year, = is the market yield on U.S. Treasury
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Risk, Total Bank Risk, and Merton Default Probability as our measures of bank risk in
Models 2, 3, and 4 respectively.
Finally, we create two measures of bank market risk based on credit ratings. First,
we convert the quarter-end long-term issuer credit ratings compiled by Standard & Poor’s
(S&P) to a numeric scale. Specifically, we create S&P Credit Rating by assigning a value
of 8 if the bank has an S&P rating of AAA, 7 if AA, 6 if A, 5 if BBB, 4 if BB, 3 if B, 2 if
CCC, and 1 if CC. Second, we create the dummy S&P Investment Grade, which is equal
to 1 if the bank has a credit rating of BBB or higher, and 0 otherwise. Higher values of
these two variables indicate lower risk.79 We consider the effect of internationalization on
S&P Credit Rating using an ordered probit analysis in Model 5 and S&P Investment Grade
using a simple probit analysis in Model 6.
The results in Table 3.10 indicate that international public banks have higher
idiosyncratic risk, higher total bank risk, higher probability of default, and lower credit
ratings than purely domestic public banks, suggesting that capital market participants
recognize the higher risk of international banks.
3.6.3 Internationalization and risk during financial crises
In Table 3.11, we examine the effect of internationalization and bank risk during
financial crises and normal times to explore whether internationalization affects risk
Securities at 1-year constant maturity, which we take to be the risk-free rate, .G is the volatility of the value
of assets, which is related to equity volatility .F , which is the standard deviation of daily equity returns over
each time period calculated as follows: (ii) .F = !EG < 2H I J5 .G "⁄ EF . We simultaneously solve equations
(i) and (ii) to obtain the values of EG and .G . Once we determine EG , we follow Hillegeist, Keating, Cram,
and Lundstedt (2004) and Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton (2013) and compute a bank’s asset returns as
N = N>OPQEG,1 ⁄EG,125 R − 1, =S . Finally, we compute the Merton Default Probability as
IP− @:!EG ⁄K " + !N − .G ⁄2 L" ⁄.G √LS.
79

We exclude unrated banks from this analysis.
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differently during financial crises. On the one hand, international banks may increase their
risk less than purely domestic banks during financial crises because their exposure to
shocks is lessened as they hold assets and deposits both in the domestic and foreign
markets. This could offer them greater income diversification and risk-sharing, provide
them with a stronger and more diversified deposit base, and ensure better liquidity
provision through access to international capital markets (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011).
On the other hand, international banks may further increase their risk during
financial crises because of their organizational complexity, making it difficult for
management to deal with financial crises. International banks may also rely more often on
inter-bank and capital markets for their funding, while domestic banks may rely more on
insured deposits, which are less volatile during financial crises.
To identify financial crises, we follow Berger and Bouwman (2013). Specifically,
we identify two banking crises (crises that originated in the banking sector) – the credit
crunch (1990:Q1–1992:Q4) and the subprime lending crisis (2007:Q3–2009:Q4) – and two
market crises (crises that originated in the financial market) – the Russian debt crisis/Long
Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout (1998:Q3–1998:Q4), and the bursting of the
dot.com bubble and September 11 (2000:Q2–2002:Q3). We first include the interaction
term Foreign Assets Ratio × Financial Crises in Model 1 and focus on whether there is a
difference in the effects of the Foreign Assets Ratio during financial crises. In Models 2
and 3, we consider separate interaction terms with a Banking Crises dummy and a Market
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Crises dummy, respectively. In Model 4, we include interactions with both the Banking
Crises and Market Crises dummies.80
The results suggest that the impact of bank internationalization on risk is higher
during financial crises than in normal times, as indicated by the negative coefficient on the
interaction term Foreign Assets Ratio × Financial Crises in Model 1.81 When we split
financial crises into banking crises and market crises, the effect of internationalization on
risk is more pronounced during market crises as indicated by Models 2, 3, and 4. Moreover,
in unreported results we conduct a t-test for the equality of the effects of
internationalization for the two types of crises from Model 4 and find that the coefficients
of the two interaction terms are statistically significantly different from one another (t =
2.702). Our result on market crises may be due to recent developments that have made
banking organizations more dependent on the capital markets (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 2012; IMF Financial Stability Report, 2012). The lower increase in risk as a result
of internationalization during banking crises may also be due to internationalized banks
cutting back their risks more or receiving more government help during banking crises.
3.6.4 Why do banks internationalize?
Our findings raise the question of why banks internationalize. We offer three
potential explanations. First, banks may internationalize to achieve higher returns.
However, our results seem to contradict this explanation, given that we find lower mean

80
We do not include the financial crises dummies as stand-alone variables because they would be subsumed
by the time fixed effects. However, in unreported tests, we replace the time fixed effects with the financial
crises dummies and find consistent results.
81

In a theoretical framework, Wagner (2011) discusses a possibility where the probability of joint liquidation
of assets during a crisis may lead banks to forgo some diversification benefits.
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profitability for internationalized banks. Second, banks may follow their important
customers abroad as part of a defensive strategy by setting up offices in countries where
their home country customers have foreign affiliates to avoid losing their clients’ business
and maintain existing relationships (e.g., Brimmer and Dahl, 1975; Goldberg and Saunders,
1981; Grosse and Goldberg, 1991; Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996). Although this
phenomenon might occur, it is unlikely to explain our results, as we would expect that such
a strategy should at least translate into large enough financial benefits from servicing
important customers abroad to offset the costs of bank internationalization. 82 Third,
internationalization could be driven by empire-building behavior of bank managers (e.g.,
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Roll, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Managers that enlarge
their banks through international activities may gain higher compensation and/or more
prestige than domestic bank managers. This might occur if there are significant agency
problems in banking, particularly if these agency problems are intensified by bank
diversification (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007; Goetz, Laeven, and Levine, 2013).
We investigate whether empire-building is a potential explanation for our results.
Our empirical strategy involves estimating our model for subsamples of banks with varying
levels of agency problems due to differences in corporate governance. This analysis is
limited to publicly listed banks because corporate governance data are available only for
these banks.

82

There is also some evidence that international banks do not always rely heavily on a “follow your
customer” strategy to support their multinational expansion (e.g., Engwall and Wallenstål, 1988; Hellman,
1996; Miller and Parkhe, 1998; Seth, Nolle, and Mohanty, 1998).
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Following prior research, we consider various measures of corporate governance.83
We first construct three measures of institutional ownership: Institutional Ownership, the
ratio of institutional share holdings to bank outstanding shares; Pension Fund Ownership,
the ratio of public pension funds’ holdings to bank outstanding shares, where the list of
public pension funds is from Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007); and Long Term Institutional
Ownership, the ratio of holdings by long-term institutions to bank outstanding shares
following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005). Prior evidence suggests that institutional
investors, particularly activist investors such as public pension funds and long-term
institutional investors, have the incentives and ability to monitor managers (e.g., Gillan and
Starks, 2000; Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2005; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). For all three
measures, a lower ownership ratio would indicate less monitoring by institutional investors
and potentially higher agency problems.
We also construct a measure of analyst coverage, Number of Analysts, which is the
number of financial analysts providing earnings forecasts for the bank in each quarter. Prior
research suggests that analyst coverage enhances corporate transparency, making
managerial extraction of private benefits more difficult (e.g., Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2004).
Our next measure, CEO Duality, is an indicator variable for whether the CEO is
also chairman of the board. CEO duality may be indicative of agency problems because it
may restrict the information flow to directors and undermine the effectiveness of board
oversight (e.g., Jensen, 1993; Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997).
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We obtain data on corporate governance from multiple sources. We retrieve the institutional ownership
data from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database and the analyst coverage data from
I/B/E/S. In addition, we manually collect data on CEO duality and insider ownership from SEC EDGAR
DEF 14A proxy filings and 10K reports for the time period 1994–2010. Our corporate governance data starts
in 1994, which corresponds to the date when the data became publicly available on the SEC EDGAR.
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Our final measure of corporate governance relates to insider ownership. Insider
Ownership is the ratio of shares owned by insiders (all directors and executive officers as
a group as reported in the DEF 14A report) divided by shares outstanding of the bank. Prior
research finds a curvilinear relation between firm valuation and insider ownership (e.g.,
Stulz, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990), suggesting that insiders with relatively low
ownership and relatively high ownership are entrenched. With very low ownership,
insiders externalize much of the outcome of their actions. With very high ownership, they
secure enough control of the firm to be able to misuse the firm assets for their personal
benefit.
Based on prior corporate governance literature, we identify the following groups of
banks as being more likely to have severe agency problems: lower institutional ownership,
lower public pension fund ownership, lower long-term institutional ownership, lower
analyst coverage, CEO is Chairman, and very low and very high levels of insider
ownership.
Our results are reported in Table 3.12. In Panel A we use Institutional Ownership
in Models 1 and 2, Pension Fund Ownership in Models 3 and 4, and Long Term
Institutional Ownership in Models 5 and 6. For each ownership variable, we report the
results for subsamples of below-median (higher agency problems) and above-median
(lower agency problems) ownership. We find that the coefficient estimates on Foreign
Assets Ratio are negative and significant at the 1% level, but are larger in absolute value in
the subsamples of banks with higher agency problems (Models 1, 3, and 5) relative to the
subsamples with lower agency problems (Models 2, 4, and 6). Importantly, for the three
ownership variables, the difference in the Foreign Assets Ratio coefficient between the
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subsamples is statistically significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that the positive
relation between internationalization and bank risk is stronger for banks that are more likely
to have higher agency problems, supporting the empire-building explanation.84
In Panel B, we use the Number of Analysts and CEO is Chairman as indicators of
agency problems. We find that the coefficient estimate on Foreign Assets Ratio is negative
and larger in absolute value in the subsamples of banks with below-median analyst
coverage (Model 1) and CEO duality (Model 4). These differences between the subsamples
are significant at the 1% level. Again, these results suggest that the relation between
internationalization and bank risk is stronger in banks suffering from more severe agency
problems, supporting the empire-building explanation.
Finally, in Panel C we use Insider Ownership to indicate agency problems. To
account for nonlinearity of the relation between insider ownership and firm value
documented in prior studies (Stulz, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990), we split the
sample according to the 20th and 80th percentiles of insider ownership to capture different
incentives of insiders across the ownership range.85 We consider insider ownership below
the 20th percentile and above the 80th percentile to be indicative of more agency problems.
We find that the coefficient estimates on our internationalization proxy, Foreign Assets
Ratio, are negative and significant only in the subsamples of banks with more agency
problems (Models 1 and 3), consistent with the curvilinear relation between firm valuation
and insider ownership previously documented in the literature. An F-test rejects the null

84
In unreported results, we also run tests alternatively using the numbers of institutional investors, pension
funds, and long-term institutional investors and obtain qualitatively similar results.
85

In unreported results, we use alternative cutoffs of the 25th and 75th percentiles. The results are qualitatively
similar.
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hypothesis of equality of these coefficients at the 1% level. Again, these results suggest
that the internationalization-risk relation is stronger for banks that are more likely to have
severe agency problems.
In

summary,

our results

suggest

that

the positive relation

between

internationalization and bank risk is consistently stronger for banks that are more likely to
have high agency problems due to poor corporate governance, supporting the empirebuilding explanation.86 87
3.7 Conclusions
This paper is the first to assess the role of internationalization in bank risk using
U.S. bank data. We find strong, robust evidence that the more internationalized the bank,
the higher the risk. We use a number of different measures of internationalization and risk,
employ various econometric procedures to control for potential endogeneity and sample
selection biases, and consider different subsamples of the data. The data persistently
suggest that internationalization is associated with higher bank risk, consistent with the
empirical dominance of the market risk hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis. This
effect appears to be more pronounced during financial crises, particularly market crises.
Additional results suggest that capital market participants recognize the difference in risk
between international and domestic banks.
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In unreported results, we repeat these tests using interactions and we obtain similar evidence.
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In unreported tests, we created dummies for each of the corporate governance variables which indicate
governance attributes that are most likely to indicate severe agency problems and regressed
internationalization on these dummies, the instrumental variable, and the other controls from the main
specification. For most of these, but the analyst coverage and very low levels of insider ownership, banks
more likely to have worse governance (less institutional ownership, less public pension fund ownership, less
long-term institutional ownership, CEO is Chairman and very high levels of insider ownership) appear to be
associated with more internationalization.
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Our finding that internationalization is associated with higher risk raises the
question of why banks internationalize. We rule out higher returns and follow-yourcustomer as primary explanations because of our finding that returns are lower for
internationalized banks. A third potential explanation is empire building by bank managers
to gain higher compensation and/or more prestige, which may occur if there are significant
agency problems in these banks due to poor corporate governance. We test this explanation
and find that the positive relation between internationalization and bank risk tends to be
much stronger for banks that are more likely to have severe agency problems, supporting
the empire-building explanation. The results about increased risk from international
diversification may or may not apply to other countries which may have very different
domestic versus international risks.
This paper contributes primarily to two related strands of research. First, it adds to
the literature on bank risk by introducing internationalization as a factor influencing risk
and sets the groundwork for further research on bank internationalization. Although some
policymakers, practitioners, and researchers point to the benefits of geographical risk
diversification resulting from the internationalization of banks, our results suggest that this
effect is dominated by other factors. Specifically, our results suggest that the additional
local market risks taken on following international expansion outweigh the benefits of
diversification.
Second, this paper contributes to the broader internationalization literature by
examining risk within one important industry rather than across diverse industries with
their confounding differences. We find that bank internationalization is associated with
higher risk in an industry in which risk is highly monitored by bank supervisors as well as
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shareholders and debtholders. These findings suggest that authorities might consider
internationalization as an additional factor in bank supervision and regulation.
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Figure 3.1: Numbers of International U.S. Commercial Banks over
Time
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of bank internationalization over our sample period. It plots
the number of international U.S. commercial banks for each quarter in our sample period.
Three dimensions of bank internationalization are considered: foreign assets, foreign loans,
and foreign deposits. The sample period illustrated is 1989:Q1 to 2010:Q4.

120

Figure 3.2: Different Internationalization Ratios over Time
Figure 3.2 plots the mean internationalization ratios of U.S. commercial banks by quarter.
Three dimensions of bank internationalization are considered: foreign assets, foreign loans,
and foreign deposits. The sample period illustrated is 1989:Q1 to 2010:Q4.
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Figure 3.3: Total Volumes of International Activities over Time
Figure 3.3 plots the actual dollar amount (billions) of U.S. commercial banks’ foreign
activities by quarter. Three dimensions of bank internationalization are considered: foreign
assets, foreign loans, and foreign deposits. The sample period illustrated is 1989:Q1 to
2010:Q4.
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Figure 3.4: Mean Z-score for International Banks vs. Domestic Banks
over Time
Figure 3.4 compares the risk (mean Z-score) of international commercial banks versus purely
domestic banks during our sample period. This figure depicts financial crisis periods in
shaded gray areas: Banking Crises in dark gray and Market Crises in light gray. The sample
period illustrated is 1989:Q1 to 2010:Q4.
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Table 3.1: Definitions and Summary Statistics
This table presents variable definitions and reports summary statistics for the full sample of U.S. commercial banks used in the analysis. All variables using dollar
amounts are expressed in real 2010:Q4 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator.
Variable
Risk Variables
Z-score ( 12
quarters)

Log of Z-score (12
quarters)
Z-score (8 quarters)

124
Z-score (20 quarters)

Definition

Mean

Median

Std

25p

75p

A bank measure of financial risk calculated as [Avg.(ROA) +
Avg.(Equity/GTA)]/Stdv. ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall
bank risk. Means of ROA and Equity/GTA as well as the standard
deviation of ROA are computed over the previous 12 quarters (t-11 to t).
A bank measure of financial risk calculated as the logarithm of Z-score
(12 quarters).
A bank measure of financial risk calculated as [Avg.(ROA) +
Avg.(Equity/GTA)]/Stdv. ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall
bank risk. Means of ROA and Equity/GTA as well as the standard
deviation of ROA are computed over the previous 8 quarters (t-7 to t).
A bank measure of financial risk calculated as [Avg.(ROA) +
Avg.(Equity/GTA)]/Stdv. ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall
bank risk. Means of ROA and Equity/GTA as well as the standard
deviation of ROA are computed over the previous 20 quarters (t-19 to t).

36.053

28.287

30.754

14.459

48.771

3.198

3.343

1.001

2.674

3.888

42.561

32.564

38.504

16.415

56.988

29.805

23.830

24.374

12.425

40.460

Sharpe Ratio

The risk-adjusted return on equity defined as ROE/Stdv. ROE. ROE is
defined as the ratio of net operating income to total equity.

6.477

3.238

157.687

1.911

5.937

Stdv. ROE

The standard deviation of ROE calculated over the previous 12 quarters
(t-11 to t.) ROE is defined as the ratio of net operating income to total
equity.
A measure of financial stability defined as the ratio of nonperforming
loans (past due at least 90 days or in nonaccrual status) to total loans; a
higher value indicates a riskier loan portfolio.

0.035

0.031

0.021

0.019

0.048

0.016

0.009

0.025

0.003

0.020

0.022

0.018

0.021

0.014

0.024

NPL Ratio

LLA Ratio

A measure of risk defined as the ratio of loan and lease loss allowance to
bank total loans; a higher value indicates higher risk.

Variable

Definition

Mean

Median

Std

25p

75p

A measure of bank idiosyncratic risk calculated at the end of each
calendar quarter using bank stock daily returns over the previous 12
months. Specifically, we regress each bank’s stock returns on the FamaFrench three factors (Market, HML, and SMB) and the momentum factor
(UMD), and then construct Idiosyncratic Risk as the standard deviation
of the regression’s residuals.
The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous 12 months
(Esty, 1998) computed at the end of each calendar quarter.
The normal transform of the distance-to-default measure using banklevel stock return data from CRSP and financial data from the Call
Report. Details for this measure are shown in footnote 20 in the text. .

0.025

0.020

0.019

0.015

0.029

0.027

0.022

0.020

0.016

0.030

0.033

0.000

0.112

0.000

0.009

Based on S&P Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating, S&P Credit
Rating equals 8 if the bank has an S&P rating of AAA, 7 if AA, 6 if A, 5
if BBB, 4 if BB, 3 if B, 2 if CCC, and 1 if CC.

2.282

1.000

1.814

1.000

4.000

S&P Investment
A dummy equal to 1 if the bank has a credit rating of BBB or higher
Grade
(investment grade), and 0 otherwise.
Internationalization Variables

0.354

0.000

0.478

0.000

1.000

Foreign Assets Ratio
(full sample)

A measure of bank internationalization defined as the ratio of foreign
total assets to GTA of the bank; a larger value indicates a higher degree
of internationalization and a ratio of 0 refers to purely domestic banks.

0.001

0.000

0.021

0.000

0.000

Foreign Assets Ratio
(international banks
only)
Bank
Internationalization
Dummy

A measure of bank internationalization defined as the ratio of foreign
total assets to GTA of the bank; a larger value indicates a higher degree
of internationalization.
A dummy that takes a value of 1 if ratio of the foreign total assets to GTA
of the bank is positive, and 0 otherwise.

0.099

0.035

0.145

0.006

0.126

0.015

0.000

0.120

0.000

0.000

Foreign Loans
Ratio

A measure of bank internationalization defined as the ratio of foreign
total loans to total loans of the bank; a larger value indicates a higher
degree of internationalization.

0.002

0.000

0.025

0.000

0.000

Risk Variables (cont.)
Idiosyncratic Risk

Total Bank Risk
Merton Default
Probability
S&P Credit Rating
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Variable

Definition

Mean

Median

Std

25p

75p

A measure of bank internationalization defined as the ratio of foreign
total deposits to total deposits of the bank; a larger value indicates a
higher degree of internationalization.

0.003

0.000

0.038

0.000

0.000

A measure of diversification across different sources of income,
calculated as 1- | (Net Interest Income - Other Operating Income)/Total
Operating Income|.
The logarithm of GTA.

0.200

0.216

0.158

0.079

0.332

11.904

11.649

1.168

11.094

12.386

A dummy that takes a value of 1 if the bank is listed on a stock exchange
or is part of a bank holding company that is listed on a stock exchange,
and 0 otherwise.
A dummy that takes a value of 1 if the bank is owned by a bank holding
company, and 0 otherwise.

0.146

0.000

0.353

0.000

0.000

0.695

1.000

0.460

0.000

1.000

Overhead Costs

A proxy for the bank’s cost structure calculated as the ratio of overhead
expenses to GTA.

1.621

1.592

0.362

1.323

1.922

FED

A dummy indicating whether the bank is a state-chartered Federal
Reserve member, that is, the Federal Reserve is the bank’s primary
federal regulator, and 0 otherwise.

0.106

0.000

0.308

0.000

0.000

OCC

A dummy indicating whether the bank has a national bank charter, that
is, the bank’s primary federal regulator is the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC), and 0 otherwise.
A dummy that takes a value of 1 for non-member banks that have the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as a primary regulator,
and 0 otherwise.

0.309

0.000

0.462

0.000

1.000

0.585

1.000

0.493

0.000

1.000

0.471

0.000

0.499

0.000

1.000

Internationalization Variables (cont.)
Foreign Deposits
Ratio
Control Variables
Income
Diversification
Size
Listed

BHC
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FDIC

Time FE

Time fixed effects, dummies for each quarter of the sample period.

Instrumental Variable
Border State

A dummy that takes a value of 1 if a bank is headquartered in one of the
U.S. states having a border with an ocean, Canada, or Mexico, and 0
otherwise.

Variable

Definition

Mean

Median

Std

25p

75p

ROA

Ratio of net income to bank GTA.

0.009

0.011

0.027

0.007

0.014

Capitalization Ratio

The bank capitalization ratio, measured as equity capital to GTA; a lower
ratio indicates higher bank distress.

0.098

0.089

0.042

0.089

0.042

Stdv. ROA

The standard deviation of ROA calculated over the previous 12 quarters
(t-11 to t). ROA is defined as the ratio of net operating income to GTA.

0.008

0.004

0.016

0.002

0.008

Financial Crises

A dummy that takes a value of 1 for a financial crisis period, and 0
otherwise, following Berger and Bouwman (2013).

0.346

0.000

0.476

0.000

1.000

Banking Crises

A dummy that takes a value of 1 for a banking crisis period, and 0
otherwise. A banking crisis is a crisis that originated in the banking
sector, following Berger and Bouwman (2013).
A dummy that takes a value of 1 for a market crisis period. A market
crisis is a crisis that originated in the capital markets, following Berger
and Bouwman (2013).

0.223

0.000

0.416

0.000

0.000

0.123

0.000

0.328

0.000

0.000

A dummy that takes a value of 1 for a normal time period, and 0
otherwise. A normal time period is a period other than a financial crisis
period, following Berger and Bouwman (2013).
The ratio of institutional share holdings to bank outstanding shares.

0.654

1.000

0.476

0.000

1.000

0.200

0.138

0.203

0.041

0.302

The ratio of public pension funds’ holdings to bank outstanding shares.
The list of public pension funds is from Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).

0.007

0.001

0.012

0.000

0.007

The ratio of holdings by long-term institutions to bank outstanding shares
following Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005).

0.070

0.044

0.079

0.009

0.110

The number of financial analysts providing earnings forecasts for the
bank in each quarter.

6.027

3.000

6.928

1.000

8.000

CEO Duality

An indicator variable for whether the CEO is the chairman of the board.

0.445

0.000

0.497

0.000

1.000

Insider Ownership

The ratio of shares owned by insiders (all directors and executive officers
as a group as reported in the DEF 14A report) to bank outstanding shares.

0.167

0.130

0.133

0.069

0.232

Other Variables

Market Crises
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Normal Times

Institutional
Ownership
Pension Fund
Ownership
Long-term
Institutional
Ownership
Analyst Coverage

Table 3.2: Correlations among Selected Variables

Foreign Assets Ratio

Income Diversification

Size

Listed

BHC

Overhead Costs

FED

OCC
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Z-score
Foreign Assets Ratio
Income Diversification
Size
Listed
BHC
Overhead Costs
FED
OCC

Z-score

This table reports pair-wise correlations among the key variables used in the regression analysis. Table 1 shows definitions for all variables. *** indicates
significance at the 1% level.

1
-0.0226***
0.0401***
0.1275***
0.0625***
0.0770***
-0.2585***
0.0358***
0.0179***

1
0.0765***
0.2292***
0.0486***
-0.0060***
0.0190***
0.0365***
0.0068***

1
0.1739***
0.1303***
0.0293***
0.4312***
-0.0284***
0.0561***

1
0.4234***
0.0559***
-0.0722***
0.0760***
0.1301***

1
0.0696***
0.0379***
0.0643***
0.0922***

1
-0.0811***
0.0228***
-0.0228***

1
-0.0464***
0.0859***

1
-0.2308***

1

Table 3.3: Internationalization and Bank Risk: Univariate Analysis
This table reports univariate comparison tests for bank risk and other controls between international banks and purely domestic banks. Panel A reports results for
the full sample. Panel B reports differences in Z-score by bank size. Table 1 shows definitions for all variables. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Panel A: Full Sample
International Banks
(1)
Variable

N

(2)

(3)

Purely Domestic Banks
(4)

(5)

(6)

Difference in Means

Difference in Medians

International - Domestic
(7)

(8)

International - Domestic
(9)

(10)
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Mean

Median

N

Mean

Median

Difference

T-Stat

Difference

Wilcoxon M-W Stat

Z- score (12 quarters)

10,376

28.6939

20.2356

690,300

36.1638

28.4147

-7.4699***

-24.6

-8.1791***

-33.9

Log of Z-score (12 quarters)
Z- score (8 quarters)

10,337

2.8558

3.0133

689,604

3.2037

3.3480

-0.3479***

-35.1

-0.3347***

-33.5

10,376

35.2728

23.6481

690,300

42.6703

32.6969

-7.3975***

-19.4

-9.0488***

-30.7

Z- score (20 quarters)

10,376

23.0126

17.0507

690,300

29.9072

23.9328

-6.8946***

-28.6

-6.8821***

-35.8

Stdv. ROE

10,376

0.0397

0.0367

690,300

0.0348

0.0314

0.0049***

24.8

0.0053***

21.1

Sharpe Ratio

10,212

6.9604

2.5289

678,290

6.4694

3.2498

0.4910

0.3

-0.7208***

-21.7

NPL Ratio

11,499

0.0269

0.0149

767,162

0.0163

0.0089

0.0106***

44.5

0.0060***

43.4

LLA Ratio

11,499

0.0344

0.0244

767,165

0.0216

0.0176

0.0128***

65.4

0.0068***

59.7

Panel B: Risk (Z- score (12 quarters) by Different Bank Sizes
International Banks
(1)

Purely Domestic Banks

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Difference in Means

Difference in Medians

International - Domestic

International - Domestic

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

N

Mean

Median

N

Mean

Median

Difference

t-stat

Difference

Wilcoxon M-W Stat

Small (≤ 1 Billion)
Medium (1-5 Billion)

2,400

25.7071

19.4527

651,483

35.8357

28.2982

-10.1286***

-16.4

-8.8455***

-19.8

1,740

28.0117

21.9034

30,616

42.9889

32.3988

-14.9771***

-15.8

-10.4954***

-16.9

Large (> 5 Billion)

6,236

30.0338

20.1937

8,201

36.7430

25.3221

-6.7092***

-11.6

-5.1284***

-13.8

Bank Size (GTA)

Table 3.4: Internationalization and Bank Risk: Regression Analysis
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk. The dependent variable is Z-score (12 quarters). Panel A reports
estimates using data at the commercial bank level, while Panel B shows estimates using data aggregated at the bank holding company (BHC) level. The main
internationalization measure is the Foreign Assets Ratio. Model 1 is an OLS regression with time fixed effects, Model 2 uses Bank Internationalization Dummy as
a proxy of internationalization, Model 3 includes international banks only, Model 4 excludes too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, Model 5 excludes the top 20 banks with
the most intensive foreign activity each quarter, Model 6 includes small banks defined as banks with GTA <1 Billion, Model 7 includes medium-sized banks
defined as banks with GTA between 1 and 5 Billion, and Model 8 includes large banks defined as banks with GTA over 5 Billion. Table 1 provides definitions for
all variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Panel A: Internationalization and Bank Risk: Regression Analysis (Commercial Bank Level)
(1)

(2)

(3)

Dependent Variable: Z-Score
(4)
(5)
Exclude Top 20

Independent Variables:
Foreign Assets Ratio

(6)

(7)

(8)

Small

Medium

Large

Full

Full

International

Exclude

International

Size

Size

Size

Sample

Sample

Banks Only

TBTF

Banks

(GTA ≤ 1 Bill)

(1 Bill < GTA ≤ 5 Bill)

(GTA > 5 Bill)

-68.064***

-15.884**

-61.465***

-90.924***

-47.035***

-49.981***

-31.945***

(-8.725)

(-2.167)

(-6.139)

(-7.072)

(-4.105)

(-4.704)

(-2.706)

-19.551***

International Bank Dummy

(-11.808)
0.957

0.923

-4.624

1.327

0.910

1.782

-12.203*

-16.791*

(0.720)

(0.695)

(-0.550)

(0.996)

(0.683)

(1.345)

(-1.701)

(-1.652)

2.496***

3.038***

-0.017

3.250***

2.604***

5.447***

2.757***

1.323

(11.514)

(13.714)

(-0.024)

(14.254)

(11.958)

(20.255)

(2.710)

(1.476)

Listed

2.893***

2.847***

7.210***

2.827***

2.821***

4.264***

2.253

6.214***

(4.672)

(4.641)

(2.912)

(4.528)

(4.549)

(6.512)

(1.269)

(2.989)

BHC

1.300***

1.120***

-2.149

1.125***

1.295***

0.615

4.485**

0.674

(3.457)

(2.988)

(-0.824)

(2.993)

(3.444)

(1.634)

(2.060)

(0.272)

-38.817***

-38.526***

-26.203***

-38.647***

-38.899***

-38.379***

-31.110***

-25.345***
(-7.874)

Income Diversification
Size
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Overhead Costs
FED
OCC
Constant
Time FE
Observations

(-54.022)

(-53.653)

(-6.478)

(-53.434)

(-53.984)

(-51.450)

(-12.741)

2.475***

2.472***

-2.936

2.455***

2.530***

2.473***

-0.541

0.505

(3.743)

(3.753)

(-0.613)

(3.709)

(3.818)

(3.619)

(-0.226)

(0.124)

1.300***

1.380***

-7.626**

1.430***

1.299***

1.543***

-0.665

-8.614***

(2.996)

(3.194)

(-2.027)

(3.304)

(2.995)

(3.551)

(-0.329)

(-2.646)

53.255***

46.567***

64.909***

44.337***

58.119***

24.793***

61.110***

40.689***

(19.109)

(16.353)

(5.434)

(15.163)

(21.352)

(7.450)

(4.663)

(2.720)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

600,055

600,055

8,886

593,939

598,340

557,607

29,295

13,153

R-squared

0.148

0.150

0.154

0.151

0.148

0.161

0.147

0.166

N-Clusters(Bank)

13,448

13,448

319

13,402

13,439

12,901

1,324

428

Panel B: Internationalization and Bank Risk: Regression Analysis (BHC Level)

Independent Variables:
Foreign Assets Ratio

(2)

(3)

Full

Full

International

Exclude

Sample

Sample

Banks Only

TBTF

-27.186***
(-3.195)

-87.159***
(-9.406)

Size
Listed
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BHC
Overhead Costs
FED
OCC
Constant
Time FE
Observations
R-squared
N-Clusters(Bank)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Exclude Top 20
International
Banks

Small
Size
(GTA ≤ 1 Bill)

Medium
Size
(1 Bill < GTA ≤ 5 Bill)

Large
Size
(GTA > 5 Bill)

-70.464***
(-6.195)

-116.299***
(-6.491)

-62.405***
(-4.153)

-68.028***
(-5.251)

-47.006***
(-3.451)

-23.007***
(-11.148)

International Bank Dummy
Income Diversification

Dependent Variable: Z-Score
(4)
(5)

(1)

0.767

0.608

-6.434

0.935

0.745

1.760

-8.115

1.882

(0.508)
4.145***
(15.963)
1.762

(0.402)
4.686***
(17.979)
2.222**

(-0.624)
0.438
(0.448)
11.656***

(0.618)
5.154***
(19.267)
2.203*

(0.492)
4.302***
(16.600)
1.656

(1.193)
6.233***
(21.055)
1.826

(-0.864)
2.180
(1.634)
6.968***

(0.137)
-2.017
(-1.414)
7.870**

(1.539)
-1.274**
(-2.525)
-40.431***

(1.974)
-1.337***
(-2.653)
-40.013***

(3.280)
8.202*
(1.807)
-26.374***

(1.894)
-1.419***
(-2.819)
-40.146***

(1.443)
-1.302***
(-2.581)
-40.473***

(1.307)
-1.610***
(-3.229)
-40.105***

(3.478)
-1.253
(-0.293)
-38.313***

(2.256)
9.029
(1.326)
-29.501***

(-48.580)
2.427***
(3.178)
2.444***

(-48.169)
2.478***
(3.260)
2.644***

(-5.560)
-9.241**
(-2.069)
-9.448**

(-48.223)
2.580***
(3.377)
2.641***

(-48.475)
2.546***
(3.329)
2.481***

(-46.995)
2.605***
(3.305)
2.514***

(-11.841)
1.764
(0.612)
4.017*

(-5.602)
2.008
(0.415)
-0.993

(4.858)
60.897***
(17.375)

(5.288)
53.971***
(15.414)

(-2.539)
72.818***
(5.139)

(5.272)
48.516***
(13.559)

(4.933)
59.174***
(16.880)

(4.997)
35.385***
(9.017)

(1.749)
93.941***
(4.907)

(-0.236)
121.499***
(5.069)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

471,599
0.165
12,873

471,615
0.168
12,875

7,049
0.164
268

464,974
0.170
12,776

469,985
0.166
12,860

436,331
0.171
12,281

24,554
0.153
1,122

10,714
0.147
348

Table 3.5: Alternative Measures of Risk
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk. The dependent variable are Log of Z-score (over prior 12 quarters)
in Model 1, Z-score (over prior 8 quarters) in Model 2, Z-score (over prior 20 quarters) in Model 3, Sharpe Ratio (over prior 12 quarters) in Model 4, Stdv. ROE
in Model 5, NPL Ratio in Model 6, and LLA Ratio.is Z-score (12 quarters) in Model 7. Foreign Assets Ratio is the measure of bank internationalization. All models
include time fixed effects. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

(1)

Dependent Variable: Alternative Measures of Risk
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
LLA Ratio

Log of Z-score
(over 12

Z-score
(over 8

Z-score
(over 20

Sharpe
Ratio (12

Stdv. ROE
(over 12

NPL Ratio
(Nonperforming

(Loan Loss

quarters)

quarters)

quarters)

quarters)

quarters)

Loans)

Allowance)

-1.999***

-78.231***

-59.208***

-29.948***

0.035***

0.055**

0.061***

(-6.544)

(-8.224)

(-8.759)

(-3.706)

(6.420)

(2.135)

(2.865)

0.197***

-0.617

3.357***

2.543

0.001

-0.003**

-0.000

(5.029)

(-0.423)

(2.625)

(0.812)

(0.778)

(-2.503)

(-0.357)

0.024***

3.282***

1.894***

1.507**

-0.001***

0.001***

0.000***

(4.278)

(13.780)

(9.136)

(2.417)

(-9.392)

(6.056)

(2.639)

Listed

0.076***

5.055***

0.496

2.636*

-0.002***

-0.004***

0.001***

(4.626)

(7.533)

(0.819)

(1.727)

(-7.547)

(-13.455)

(2.696)

BHC

0.060***

1.783***

0.664*

-0.631

-0.001***

-0.001***

-0.002***

(5.751)

(4.339)

(1.869)

(-0.575)

(-3.369)

(-5.024)

(-6.690)

Overhead Costs

-1.334***
(-63.319)

-44.649***
(-56.272)

-32.296***
(-47.134)

-5.240***
(-4.574)

0.020***
(44.892)

0.016***
(25.312)

0.006***
(7.661)

FED

0.063***

2.573***

2.461***

-1.654***

-0.001***

-0.001***

-0.001**

(3.692)

(3.594)

(3.881)

(-2.857)

(-4.070)

(-3.385)

(-2.005)

Independent Variables:
Foreign Assets Ratio
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Income Diversification
Size

OCC
Constant

0.021*

1.208**

1.396***

-0.293

-0.001**

0.000*

0.001***

(1.797)

(2.531)

(3.419)

(-0.334)

(-2.219)

(1.955)

(4.328)

4.391***

49.990***

40.611***

-3.071

0.017***

0.004*

0.009***

(58.182)

(16.309)

(15.686)

(-0.394)

(10.864)

(1.954)

(4.618)

Time FE
Observations

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

599,746

656,175

498,015

591,760

600,055

762,671

762,674

R-squared

0.185

0.138

0.144

0.000

0.125

0.115

0.063

N-Clusters(Bank)

13,423

14,389

11,868

13,365

13,448

15,750

15,750
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Table 3.6: Alternative Measures of Bank Internationalization
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk. The
dependent variable is Z-score (12 quarters). The internationalization measures are Foreign Assets Ratio in
Model 1, Foreign Loans Ratio in Model 2, and Foreign Deposits Ratio in Model 3. All models include time
fixed effects. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Z-Score
(1)
Foreign Assets
Independent Variables:
Internationalization Ratio
Income Diversification

(2)

(3)

Foreign Loans

Foreign Deposits

Ratio

Ratio

Ratio

-68.064***

-50.636***

-43.267***

(-8.725)

(-9.045)

(-8.281)

0.957

0.883

1.220

(0.720)

(0.665)

(0.918)

Size

2.496***

2.375***

2.571***

(11.514)

(10.996)

(11.762)

Listed

2.893***

3.019***

2.855***

(4.672)

(4.867)

(4.613)

1.300***

1.296***

1.241***

(3.457)

(3.448)

(3.304)

-38.817***

-38.732***

-38.746***

(-54.022)

(-53.890)

(-54.025)

2.475***

2.482***

2.469***

(3.743)

(3.748)

(3.733)

1.300***

1.370***

1.263***

(2.996)

(3.155)

(2.912)

53.255***

54.567***

52.318***

(19.109)

(19.646)

(18.621)

BHC
Overhead Costs
FED
OCC
Constant
Time FE
Observations

YES

YES

YES

600,055

600,055

600,055

R-squared

0.148

0.147

0.148

N-Clusters(Bank)

13,448

13,448

13,448
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Table 3.7: Alternative Econometric Specifications and Standard Errors
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk. The
dependent variable is Z-score (12 quarters). Foreign Assets Ratio is the measure of bank internationalization.
Model 1 (baseline model) is an OLS regression with time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by bank,
Model 2 uses Newey-West standard errors, Model 3 uses Prais-Winsten standard errors, Model 4 uses FamaMacBeth standard errors, and Model 5 uses two-way clustered standard errors by bank and time. Table 1
provides definitions for all variables. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

(1)
OLS w/
Independent Variables:
Foreign Assets Ratio
Income Diversification

Dependent Variable: Z-Score
(2)
(3)
(4)
Newey-

(5)
Two-way

Time FE &

West

Prais-

Fama

Clustering

Bank Clusters

w/Lags

Winsten

MacBeth

By Bank & Time

-68.064***

-61.317***

-31.286***

-66.712***

-61.317***

(-8.725)

(-25.476)

(-5.818)

(-16.430)

(-7.015)

0.957

15.963***

-5.907***

2.082

15.963***

(0.720)

(42.188)

(-26.760)

(1.588)

(9.819)

Size

2.496***

1.531***

2.609***

2.748***

1.531***

(11.514)

(22.949)

(28.974)

(11.020)

(4.015)

Listed

2.893***

4.212***

2.985***

2.070***

4.212***

(4.672)

(18.769)

(10.157)

(5.562)

(5.759)

BHC

1.300***

0.629***

0.756***

1.239***

0.629

Overhead Costs
FED
OCC
Constant

(3.457)

(5.199)

(5.373)

(7.266)

(1.434)

-38.817***

-28.725***

-4.763***

-38.502***

-28.725***

(-54.022)

(-168.170)

(-36.639)

(-59.272)

(-26.439)

2.475***

2.691***

1.885***

2.479***

2.691***

(3.743)

(13.065)

(7.196)

(18.656)

(3.950)

1.300***

2.083***

0.554***

1.457***

2.083***

(2.996)

(16.168)

(3.290)

(9.583)

(4.061)

53.255***

62.457***

15.067***

66.084***

62.457***

(19.109)

(75.380)

(13.716)

(27.934)

(17.232)

Time Effects

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

Observations

600,055

600,055

600,055

600,055

600,055

0.162

0.105

R-squared

0.148

N-Clusters(Bank)

13,448

0.102
13,447
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Table 3.8: Endogeneity
Panel A: IV Model

Panel A presents the results of instrumental variable (IV) estimation that controls for the endogeneity of bank
internationalization. The instrument is Border State, a binary indicator for whether a bank is headquartered
in a state that borders an ocean, Canada, or Mexico. Model 1 (baseline model) is an OLS regression. Models
2 and 3 are the first- and second-stage regressions of the IV estimation. The row labeled “F-statistic” reports
the F-statistic of the test on whether the IV is significant in the first-stage regression. All models include time
fixed effects. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Independent
Variables:
Foreign Assets Ratio

(1)

(2)

(3)

OLS

IV 2SLS
First Stage

IV 2SLS
Second Stage

-68.064***

-200.382***

(-8.725)

(-4.115)
0.001***

Border State

(26.988)
0.957

0.004***

(0.720)

(14.493)

(3.820)

Size

2.496***

0.005***

3.249***

(11.514)

(43.595)

(11.659)

Listed

2.893***

-0.004***

2.251***

(4.672)

(-29.665)

(8.030)

BHC

1.300***

-0.000***

1.197***

Income Diversification

Overhead Costs
FED
OCC
Constant
Time FE
Observations
R-squared

1.413***

(3.457)

(-6.075)

(13.463)

-38.817***
(-54.022)

0.001***
(4.402)

-38.694***
(-216.549)

2.475***

0.002***

2.669***

(3.743)

(11.352)

(17.620)

1.300***

-0.001***

1.128***

(2.996)

(-23.130)

(10.733)

53.255***

-0.060***

44.179***

(19.109)

(-42.759)

(12.999)

YES

YES

YES

600,055

600,055

600,055

0.065

0.139

0.148

F-Statistic

720.795***
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Panel B: Propensity Score Matching

Panel B reports the difference in Z-score between international banks and matched purely domestic banks.
Four different propensity score matching (PSM) methods are used to construct the control sample of purely
domestic banks: 1:1 matching without replacement, 1:1 matching with replacement, nearest neighbor (n=2),
and nearest neighbor (n=3). The propensity scores are computed from a probit model that uses the same
control variables as in the baseline model (Model 1 in Table 4) plus the instrumental variable, Border State.
Panel B also shows regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk on the four
PSM samples. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Z-score
Propensity Score Matching Estimation

Treated (International)

Controls

Difference

t-stat

1:1 Matching without replacement

29.33

35.77

-6.44***

-12.28

1:1 Matching with replacement

29.33

35.28

-5.96***

-4.42

Nearest neighbor (n=2)

29.33

35.36

-6.04***

-5.53

Nearest neighbor (n=3)

29.33

35.41

-6.08***

-6.15

Dependent Variable: Z-Score
(1)
(2)
Independent
Variables:
Foreign Assets Ratio
Income Diversification
Size
Listed

(3)

(4)

1:1 Matching

1:1 Matching

Nearest

Nearest

without
replacement

with
replacement

neighbor
(n=2)

neighbor
(n=3)

-24.552***

-24.329***

-27.596***

-28.733***

(-3.483)

(-3.531)

(-3.918)

(-4.085)

-9.697

-10.014

-10.977*

-11.538**

(-1.493)

(-1.543)

(-1.826)

(-2.013)

-0.912*

-0.836

-1.199**

-1.336***

(-1.779)

(-1.627)

(-2.533)

(-2.951)

5.515***

5.362***

4.343***

3.743***

(3.341)

(3.179)

(2.861)

(2.648)

0.887

-0.022

1.454

1.896

(0.516)

(-0.012)

(0.937)

(1.340)

-28.404***
(-11.067)

-29.423***
(-10.451)

-31.123***
(-12.578)

-32.228***
(-14.335)

FED

1.681

0.213

1.768

1.948

(0.540)

(0.065)

(0.639)

(0.790)

OCC

-5.327**

-5.304**

-4.000**

-3.404**

BHC
Overhead Costs

(-2.557)

(-2.417)

(-2.135)

(-2.015)

77.760***

79.442***

89.190***

93.349***

(9.570)

(10.011)

(12.257)

(13.866)

YES

YES

YES

YES

Observations

17,772

14,721

19,105

22,846

R-squared

0.149

0.154

0.153

0.155

N-Clusters(Bank)

2,020

1,999

2,750

3,220

Constant
Time FE
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Table 3.9: Z-score Decomposition
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and the components of Zscore. The dependent variables are mean ROA in Model 1, mean Capitalization Ratio in Model 2, and Stdv.
ROA in Model 3. Foreign Assets Ratio is the measure of bank internationalization. All models include time
fixed effects. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Z-Score Components
(1)
(2)
Independent Variables:
Foreign Assets Ratio

(3)

Mean ROA

Mean Capitalization Ratio

Stdv. ROA

-0.018***

0.050**

0.009**

(-6.152)

(2.016)

(2.475)

Income Diversification

0.011***

0.002

0.000

Size

(14.418)
0.000*

(0.703)
-0.004***

(0.575)
0.000**

Listed

(1.743)
0.000

(-11.474)
-0.003***

(2.309)
-0.000

BHC

(0.551)
0.000

(-3.660)
-0.011***

(-1.378)
-0.001***

Overhead Costs

(0.323)
-0.006***

(-17.886)
-0.030***

(-8.397)
0.010***

FED

(-11.590)
-0.001***

(-13.605)
-0.002***

(18.781)
-0.000***

OCC

(-4.208)
0.000

(-2.606)
-0.001**

(-2.903)
0.000

Constant

(0.330)
0.010***

(-2.080)
0.208***

(0.510)
-0.005***

(7.150)

(37.888)

(-2.962)

YES

YES

NO

Observations
R-squared

600,055
0.101

600,055
0.136

600,055
0.036

N-Clusters(Bank)

13,448

13,448

13,448

Time FE
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Table 3.10: Accounting and Market Risk Measures for Listed Banks
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk. The
dependent variables are Z-score in Model 1 (baseline model), Idiosyncratic Risk in Model 2, Total Bank Risk
in Model 3, Merton Default Probability in Model 4, S&P Credit Rating in Model 5, and S&P Investment
Grade in Model 6. Models 1 to 4 are OLS regressions. Model 5 is an ordered logit regression (intercepts of
this model are not shown). Model 6 is a logit regression. Foreign Assets Ratio is the measure of bank
internationalization. All models include time fixed effects. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables.
Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Risk
(1)

Independent
Variables:

Foreign Assets Ratio
Income Diversification

Size

BHC
Overhead Costs
FED

OCC
Constant

Time FE

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Idiosyncrati
c

Total
Bank

Merton
Default

S&P
Credit

S&P Investment
vs.

Z-score

Risk

Risk

Probability

Rating

Speculative

-60.236***

0.016***

0.015***

0.032**

0.694***

-6.189***

(-4.534)

(4.167)

(3.633)

(2.026)

(-2.971)

(-19.603)

14.606**

-0.005

-0.005

-0.021

1.317***

0.715***

(1.983)

(-1.220)

(-1.035)

(8.458)

(3.103)

-0.659

-0.003***

(-1.212)
0.002***

-0.008***

0.594***

0.999***

(-0.907)

(-9.065)

(-6.766)

(-4.346)

(35.655)

-0.600

-0.004

-0.004*

-0.011

(38.863)
0.448***

(-0.176)

(-1.628)

(-1.777)

(-1.265)

(-6.980)

(-3.436)

-46.186***

0.011***

0.012***

0.048***

0.076

0.516***

(-12.036)

(6.557)

(6.725)

(5.479)

(0.923)

(3.750)

5.632**

-0.001

-0.001*

-0.005

0.318***

0.087

(2.072)

(-1.329)

(-1.335)

(9.953)

(1.406)

8.195***

-0.002***

(-1.794)
0.003***

-0.014***

0.135***

0.099*

(3.149)
137.480**
*

(-3.264)

(-3.591)

(-3.286)

(4.244)

(1.915)

0.052***

0.041***

0.072***

-26.387***

(10.593)

(11.667)

(9.075)

(3.360)

(-45.523)

-0.523***

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Observations

29,953

29,816

29,816

29,176

10,022

10,022

R-squared

0.155

0.350

0.154

0.174

0.379

0.722

941

941

941

933

N-Clusters(Bank)
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Table 3.11: Internationalization and Bank Risk during Financial Crises
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk during
financial crises and normal times. The construction of the financial crisis periods follows Berger and
Bouwman (2013). The dependent variable is Z-score (12 quarters). All models include time fixed effects.
Foreign Assets Ratio is the measure of bank internationalization. Table 1 provides definitions for all
variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Z-score
(1)
(2)
Independent Variables:
Foreign Assets Ratio
Foreign Assets Ratio × Financial Crises

(3)

(4)

Financial

Banking

Market

Banking Crises and

Crises

Crises

Crises

Market Crises

-61.650***

-65.164***

-65.985***

-61.647***

(-7.452)

(-7.875)

(-8.443)

(-7.452)

-16.856***
(-3.490)

Foreign Assets Ratio × Banking Crises

-10.967*

-14.491**

(-1.662)

(-2.260)

Foreign Assets Ratio × Market Crises

-17.903**

-22.259***

(-2.032)

(-2.672)

0.950

0.949

0.963

0.953

(0.714)

(0.714)

(0.725)

(0.717)

2.498***

2.498***

2.496***

2.498***

(11.525)

(11.520)

(11.514)

(11.523)

2.893***

2.893***

2.894***

2.894***

(4.673)

(4.672)

(4.674)

(4.674)

1.300***

1.299***

1.301***

1.300***

(3.458)

(3.456)

(3.460)

(3.459)

-38.809***
(-54.002)

-38.815***
(-54.015)

-38.812***
(-54.014)

-38.808***
(-54.003)

FED

2.475***

2.473***

2.478***

2.476***

(3.742)

(3.740)

(3.747)

(3.744)

OCC

1.300***

1.300***

1.300***

1.300***

(2.996)

(2.996)

(2.996)

(2.996)

Constant

53.214***

53.234***

53.247***

53.216***

(19.097)

(19.100)

(19.109)

(19.098)

YES

YES

YES

YES
600,055

Income Diversification
Size
Listed
BHC
Overhead Costs

Time FE
Observations

600,055

600,055

600,055

R-squared

0.148

0.148

0.148

0.148

N-Clusters(Bank)

13,448

13,448

13,448

13,448
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Table 3.12: Role of Corporate Governance for the Impact of Internationalization on Bank Risk
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk conditional on the magnitude of agency problems. The dependent
variable is Z-score (12 quarters). The main internationalization measure is the Foreign Assets Ratio. The following are banks that are more likely to suffer from
agency problems: less institutional ownership, less public pension fund ownership, and less long-term institutional ownership (Panel A); less analyst coverage and
CEO is Chairman (Panel B); and relatively low and relatively high levels of insider ownership (Panel C). All models include time fixed effects. Robust t-statistics
adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Panel A: Institutional Ownership
Institutional Ownership

Pension Fund Ownership

Long-Term Institutional Ownership

≤ median
(1)

> median
(2)

≤ median
(3)

> median
(4)

≤ median
(5)

> median
(6)

Z-score

Z-score

Z-score

Z-score

Z-score

Z-score

Foreign Assets Ratio

-174.189***
(-7.639)

-47.810***
(-3.601)

-250.119***
(-5.653)

-42.306***
(-3.171)

-264.529***
(-4.433)

-43.954***
(-3.381)

Income Diversification

22.637**
(2.389)
3.184**
(2.277)
1.197
(0.287)
-51.130***
(-9.737)
4.073
(1.036)
5.323
(1.520)
74.228***
(3.607)

6.360
(0.648)
-1.399
(-1.500)
-4.088
(-0.831)
-40.862***
(-7.896)
5.321
(1.617)
9.415***
(2.763)
134.312***
(8.039)

18.040**
(2.008)
5.162***
(3.674)
-2.410
(-0.635)
-57.691***
(-10.987)
9.342**
(2.424)
8.953**
(2.521)
86.329***
(3.925)

5.665
(0.599)
-2.252**
(-2.506)
-4.757
(-0.971)
-34.777***
(-7.855)
2.041
(0.648)
7.979***
(2.595)
149.069***
(8.835)

16.066*
(1.778)
4.772***
(3.502)
0.291
(0.076)
-51.913***
(-10.180)
3.964
(1.099)
3.349
(0.998)
22.616
(1.103)

9.408
(0.974)
-2.212**
(-2.392)
-5.373
(-1.087)
-39.418***
(-7.837)
5.348*
(1.721)
10.934***
(3.432)
151.726***
(9.969)

YES
12,519
0.182
718

YES
17,434
0.146
656

YES
11,685
0.191
747

YES
18,268
0.159
678

YES
11,879
0.175
757

YES
18,074
0.159
700

Independent Variables:

Size
BHC
Overhead Costs
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FED
OCC
Constant
Time FE
Observations
R-squared
N-Clusters(Bank)

Institutional Ownership
t-test for equality of the Foreign Assets
Ratio coefficients across subsamples

-4.789***

Pension Fund Ownership

Long-Term Institutional Ownership

-4.497***

-3.612***

Independent Variables:
Foreign Assets Ratio
Income Diversification
Size
BHC
Overhead Costs
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FED
OCC
Constant
Time FE
Observations
R-squared
N-Clusters(Bank)

Panel B: Analyst Coverage and CEO Duality
Number of Analysts
≤ median
> median
(1)
(2)
Z-score
Z-score
-167.039***
(-7.453)
15.467
(1.274)
1.137
(0.688)
0.909
(0.186)
-45.901***
(-6.829)
4.140
(0.982)
7.197*
(1.800)
115.740***
(4.043)
YES
8,933
0.171
613

-43.260***
(-3.029)
-6.304
(-0.469)
-2.395*
(-1.742)
-10.863
(-1.386)
-32.286***
(-4.893)
5.431
(1.297)
7.366*
(1.760)
145.439***
(6.792)
YES
9,082
0.157
374

Number of Analysts
t-test for equality of the Foreign Assets
Ratio coefficients across subsamples

-4.658***

CEO Duality
NO
(3)
Z-score

YES
(4)
Z-score

2.148
(0.096)
-15.047
(-1.496)
-0.262
(-0.220)
0.778
(0.105)
-43.367***
(-8.789)
-3.476
(-0.785)
5.275
(1.260)
134.051***
(5.761)
YES
11,004
0.158
550

-54.929***
(-3.337)
21.926*
(1.682)
-1.849*
(-1.678)
-7.767
(-1.272)
-46.187***
(-7.660)
6.136
(1.465)
7.882*
(1.925)
158.309***
(8.597)
YES
9,822
0.152
435
CEO Duality
-2.0493**

Independent Variables:
Foreign Assets Ratio
Income Diversification
Size
BHC
Overhead Costs
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FED
OCC
Constant
Time FE
Observations
R-squared
N-Clusters(Bank)

Panel C: Insider Ownership
Insider Ownership
≤ p20
(p20, p80]
(1)
(2)
Z-score
Z-score
-26.200*
(-1.755)
9.306
(0.617)
-4.308***
(-3.071)
-8.654
(-0.882)
-35.687***
(-5.201)
6.987
(1.219)
12.256**
(2.166)
178.817***
(7.619)
YES
4,718
0.171
224

16.037
(0.653)
7.407
(0.667)
0.458
(0.359)
-8.302
(-1.167)
-47.123***
(-7.683)
-1.419
(-0.339)
3.848
(0.981)
129.416***
(5.195)
YES
12,327
0.148
575
Insider Ownership

F-test for equality of the Foreign Assets
Ratio coefficients across subsamples

15.56***

> p80
(3)
Z-score
-316.526***
(-5.751)
-29.911**
(-2.461)
4.300**
(2.368)
-0.487
(-0.044)
-34.272***
(-6.590)
-3.572
(-0.675)
1.706
(0.356)
86.203***
(2.792)
YES
3,631
0.210
216

CHAPTER 4
DID TARP BANKS GET COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES?88,89
4.1 Introduction
This paper investigates whether the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) – one of the
largest government interventions in the US during the recent financial crisis – may have
given its recipients competitive advantages. Also, if such competitive advantages were
conferred, which channel(s) brought about these changes? The main component of TARP,
the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), is a preferred stock and equity warrant purchase
program led by the US Treasury's Office of Financial Stability. We use the name TARP
henceforth to refer to CPP, since this is the name ultimately widely used in the media
(although CPP is only one of the interventions).
The main objectives of TARP were to improve the stability of the financial system
and increase the availability of credit. However, it may also have had unintended effects
on bank competition and resource allocation, given that the literature on regulatory

88

Allen N. Berger, and Raluca A. Roman. A modified version has been accepted for publication by Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 08/13/2014.
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Michael Koetter, Myron Kwast, Orgul Ozturk, Tony Saunders, Klaus Schaeck, Larry Wall, and conference
participants at the Chicago Federal Reserve Conference, Finance Management Association Conference,
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interventions in the banking sector often opines that public guarantees distort competition
(TARP funds may be relatively expensive).90 The competitive advantages appear to be
primarily or entirely due to TARP banks that repaid early, suggesting that these banks had
reduced importance of the cost disadvantage channel and had increased importance of the
safety channel.

Our results suggest a possible distortion in competition due to the

government intervention, which may have misallocated resources. The results may also
help explain other findings in the literature on the effects of TARP on bank risk and
lending, and yield important policy implications.
Our hypotheses suggest diverging predictions regarding the effect of TARP on bank
competitive indicators, market share and market power. TARP can either increase or
decrease these measures of competitive advantage. We consider separately the cases of
market share and market power as our different channels may influence them in the same
or opposite directions.
We first consider market share as measured by local market share of assets. Three
potential channels may lead to higher market shares for TARP recipients: the predation
channel (TARP banks may compete more aggressively), the safety channel (TARP banks
may be considered safer), and the cost advantage channel (TARP funds may be cheaper
than non-TARP funds). In contrast, three different channels may lead to lower market
shares for TARP banks: the charter value / quiet life channel (bailout may increase charter
value and/or allow for a “quiet life”), the stigma channel (TARP banks may be perceived
as riskier), and the cost disadvantage channel (TARP funds may be more expensive than
non-TARP funds). Importantly, the safety and stigma channels are opposites and the cost

90

These and other channels are described in detail in Section 4.4.
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advantage and cost disadvantage channels are opposites, and only one of each pair can
hold for a given bank at a given time.
We then consider market power as measured by Lerner Index. TARP banks may
increase their market power relative to non-TARP banks due to four different channels,
three of which also affect market share as described above: the safety channel, the
increased moral hazard channel (reduction in discipline results in shifts into riskier
portfolios), the charter value / quiet life channel, and the cost advantage channel.
Alternatively, TARP banks may decrease their market power relative to non-TARP banks
due to four different channels, three of which also affect market share as described above:
the predation channel, the decreased moral hazard channel (increase in capital results in
shifts into safer portfolios), the stigma channel, and the cost disadvantage channel. The
increased moral hazard and decreased moral hazard channels are opposites, and only one
can hold for a given bank at a given time.91
Some of the market share and market power channels go in the same direction and
some go in the opposite direction, and we formulate hypotheses that take these channels
into consideration. We test the hypotheses and try to distinguish which of the channels
empirically dominate using a difference-in-difference (DID) regression model. The model
uses the two indicators of competitive advantage – local market share of assets as a proxy
for market share and Lerner index as a proxy for market power – as the key dependent
variables. The exogenous variables include a TARP Recipient dummy and a DID term, Post
TARP x TARP Recipient (where Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the

91

The predation and charter value/quiet life channels may also be regarded as opposites because they have
opposing implications for both market share and market power and because only one can hold for a given
bank at a given time.
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period after the TARP program initiation), to capture the effect of the TARP treatment. We
also control for proxies for CAMELS, the declared set of financial criteria used by
regulators to assess the health of banking organizations, as well as a rich set of other bank
characteristics and time fixed effects.
Our results suggest that TARP banks did get competitive advantages and increased
both their market shares and market power. When splitting the TARP participants by
whether or not they repaid early, we find that the competitive advantages are primarily or
entirely due to recipients that repaid early, suggesting that these banks had significantly
reduced importance of the cost disadvantage channel and had increased importance of the
safety channel. When assessing which of the channels above are the strongest and weakest,
we find that: 1) the moral hazard channels seem to be unimportant, 2) the cost
disadvantage channel seems to dominate the cost advantage channel, at least for the banks
that repaid early, and 3) the safety channel dominates the stigma and cost disadvantage
channels.
We perform a number of robustness checks. We address the potential endogeneity
between our independent variable (TARP recipient) and the dependent variables for
competitive advantage using instrumental variable analysis (following Bayazitova and
Shivdasani (2012), Li (2013), Duchin and Sosyura (2014)). We address potential selectionbias issues using a propensity score matching analysis. We attempt to rule out the
possibility that alternative forces may drive our results using placebo experiments. We also
check the sensitivity of our results to alternative proxies of TARP – TARP infusion amount
divided by gross total assets (GTA) and TARP infusion amount divided by risk-weighted
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assets – instead of a TARP recipient dummy.92 We try alternative proxies of market share
– local market shares of loans, deposits, and uninsured deposits – instead of the local
market share of assets. We use alternative econometric models – bank fixed effects and
random effects models – as well as a model with standard errors clustered at the bank level.
We also perform tests to capture the effects of different bank sizes. Finally, we also conduct
several subsample analyses such as: excluding involuntary participants, excluding stresstested banks, and subsample analyses based on bank capitalization and local market
concentration. Our results are robust to all these checks.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe
TARP and in Section 4.3, we review the related literature. In Section 4.4, we develop the
empirical hypotheses. In Section 4.5, we describe the econometric framework. In Section
4.6, we discuss the data. In Section 4.7, we present the main empirical results and in Section
4.8, we focus on robustness tests. In Section 4.9, we draw conclusions, describe how our
findings may explain other results in the TARP literature, and give policy implications.

92

Gross total assets (GTA) equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated
transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). Total assets on Call Reports deduct these two
reserves, which are held to cover potential credit losses. We add these reserves back to measure the full value
of the assets financed. Risk-weighted assets are based on the Basel I requirements.
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4.2 Description of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was established in October 2008 pursuant to
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). It was one of the largest
government interventions to address the subprime mortgage crisis. Its primary purposes
were to improve financial stability by purchasing up to $700 billion of the banking
organizations’ “troubled assets” (to stabilize their balance sheets and avoid further losses)
and encourage banks to increase lending.
Rather than purchasing "troubled assets,” the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) of
TARP authorized the U.S. Treasury to invest up to $250 billion (out of the $700 billion
bailout package) in the preferred equity of selected financial institutions to enhance their
capital ratios. This included $125 billion in $10 billion and $25 billion increments to nine
large involuntary participants (Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo,
Goldman Sachs Group, Morgan Stanley, Wachovia Corporation, State Street Corporation,
and Merrill Lynch).These initial recipients did not follow the formal CPP evaluation
process, while the rest followed the formal process and applied for CPP funds from the
U.S. Treasury. During 2008:Q4-2009:Q4, TARP infused capital of $204.9 billion into 709
banking organizations. Approval to receive TARP took into account the health of the
banking organizations, with the viable, healthier ones being more likely to receive capital.
In addition, Duchin and Sosyura (2012, 2014), Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), and Li
(2013) find that banks with more political influence were more likely to receive TARP
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funds. The CPP investment in preferred shares was determined by the Treasury, ranging
from 1-3% of a firm’s risk-weighted assets or $25 billion (whichever was smaller).93
In return for the capital infusion, banks provided the Treasury with non-voting
preferred stock (paying dividends at an annual yield of 5% for the first five years and 9%
afterwards) and ten-year life warrants for the common stock (allowing the purchase of
common stock for an amount equal to 15% of the preferred equity infusion), giving
taxpayers the opportunity to benefit from the banks’ future growth. TARP participants were
also subject to compensation restrictions. Some of these were outlined at program inception
in October 2008: limiting tax deductibility of compensation for senior executives to
$500,000, requiring bonus claw-backs, and limiting golden parachute payments. In
February 2009, the Treasury revised the rules and limited total annual compensation for
senior executives at TARP banks to $500,000 excluding certain incentive awards. The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) further prohibited bonuses, retention
awards, and incentive compensation other than long-term restricted stock awards that
exceed one-third of annual compensation. As of December 31, 2012, the Treasury had
received over $220 billion back on $204.9 billion TARP invested in banking
organizations.94
4.3 Related Literature
A number of papers look at TARP determinants and effects. First, several papers look at
factors that affect the initial decisions to apply for and receive TARP funds by banks.

93

TARP investments outside the CPP were not subject to these limits (e.g., AIG, GMAC (now Ally
Financial)). In addition, Citigroup and Bank of America initially received $25 billion, but later got
installments of additional funds.

94

http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Monthly-Report-to-Congress.aspx
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Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), Duchin and Sosyura (2012, 2014), Li (2013), and
Berger and Roman (2014) find that banks with more political connections were more likely
to receive TARP funds. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) find that banks that posed
systemic risk and faced high financial distress costs, but had strong asset quality, obtained
TARP equity infusions. Cornett, Li, and Tehranian (2013) find that financial characteristics
related to the probability of receiving TARP differ for the healthiest (‘‘over-achiever’’)
versus the least healthy (‘‘under-achiever’’) banks. TARP under-achievers had weaknesses
in income production and experienced liquidity issues while TARP over-achievers’ loans
performed well, but liquidity issues hurt the abilities of these banks to continue lending.
Other papers look at “exit from TARP” decisions. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) and
Wilson and Wu (2012) find that banks with high levels of CEO pay were more likely to
exit early, presumably due to TARP restrictions on executive pay.
Second, some papers look at valuation effects of TARP. Ng, Vasvari, and
Wittenberg-Moerman (2013) find that TARP banks had lower equity returns in the
program initiation and increased their valuations later. Harrisa, Huertab, and Ngob (2013)
find deteriorating operating efficiency for TARP banks. Veronesi and Zingales (2010) find
that as of the end of 2009, TARP increased the value of the top 10 banks’ financial claims
by $130 billion at a taxpayers’ cost of $21 billion - $44 billion with a net benefit between
$86 billion and $109 billion. Norden, Roosenboom, and Wang (2013) find that TARP led
to spillover effects from banking to the corporate sector, leading to a significantly positive
impact on borrowing firms’ stock returns. In contrast, Lin (2013) finds that firms that have
relationships with TARP banks suffer a significant valuation loss of 2.5% in 3-day
abnormal returns around TARP approval announcements.
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Third, other papers investigate the impacts of TARP on bank risk and/or lending.
Duchin and Sosyura (2014) use a sample of 529 publicly traded financial firms (which tend
to be the largest firms) over the period 2006-2010, and find that TARP banks approved
riskier loans, but find no evidence of an increase in credit supply. Black and Hazelwood
(2013) analyze risk-taking by bank size using 81 banks from the Survey of Terms of Bank
Lending survey over 2007-2010. They find that risk of loans originated increased for large
TARP banks, but decreased for small TARP banks. They also find that outstanding
commercial and industrial loans (C&I) increased at small TARP banks, but decreased at
large TARP banks relative to non-TARP banks. Li (2013) looks at TARP’s effect on bank
loan supply using 7,062 banks (both public and private), of which 647 are TARP recipients.
He focuses on banks with below-median Tier 1 ratios (less well capitalized) because these
are more likely to receive TARP, and finds that these TARP banks expanded their credit
supply, and this increase was registered in all major types of loans. Puddu, and Walchli
(2013) find that TARP banks provide on average 12% more small business loan
originations than non-TARP banks. Chang, Contessi, and Francis (2014) find that banks
that received TARP funds maintained lower cash-to-assets ratios (and thus lower excess
reserves ratios), consistent with the view that the TARP capital injection possibly resulted
in more lending for the TARP beneficiaries. Presumably, the results in these last three
studies were dominated by the effects on small banks, which constitute the vast majority
of banks.
Fourth, one paper examines the effects of TARP on local economic conditions
(Berger and Roman (2015)). (Berger and Roman, 2015) that investigates the impact of
TARP on real economic conditions. They find that banks’ TARP bailouts were followed
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by improvements in economic conditions in the local markets in which they operate. TARP
increased net job creation and net hiring establishments, and decreased business and
personal bankruptcies.
Another relevant paper is Koetter and Noth (2014) which finds competitive
distortions as a result of TARP for unsupported banks. They find that higher bailout
expectations for unsupported banks are associated with increases in banks’ interest
margins: loan rates increase and deposit rates decrease. We focus on the competitive effects
(market power and market share) for the TARP recipient banks.
Related literature looks at government interventions in other nations on bank risktaking, lending, and liquidity creation (e.g., Brandao-Marques, Correa, and Sapriza (2012),
Dam and Koetter (2014), Hryckiewicz (2012), Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck
(2014)) and find either reductions or increases in risk-taking, and reductions in credit
growth and liquidity creation. Others look at effects on competition (e.g., Cordella and
Yeyati (2003), Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011), Calderon and Schaeck (2012), King
(2013)) and find less aggressive competitive conduct when banks are subject to bailouts,
and lower market power or more aggressive conduct for competitors of bailed out
institutions, and mixed competitive effects on shareholders.
Also relevant are papers studying the impact of capital on competition, given that
TARP increased bank capital (e.g., Calomiris and Mason (2003), Calomiris and Wilson
(2004), Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011), Mehran and Thakor (2012), Berger and
Bouwman (2013)), which generally report positive effects of capital on banks’ market
share or ability to compete.
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Finally, there is research examining the effect of competition on financial stability,
which is relevant because TARP may distort competition, with further implications for
financial stability. Two opposing strands of literature relate competition to stability. The
“competition-fragility” view (e.g., Marcus (1984), Keeley (1990), Demsetz, Saidenberg,
and Strahan (1996), Carletti and Hartmann (2003)) contends that more banking
competition increases bank instability, while the “competition-stability” view (e.g., Boyd
and De Nicolo (2005), Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal (2006), Schaeck and Cihak (2010))
asserts that lower competition is associated with financial instability. Berger, Klapper, and
Turk-Ariss (2009) find that the two views do not necessarily yield opposing predictions
and find evidence supporting both. Others predict a potential nonmonotonic U-shape
relationship between market power and risk-taking (e.g., Martinez-Miera and Repullo
(2010)). Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2014) account for competition as a factor
impacting bank failure during the recent financial crisis, and find results consistent with
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) that the effect of concentration increased the
probability of failure at high levels and decreased it at low levels.
We raise the possibility that the effects on bank risk and lending may be related to
the effects on competition. As discussed in the conclusions in Section 4.9 below, if TARP
banks obtained competitive advantages and the relationship between market power and
risk-taking was nonmonotonic during the crisis, this may help explain the results on risk
and lending by large and small banks.
4.4 Hypothesis Development
Our hypotheses examine the impact of TARP on competition, measured by market share
and market power. We first consider market share. Government capital infusions can help
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TARP banks increase their market shares (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Boot and Marinc
(2008), Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011), Mehran and Thakor (2012), Berger and
Bouwman (2013)). Three potential channels could lead to this. First, the predation channel
(Telser (1966), Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)) suggests that better capitalized banks may
have used TARP capital to act aggressively to take market share away from financially
constrained peers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some TARP recipients used the funds
to acquire peers with poorer capital ratios.95 Second, under the safety channel, TARP banks
may be perceived as safer due to the extra capital and/or the selection criteria which
targeted “healthy, viable institutions.” The safety channel includes the effects of both the
banks’ decision to apply for TARP and whether the application is accepted. Customers
may take more loans and loan commitments from TARP banks because they are less likely
to fail or become distressed, and creditors are more likely to lend to them because they are
more likely to pay back, both suggesting higher market shares for the TARP banks. Finally,
under the cost advantage channel, TARP funds may be cheaper than other funds, so TARP
banks have an incentive to expand their portfolios, yielding higher market shares.
A contrasting view is that higher capital as a result of capital infusions decreases
the market shares of TARP banks. There are three different channels that can lead to this.
First, under the charter value / quiet life channel (Hicks (1935), Keeley (1990), Cordella
and Yeyati (2003)), bailouts may increase charter values and/or allow for “quiet lives,”
decreasing incentives for aggressive behavior, leading to lower market shares.96 Second,

95
As examples, MB Financial acquired in 2009 several failing institutions: Benchmark Bank, Corus Bank
NA, InBank, and Heritage Community Bank. M&T Bank Corp, New York also acquired all the outstanding
common stock of Provident Bankshares Corp in 2009 and Wilmington Trust Corporation in 2010.
96

In addition, the bailout may induce more aggressive behavior by competitors, leading to lower market
shares for the TARP banks (Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011)).
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there may be a stigma channel if market participants perceive TARP banks as riskier.97
The stigma channel, like the safety channel, includes the effects of both the decisions to
apply for and to accept bailout funds. Customers may take less credit from TARP banks
because they may be more likely to fail or become financially distressed, and creditors to
be more reluctant to lend to them because they are less likely to pay back. Finally, under
the cost disadvantage channel, TARP funds may be more expensive than other funds,
leading TARP banks to decrease their portfolio sizes, resulting in lower market shares. As
noted above, the safety and stigma channels are opposites and the cost advantage and cost
disadvantage channels are opposites, and only one of each pair can hold for a given bank
at a given time.98
We test empirically the impact of the TARP on market share to understand which
view finds empirical support and which channels dominate. Our first hypotheses (H1aH1b) are:
H1a: TARP banks increased their market shares relative to non-TARP banks.
H1b: TARP banks decreased their market shares relative to non-TARP banks.
We next consider market power, proxied by Lerner GTA, Price minus MC
(marginal cost) divided by Price (discussed in Section 4.6.2). TARP banks may increase
their market power due to four different channels (three of which also affect market share
above). First, under the safety channel, customers may pay more for credit from TARP

97
Hoshi and Kashyap (2010), in their study about lessons from Japan crisis, mention that a bank may refuse
government assistance if it generates stigma or an adverse signal that the bank is expected to have high future
losses.
98

As discussed above, the predation and charter value/quiet life channels may also be regarded as opposites
because they have opposing implications and only one can hold for a given bank at a given time.
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banks because these banks are less likely to fail or become distressed, and creditors may
charge them lower interest rates because TARP banks are more likely to pay back, both
leading to higher market power. Second, under the increased moral hazard channel, there
may be reductions in market and regulatory discipline due to the increased probability of
future bailouts, resulting in shifts into riskier portfolios. This leads to higher measured
market power because the riskier pool of customers pay higher interest rates. Creditors may
also charge more if they perceive the TARP banks as riskier, but this increase will be less
than enough to compensate for the riskier asset portfolio. Third, under the charter value /
quiet life channel, TARP bailout may decrease incentives for aggressive behavior. This
may lead to higher market power as TARP banks maintain higher rates and fees for credit
and maintain lower deposit and non-deposit funding rates rather than going after business.
Finally, under the cost advantage channel, TARP banks have decreased marginal costs and
may reduce price (by a lesser amount) to attract more business, yielding higher market
power.
Alternatively, TARP banks may have decreased market power due to four different
channels (three of which are from the market share hypotheses above). First, under the
predation channel, TARP banks may use the capital infusions to compete more
aggressively by offering customers lower rates and fees on loans and loan commitments
and higher rates on deposits and other funds, resulting in lower market power. Second,
under the decreased moral hazard channel, the increase in capital may result in shifts into
safer portfolios. This leads to lower measured market power because the safer pool of
customers pay less for loans and loan commitments, which is partially offset by lower
interest rates from creditors. Third, under the stigma channel, customers may demand
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lower rates on credit from TARP banks because they are perceived as riskier, and creditors
may charge them more for funds, leading to lower market power. Finally, under the cost
disadvantage channel, TARP banks have an increase in marginal cost and may increase
price (by a lesser amount), leading to lower market power. The increased moral hazard
and decreased moral hazard channels are opposites, and only one can hold for a given
bank at a given time.
We test empirically the impact of the TARP on market power to try to understand
which view finds more empirical support. Our second series of hypotheses (H2a-H2b) are:
H2a: TARP banks increased their market power relative to non-TARP banks.
H2b: TARP banks decreased their market power relative to non-TARP banks.
The eight channels may influence market share and market power in the same or
opposite directions, as shown in Graph A of Figure 4.1. The only exceptions are the moral
hazard channels, for which we only have predictions for market power.
We also distinguish between TARP banks that repaid early and those that did not.
We expect that those that repaid early would have shed some of the cost advantages or
disadvantages of the program by leaving it. In addition, any stigma attached to the program
would likely largely be lifted, and there may be an increased safety channel from
demonstrating the ability to repay. The changes in the importance of the channels from
early repayment are shown with the smaller and larger arrows in Graph B of Figure 4.1.
We expect that for those that repaid early, the cost disadvantage channel and/or the stigma
channel was likely in force encouraging the repayment. Since the cost disadvantage
channel and stigma channel have negative influences on both market share and market
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power, the reduction of the importance of these channels and any increase in the importance
of the safety channel should make the overall impact of TARP more positive or less
negative for those that repaid early. These arguments lead to our third hypothesis:
H3: TARP banks that repaid early incurred more positive or less negative market share
and market power outcomes.
4.5 Econometric Framework
We test the effects of TARP on competition using data for virtually all US banking
organizations. The changes in banks’ behavior after TARP are studied using a differencein-difference (DID) analysis. A DID estimator is commonly used in the program evaluation
literature (e.g., Meyer (1995)) to compare a treatment group to a control group before and
after treatment. Recently, it has been used in the banking literature (e.g., Beck, Levine, and
Levkov (2010), Gilje (2012), Schaeck, Cihak, Maehler, and Stolz (2012), Berger, Kick,
and Schaeck (forthcoming)). In this case, the treated group consists of banks that received
TARP funds, and the control group consists of other banks. An advantage of this approach
is that by analyzing the time difference of the group differences, the DID estimator
accounts for omitted factors that affect treated and untreated banks alike.
The first DID regression model considers TARP banks that repaid early and those
that did not equally, and accounts for Hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2a, and H2b:

Yit = β0 + β1 ⋅TARP Recipientit + β2 ⋅ Post TARPit x TARP Recipientit +
+β3 ⋅ Xit −1 + β4 ⋅Timet + εit

(4.1)

Yit is a competitive advantage indicator (market share or market power), TARP Recipientit
is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post
TARPit x TARP Recipientit is the DID term and captures the effect of the treatment (TARP)
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on the treated (TARP recipients) compared to the untreated (non-TARP banks) after
treatment. Post TARPit is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after the TARP
program initiation (following Duchin and Sosyura (2014)), but considering a longer period
for estimation. Xit-1 are control variables, Timet is a series of time fixed effects, and εit
represents a white noise error term.99 A positive coefficient on the DID term would show
the presence of a competitive advantage associated with TARP.
The second DID regression model analyzes the different behavior of TARP banks
that repaid early and those that did not repay early, and accounts for Hypothesis H3:

Yit = δ0 + δ1 ⋅TARP Recipient _ Not Repaidit + δ2 ⋅TARP Recipient _ Repaidit +
+ δ3 ⋅ Post TARPit x TARP Recipient _ Not Repaidit +
+ δ4 ⋅ Post TARPit x TARP Recipient _ Repaidit + δ5 ⋅ Xit −1 + δ6 ⋅Timet +ηit

(4.2)

All the variables are the same as in equation (1), except that TARP Recipient_Not Repaidit
(a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010) and TARP
Recipient_Repaidit (a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid early in 2009-2010) replace
TARP Recipientit. Post TARPit x TARP Recipient_Not Repaidit and Post TARPit x TARP
Recipient_Repaidit are the DID terms and capture the effects of the treatment (TARP
capital infusion) on the treated (TARP recipients that did not repay early and TARP
recipients that repaid early) compared to the rest. Positive coefficients on these DID terms
would show competitive advantages. Under Hypothesis H3, the effect of TARP is more
positive or less negative for those that repaid early, predicting that δ4 > δ3.

99

The term Post TARP is not included in the model by itself because it is subsumed by the time fixed
effects.
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4.6 Data and Sample
4.6.1 Data Sources
Data are collected from multiple sources. We obtain TARP transactions data for October
2008 to December 2010 and TARP recipients list from the Treasury’s website. 100 We
match by name and location the institutions in the list with their corresponding RSSD9001
(Call Report ID) where available. The TARP report has 756 transactions included for 709
unique institutions (572 bank holding companies (BHCs), 87 commercial banks, 50 S&Ls
and thrifts), since some institutions have multiple transactions – some received more than
one TARP capital purchase and some made one or more repayment transactions.101 We
exclude S&Ls and thrifts because datasets are not comparable with banks and these
institutions compete in different ways than commercial banks.
We obtain bank data from quarterly Call Reports for the period 2005:Q1 to
2012:Q4. Given that the majority of our TARP recipients are BHCs, we aggregate Call
Report data of all the banks in each BHC at the holding company level. This aggregation
is done for all bank-level variables, including competitive indicators. If the commercial
bank is independent, we keep the data for the commercial bank. For convenience, we use
the term bank to refer to either type of entity.
We exclude observations that do not refer to commercial banks (RSSD9331 ≠ 1),
have missing or incomplete financial data for total assets or common equity, have missing

100

http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/Pages/default.aspx

101

A few special cases are resolved as follows: For Union First Market Bancshares Corporation (First Market
Bank, FSB) located in Bowling Green, VA, we include the RSSD9001 of the branch of the commercial bank
First Market Bank because this is the institution located in Bowling Green, VA. In two other cases where
M&As occurred (the bank was acquired by another BHC according to the National Information Center
(NIC)), and TARP money were received by the unconsolidated institution, we included the RSSD9001 of
this unconsolidated institution.
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or negative data for the income statement items such as interest expenses, personnel
expenses, and non-interest expenses, or if the bank failed before 2009:Q1 (before
observation of TARP effects). To avoid distortions for the Equity to GTA ratio, for all
observations with equity less than 0.01 * GTA, we replace equity with 1% of GTA (e.g.,
Berger and Bouwman, 2013). In addition, we normalize financial variables using
seasonally adjusted GDP deflator to be in real 2012:Q4 dollars.
We also use data from several other sources for additional control variables and
instruments: FDIC Summary of Deposits, List of Corrective Actions, House of
Representatives website, Missouri Census Data Center, Execucomp, DEF 14A Filings
from SEC Edgar website, Center for Responsible Politics, and the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia website. The regressions lose one quarter of observations because of the
use of lagged values for some of the exogenous variables. We end up with a final regression
sample of 178,604 firm-quarter observations for 7,323 unique banks.
4.6.2. Main Dependent Variables
For dependent variables, we first consider market share proxied by local market asset share
of each bank (Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), New England County Metropolitan
Area (NECMA), or rural county). In the cases of multimarket banks, we use the weighted
average local market asset share, where the weights are the proportions of deposits in the
different local markets (locations of assets are not available).102,103
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As alternative method in unreported results, we construct the weighted average local market asset share
using as weights the proportions of branches that banks have in their local markets, and results are robust.
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We assume that assets and loans are distributed the same as deposits according to the “cluster” approach
in the industrial organization literature. This originated in the Supreme Court’s 1963 Philadelphia National
Bank decision, which confirmed that antitrust laws are applicable also to banking mergers and defined both
the product and geographical markets to be used in the structural analysis of bank mergers. The Court found
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Our second way of measuring competitive advantage is market power. We proxy
market power by the Lerner Index for GTA, and calculated as the price-cost margin divided
by price:
Lerner GTAit =

Priceit − MCit
Priceit

(4.3)

where Priceit is the price of GTA proxied by the ratio of total revenues (interest and noninterest income) to GTA for bank i at time t and MCit represents marginal cost of assets
for bank i at time t . The main advantage of this method is that it can be calculated for each
bank at each point in time and does not require the assumption of long-run equilibrium,
unlike other indicators such as the Panzar and Rosse H-Statistic (Dick and Hannan (2010)).
A firm in perfect competition has an index value of 0 and thus no market power (as Price
= MC) and a firm with market power has a positive index. The detailed calculation of the
Lerner Index is explained in Appendix D.
4.6.3. Main Independent Variables
As discussed above, we use several TARP variables for our analysis: TARP Recipient,
TARP Recipient_Repaid, and TARP Recipient_Not Repaid and the interaction terms of
Post_TARP with these variables. These are defined above in Section 4.5.

that banks produce a “cluster” of services that are traded in “local markets” and established this cluster
analytical approach. This method defines that the relevant product market includes in that market all products
and services provided by the commercial banks. In addition, there is a large literature on whether bank deposit
and lending markets are geographically segmented, with some researchers finding that bank product markets
have become more integrated over time and that local monopoly power remains (e.g., Eichengreen (1984),
Berger and Hannan (1989), Cyrnak and Hannan (1999)).
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4.6.4. Control Variables
We include a broad set of control variables to mitigate potential omitted variable problems.
We control for proxies for CAMELS (the declared set of financial criteria used by
regulators for evaluating banks) as in Duchin and Sosyura (2014) because these are widely
perceived as good indicators of a bank’s financial health. We control for Capital Adequacy
– the ratio of equity capital divided by GTA – to account for the extent to which a bank
can absorb potential losses and compete more vigorously. We control for Asset Quality –
the fraction of nonperforming loans to total loans – to account for the overall condition of
a bank’s portfolio. We control for Management Quality/Regulatory Action, a dummy
taking a value of -1 if a bank had a corrective action by the corresponding banking regulator
(FED, FDIC, and OCC) during the quarter and 0 otherwise. 104 Earnings is proxied by
return on assets (ROA), the ratio of the annualized net income to GTA. We account for
bank Liquidity, the ratio of cash over total deposits. Finally, Sensitivity to Market Risk is
the ratio of the absolute difference (gap) between short-term assets and short-term
liabilities to GTA.
We also control for several other bank characteristics following the literature. We
include Bank Size, the natural log of GTA, because prior research shows there may be a
connection between size and capacity to gain a competitive advantage (Berger and
Bouwman (2009, 2013)). Second, we control for Bank Age, the age (in years) of the
commercial bank or the oldest bank owned by the BHC (when there are multiple banks
owned by a BHC). This is important because market share usually rises as a bank

104

The list of enforcement actions are taken by FDIC, FED, and OCC regulators against banks. We consider
that this variable captures management quality also as bank regulators would not take regulatory actions
against banks unless they judged that bank management would not take appropriate action in the absence of
the enforcement actions.
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accumulates years in a market (Berger and Dick (2007)). Third, we control for DWTAF –
a dummy for whether a bank received discount window loans and/or Term Auction Facility
(TAF) funding during the crisis. Berger, Black, Bouwman, and Dlugosz (2014) find that
banks that received these funds increased their lending significantly, raising the possibility
that these programs may have also affected competitive advantages in terms of market
share and market power.105 Fourth, we control for Merger, a dummy equal to 1 from the
time that the bank acquired another institution. Institutions that acquire others may gain
market share and market power.106 Fifth, we control for BHC, a dummy equal to 1 if the
entity is a BHC, as this may help a bank strengthen its competitive position because the
holding company may support its affiliates by injecting capital through internal capital
markets (Houston, James, and Marcus (1997)). Sixth, we control for the public status of
the bank or its holding company (Listed), as listed entities have better access to capital
markets and more public information available, which may affect their competitive
advantages. Listed is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is listed
on a stock exchange.107 Seventh, we control for Metropolitan – a dummy equal to 1 if the
majority of bank deposits are in MSAs or NECMAs – as banks in metropolitan locations
may have more opportunities for expansion and growth. Eighth, we control for HHI
Deposits, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index determined using the bank deposit data from
the FDIC Summary of Deposits, which may affect the pricing strategy of the bank. HHI is

105

Data on these programs during the crisis were made public due to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests and a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, and the data were generously provided to us by those authors.
106
As an alternative way to control for mergers in unreported results, we exclude the quarter of the acquisition.
Results are robust to this alternative method.
107

In order to split banks by listed versus non-listed status, we match banks in the Call Reports with the
CRSP dataset using the CRSP-FRB link from the University of Chicago.
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weighted by the share of bank deposits in each local market over bank’s total deposits over
all the markets in which the bank operates. Ninth, we control for Branches/GTA – the ratio
of the number of branches that the bank has over GTA multiplied by 1000 – as banks with
more branches per dollar of assets may have more complex organizational structures,
which may also affect banks’ ability to compete (e.g., Degryse and Ongena (2005, 2007),
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007), Degryse, Laeven, and Ongena (2009),
Berger and Bouwman (2013)).
4.7 Empirical Results
4.7.1 Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 provides definitions and summary statistics for the variables. We present means,
medians, standard deviations, and numbers of observations across all banks in the sample
for the variables used in the analyses. In terms of competitive advantage indicators, the
average bank has a Local Market Share of Assets of 0.049 and a Lerner GTA of 0.051. As
for the TARP indicators, TARP Recipient dummy shows that 9.7% of the banks received
TARP money – 1.8% repaid early (TARP Recipient_Repaid) and the remaining 7.9% did
not repay early (TARP Recipient_Not Repaid).
Looking at the proxies for CAMELS ratings for the sample banks, we find that the
average bank has Capital Adequacy of 0.109, Asset Quality of 0.003, Management
Quality/Regulatory Action of -0.005, Earnings of 0.017, Liquidity of 0.137, and Sensitivity
to Market Risk of 0.130. These statistics suggest that, on average over the sample period,
banks were well capitalized and did not have many performance problems, although the
means mask problems for individual banks at different points in time. Turning to the other
bank variables, we find that the average bank has a Bank Size (logarithm of the GTA) of
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12.053 (GTA of $1.89 billion) and a Bank Age of 76.26 years. In addition, 23.7% of the
banks obtained Discount Window and/or TAF funds (DWTAF), 21.90% of the banks in
the sample acquired another institution (Merger), 86.3% of the banks are BHCs or part of
a BHC (BHC), 6.80% are listed (Listed), and 67.3% are in metropolitan locations
(Metropolitan). The average bank also has a local market concentration (HHI Deposits) of
1,162 and a ratio of Branches/GTA of 0.029.
4.7.2. Regression Analysis
Table 4.2 tabulates the main estimation results for equation (2) that tests our Hypotheses
(time fixed effects are not shown for brevity). Panel A columns (1) and (3) show that the
DID term, Post TARPit * TARP Recipientit, is positive and statistically significant at 1%
level, indicating that TARP banks gained a competitive advantage and increased both
market share and market power after TARP capital injections. These results are also
economically significant. The coefficient on Post TARPit * TARP Recipientit of 0.0045 in
the market share equation increases the local market share by 9.14%, evaluated at the
average market share of 0.0492. In addition, the coefficient on Post TARPit * TARP
Recipientit of 0.0384 in the market power equation increases the Lerner Index by 74.85%,
evaluated at the average Lerner Index of 0.0513. Results are consistent with the empirical
dominance of Hypothesis H1a over Hypothesis H1b and Hypothesis H2a over Hypothesis
H2b. Panel A columns (2) and (4) and Panel B showing t-tests for the equality of the effects
for the two types of TARP banks indicate that the competitive advantage is predominantly
for the TARP banks that repaid early, suggesting that these banks significantly reduced
their cost disadvantages and increased their revenues more than those that did not repay
early, consistent with Hypothesis H3.
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While we are primarily interested in the DID terms, Post TARP * TARP, the
coefficients of the TARP dummy are also of interest. The TARP dummies from both the
market share and market power regressions suggest that prior to TARP, recipients had
lower market share and market power. The sums of the TARP dummies and the interaction
coefficients indicate that after TARP, the recipients still had lower market share, although
closer to that of the non-recipients, while they surpassed their competitors in terms of
market power. When splitting between TARP banks that repaid early and those that did
not, we find that all TARP recipients had lower market share and power prior to the
program, and in all cases except for the market share for TARP recipients that did not repay
early, they increase their market share and market power.
Turning to the bank control variables, we find that most of the proxies for CAMELS
indicate that banks with better asset quality, better management quality, higher earnings,
higher liquidity, and lower sensitivity to market risk may be better able to gain competitive
advantages in both market share and market power. The only CAMELS variable that
differs across the two competitive advantage indicators is capital adequacy, which tends to
decrease market share and increase market power. Looking at the other control variables,
across both market share and market power regressions we find that banks with more
experience (as proxied by the Bank Age), higher local market concentration, lower
metropolitan coverage, without a BHC membership, not engaging in M&As, and with a
less complex organizational structure are more likely to gain competitive advantages.108
The DWTAF variable does not appear to affect market share significantly, but it has a
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We also try dropping the local market concentration variable (HHI Deposits) to mitigate the potential
concern that it is an alternative measure of competition that may bias our regression estimates. The results
are robust (not shown).
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negative impact on market power. As for the effects of size and public status on market
share, estimates suggest that it may be harder for larger and public banks to increase their
market shares due to different growth and expansion strategies, consistent with Berger and
Bouwman (2013). However, in terms of market power, larger and public banks are more
likely to increase market power due to better ability to set higher prices for products or
obtain cheaper funding from the capital markets.
4.7.3. Lerner Index Decomposition
In Table 4.3, we decompose Lerner GTA into its components, Price and MC, to shed light
on the source of the market power competitive advantage that TARP banks obtain. An
increase in Price would come from charging higher interest rates and fees for loans and
loan commitments, while a lower MC may come from paying lower interest rates on
deposits or non-deposit funds. Results in Panel A columns (1) and (3) suggest that the
competitive advantage findings are primarily due to marginal costs going down, suggesting
that the market power gain is mainly on the input side (lower prices for deposits and/or
other sources of funding). When splitting the banks between banks that repaid early and
those that did not, both groups had an increase in their market power on the input side and
banks that repaid early also had an increase in market power on the output side.
4.7.4. Channels Analysis
In Graph C of Figure 4.1, we examine which of the possible channels of TARP on
competition appear to be relatively important and unimportant for explaining our empirical
results. The shaded areas surrounded by dotted lines illustrate the channels most consistent
with our findings, while the crossed-out areas illustrate the channels least consistent with
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our findings.109 We have several important findings. First, the moral hazard channels seem
to be unimportant because Price does not change nearly as much as MC and goes in two
different directions for those that did not repay and those that repaid. Second, the cost
disadvantage channel seems to dominate the cost advantage channel, at least for the banks
that repaid early, because when the cost effects are reduced by early repayment, the
competitive advantages are amplified. Finally, the safety channel, the only remaining one
with positive influences on both market share and market power appears to dominate the
stigma and cost disadvantage channels, which have negative influences on both. For banks
that did not repay, the safety channel seems to primarily come in the form of lower interest
rates for deposits and/or other types of financing, which more than offset the higher cost
of TARP funds. Banks that repaid also appear to have gotten a boost in their revenues from
an enhanced safety channel. In sum, the safety channel and the cost disadvantage channel
are the most important to explain the results.
4.8 Robustness Tests
In this section, we provide a number of robustness tests. We include all control variables
from the main regressions in these tests, but they are not shown for brevity.
4.8.1. Instrumental Variable (IV) Analysis
We first address the potential endogeneity of our TARP Recipient variables, which could
bias our findings. For example, TARP capital might be more often provided to the strongest
banks, which may be more likely to gain a competitive advantage, yielding a spurious
relationship. To deal with this, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) analysis.
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The remaining channels are generally not strongly consistent with our findings because the predicted
market share and market power effects of these channels go in opposite directions, counter to our results.
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To find instruments, we first note that prior research on TARP finds that bank’s
political and regulatory connections can affect the bank’s probability of receiving TARP
funds. Following this research, we use the following instruments for the TARP Recipient
variables: Subcommitee on Financial Institutions or Capital Markets, a dummy variable
which takes a value of 1 if a firm is headquartered in a district of a House member who
served on the Financial Institutions Subcommittee or the Capital Markets Subcommittee
of the House Financial Services Committee in 2008 or 2009, following Sosyura and Duchin
(2014); Democrat, a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a bank's local
Representative was a Democrat in the 2007-2008 campaign election cycle, following Li
(2013); Fed Director, a dummy which takes a value of 1 if one of the bank’s directors was
on the board of directors of one of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks (FRB) or a branch in 2008
or 2009, following Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), Duchin and Sosyura (2012), and Li
(2013).110
Because we consider the TARP recipients that did and did not repay early
separately, we include two additional instrumental variables that account for exit from the
TARP program. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) show that costs of participation in the
TARP program are a major determinant for whether banks chose to remain in the program.
Thus, revised compensation rules announced in February 2009 may pose restrictions for
management compensation and freedom of decisions in TARP banks with highly
compensated executives. We include CEO Compensation, a dummy which takes a value
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We use the MABLE/Geocorr2k software on the Missouri Census Data Center website to match banks
with congressional districts using the zip codes of their headquarters. The final regression sample for this test
is 167,112 bank-quarter observations, less than the main regression sample. This is due to two reasons: First,
some of the banks could not be mapped into a congressional district (either due to an invalid headquarters
zipcode or because we could not match it to a congressional district), a problem reported also by Li (2013).
Second, we use an indicator of local market conditions for the 2007-2010 period, although some entities may
not be present during this entire period.
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of one if bank’s CEO had a total compensation greater than $500,000 in 2008111,112 because
banks with high CEO compensation are more likely to exit the program, following Wilson
and Wu (2010) and Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012). We also use the change in state
economic conditions, Coincident Index (weighted), which combines four state-level
indicators to summarize economic conditions in a single statistic.113 The Coincident Index
(weighted) is calculated as the weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal
Reserve’s state coincident indexes from December 2007 to December 2010 with the share
of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights, following Bayazitova and Shivdasani
(2012), because banks in states that experience more economic growth may exit the
program earlier since they can raise cheaper financing in the local market, have more
internal growth in funding, and/or have fewer loan performance problems.
Because the potential endogenous explanatory variable in equation (1) is binary and
we need the instrument to predict treatment, we employ a dummy endogenous variable
model as suggested in section 18.4.1 of Wooldridge (2002). For the first stage, we use a
probit model in which we regress the TARP Recipient dummy on the political and
regulatory instruments discussed and all control variables from the main regression model.
We then use the predicted probability obtained from the first stage as an instrument for the

111

To construct this variable, we consider banks with GTA greater than $1 billion and use ExecuComp
complemented with DEF14A Filings in SEC Edgar to determine the compensation package for the CEO in
2008 for all banks with information available. We assume for the rest that 2008 CEO Compensation is less
than $500,000, based on the reasoning that small banks are less likely to receive such a high level of
compensation.
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In unreported results, we also use a continuous variable, Excess CEO Compensation, the log of the 1 plus
the excess of $500,000 of 2008 CEO total compensation. Results are comparable using this alternative
instrument.
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The four indicators are: nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the
unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index.
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second stage. Similarly, for equation (2), we conduct probit regressions for each of the two
types of TARP banks, TARP Recipient_Not Repaid and TARP Recipient_Repaid on all
political instruments and regulatory instruments discussed and the two extra instruments
for early program exit decisions. We also include all control variables from the main
regression model. We then use the predicted probabilities obtained from the first stage as
instruments for the second stage.
The results of the IV regressions are reported in Table 4.4. We report the first-stage
regression results in Table 4.4 Panel A columns (1)-(3), and the second-stage results for
the IV specification in Table 4.4 Panel B, with columns (1) and (3) for market share and
columns (2) and (4) for market power, respectively. The first-stage regressions in column
(1) indicate that the instrumental variables are positively related to TARP injections, and
the F-tests indicates that the instruments are valid. Similarly, the first-stage regression in
columns (2) and (3) indicate that the additional instruments for repayment of TARP, CEO
Compensation and Coincident Index (weighted) are related to TARP repayment decisions,
so that TARP recipients that repaid early are more likely to have had higher CEO
compensation and higher growth in local markets, while the opposite is true for the TARP
banks that did not repay early. The F-tests from the first stage again indicate that the
instruments are valid.
The second stage results in Panel B and the tests of equality for different types of
TARP banks in Panel C show that the main results about our DID terms are robust. The
Post_TARP* TARP Recipient terms remain positive and significant for both market share
and power. Also the results for the Post_TARP* TARP Recipient_Repaid terms remain
positive and significant in both equations, showing that TARP recipients that repaid early
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obtained a competitive advantage. Some of our secondary results, however, are not robust.
For example, the TARP Recipient dummies switch sign from negative to positive in the IV
estimation. This result might be consistent with endogeneity concerns, and hence the IV
estimates may be better able to identify the true effects.
4.8.2. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Analysis
We address the related potential concern of selection bias using a propensity score
matching analysis. We follow Black and Hazelwood (2013) and Duchin and Sosyura
(2014) and match each TARP recipient based on the propensity score probabilities to one
or more non-TARP banks with similar characteristics to help dispel the competing
explanation that our results spuriously reflect differences in the characteristics of recipients
and non-recipients rather than the effect of TARP per se on competitive advantage
indicators. Using a probit regression, we estimate the propensity scores of all banks using
the proxies for CAMELS, Bank Size, and DWTAF.114 The propensity score is the probability
of a bank receiving TARP funds, based on the bank’s pre-treatment characteristics. TARP
banks are assigned their corresponding non-TARP bank matches based on the absolute
difference in propensity scores. Banks with the smallest differences are considered matches
and are selected to be part of our analysis.
We use several matching techniques: 1) Nearest-neighbor Matching with N=1,
which matches each treatment unit to the nearest control unit, 2) Nearest-neighbor
Matching with N=2, which match each TARP bank with 2 non-TARP banks with the
closest propensity scores, and 3) Nearest-neighbor Matching with N=3, which match each
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As an alternative, in unreported results, we also estimate the propensity scores using only the bank
characteristics of size, capitalization level, and profitability. The PSM results are robust to this method.
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TARP bank with 3 non-TARP banks with the closest propensity scores. The matches are
done with replacement, so that a non-TARP bank could be the closest match for multiple
TARP banks. We rerun all main regressions using these matched samples. Table 4.5 Panel
A shows the results for market share using the three different PSM samples (columns (1)(6)) and we find that market share results continue to hold, except that in some instances
only TARP recipients that repaid early continue to show a competitive advantage. Table
4.5 Panel B shows the results for market power using the three different PSM samples
(columns 1-6) and we find that market power results continue to hold. The t-tests of
equality for the different groups of TARP banks reported in Panel C again indicate that the
competitive advantage is greater for TARP banks that repaid early.
4.8.3. Placebo Experiments
We are also concerned that alternative forces may drive the effects we document. To
mitigate this potential problem, we conduct two types of placebo experiments.
First, we do a placebo experiment following Puddu, and Walchli (2013). We
fictionally assume that the TARP participation took place four years earlier, while still
distinguishing between banks that received TARP and those that did not and banks that
repaid early versus those that did not according to the “true" TARP program. To mimic our
main analysis, we use an eight-year period immediately preceding the TARP program from
2001-2008, and assume that the fictional Post TARP period begins four years before the
actual program. We rerun the regressions using the placebo sample (2001-2008) and define
Placebo Post TARP as a dummy equal to one in 2005-2008, the period after the fictional
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TARP program initiation.115 If our main results reflect the true program, we should not find
positively significant results for the DID terms.
The results of the first placebo experiment, reported in Table 4.6 Panel A, confirm
that indeed there are no positively significant results on market share and measured market
power for the fictional TARP. In the case of market share, the fictional TARP effect is
negative and statistically significant, and in the case of measured market power, the effect
is insignificantly different from zero. The negative effects for market share may reflect that
these banks may have been in relatively poor condition in the period just before the TARP
program started. Results are similar when we distinguish between TARP banks that repaid
early and those that did not. The t-tests in Panel C confirm that there is no statistically
significant difference in terms of competitive advantages between the two groups.
As an alternative placebo experiment, we allocate the TARP treatment randomly to
banks and then re-estimate the regressions with boot-strapped confidence intervals using
1000 replications. Results are reported in Table 6 Panel B and confirm that indeed there
are no positively significant results on market share and market power for the randomly
assigned TARP banks.

The t-tests in Panel C confirm that there is no statistically

significant difference in terms of competitive advantages between TARP banks that repaid
early and those that did not. In sum, the two types of placebo experiments suggest that our
main results do not appear to be driven by alternative forces.
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In the regressions, we include all controls as in our main analysis, except that we are not able to include
Management Quality/Regulatory Action because of data limitations on enforcement actions (only available
from 2005 onwards).
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4.8.4. Alternative Measures of TARP
We next test the robustness of our main results to the use of alternative measures of TARP.
In Table 4.7, we replace the TARP Recipient dummies with: Bailout Amount / GTA and
Bailout Amount / Risk-Weighted Assets. Our results hold, except that in some instances
only TARP banks that repaid early continue to show a competitive advantage.
4.8.5. Alternative Measures of Market Share
We test the robustness of our results to the use of alternative measures of market share. In
Table 4.8, we replace the Local Market Share Assets with Local Market Share Loans,
Local Market Share Deposits, and Local Market Share Uninsured Deposits. Uninsured
deposits may be particularly sensitive to the safety and stigma channels because these
depositors are not explicitly protected by FDIC deposit insurance.116 Our main results
hold, except that in some instances, only TARP recipients that repaid early show a
competitive advantage. Moreover, results that TARP recipients increased their Local
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To calculate uninsured deposits, we take all the funds in accounts that are partially insured and subtract
off the amount that is insured. This requires separate treatment for several time periods because of the changes
in deposit insurance limits over time. For the period 2005:Q1-2006:Q1, we calculate the uninsured deposits
as the amount of bank deposit accounts (demand, savings, and time) with a balance on the report date of more
than $100,000 minus the number of such deposit accounts multiplied by $100,000. For the period 2006:Q22009:Q2, we take into account the different treatment of deposit retirement accounts versus the rest. Thus,
we calculate the uninsured deposits as the amount of bank deposit accounts (demand, savings, and time,
excluding retirement accounts) with a balance on the report date of more than $100,000 minus the number
of such deposit accounts multiplied by $100,000 plus the amount of bank deposit retirement accounts with a
balance on the report date of more than $250,000 minus the number of such deposit accounts multiplied by
$250,000. For the period 2009:Q3 onwards, we account for the deposit insurance limit increase from
$100,000 to $250,000 for all deposits except foreign ones. Thus, we calculate the uninsured deposits as the
amount of bank deposit accounts (demand, savings, and time, including retirement accounts) with a balance
on the report date of more than $250,000 minus the number of such deposit accounts multiplied by $250,000.
While the last change in deposit insurance took place in October 2008, the Call Report did not change to
reflect it until 2009:Q3. For all time periods, we also add the foreign deposits to the uninsured deposits
because foreign deposits are not covered by the FDIC deposit insurance.
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Market Share Uninsured Deposits confirm that the safety channel is one of the most
important channels to explain our findings.
4.8.6. Alternative Econometric Models
To help alleviate the concern that omitted unobserved bank-specific determinants might be
explain our results, we also test robustness using specifications with bank fixed effects in
Table 4.9 Panel A columns (1)-(4) and random effects (using a generalized least squares
approach) in Table 4.9 Panel A columns (5)-(8). We also present a model with time fixed
effects and White standard errors which are robust to within-cluster correlation at the bank
level (Rogers standard errors) in Table 4.9 Panel A columns (9)-(12). Panel B shows the
tests of the equality of the coefficients for different types of TARP banks. In all
specifications, we continue to find support for our main results.
4.8.7. Dynamics of TARP and Competitive Indicators
We next examine the dynamics of the relation between TARP and competitive advantage
indicators for the TARP banks in a similar fashion to Beck, Levine, and Levkov (2010).
We do this by including a series of dummy variables in the standard regression to trace out
the quarter-by-quarter effects of TARP on the competitive indicators for the TARP
recipients. In the regression, we replace the DID term Post TARPit x TARP Recipientit from
equation (1) with DID terms created by interacting the TARP Recipientit with quarter
dummies for each of the time periods before and after the TARP.
Yit = λ0 + λ1 ⋅ TARP Recipientit +
+ λ2 ⋅ D

−14

(4.4)

x TARP Recipientit + ... + λ32 ⋅ D

+16

it

+ λ33 ⋅ X it −1 + λ34 ⋅ Timet + ζ it
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it

x TARP Recipientit +

where Yit, TARP Recipientit, Xit-1, and Timet are defined as above. The “Ds” are dummies
defined such that D−j equals one for banks in the jth quarter before 2008:Q4 and D+j equals
one for banks in the jth quarter after 2008:Q4, and ζ it represents a white noise error term.
We plot the DID coefficients, adjusted for seasonality, with their 95% confidence intervals
and trends in Graphs A and C of Figure 4.2 for market share and market power,
respectively.117 We repeat the exercise by separating out the TARP recipients that repaid
early and those that did not in Graphs B and D of Figure 4.2.
Graph A of Figure 4.2 illustrates that the increase in the market share of TARP
banks did not precede TARP. The impact of TARP on market share takes time to
materialize and only becomes significantly positive in 2010:Q1, and this effect remains at
a high level until the end of the sample period. This may suggest that taking share away
from competitors is a medium- to long-term strategic process.
As for the impact of TARP on market power, Graph C of Figure 2 illustrates that
there is an increase in TARP banks’ market power after TARP. This materializes very
quickly, from the first quarter after TARP (2009:Q1), possibly because it may immediately
affect banks’ costs of funds. The effect eventually disappears in 2011. In sum, market share
and market power record different patterns of increase post TARP, but both show a positive
trend.
Graph B of Figure 4.2 illustrates an increase in market share post TARP for both
those that repaid early and those that did not, but the increase is much higher for the TARP
banks that repaid early. For timing, both groups experience an increase in market share by
same time (2010:Q1), but the TARP banks that did not repay early quickly lose this

117

To deseasonalize the data, we follow use the X11 procedure developed by the U.S. Census Bureau.
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advantage, while TARP banks that repaid early maintain the advantage until the end of the
sample period. Similarly, Graph D of Figure 2 illustrates that there is an increase in market
power post TARP for both groups, but the increase is much higher for TARP banks that
repaid early. Although initially both TARP groups experience an increase in market power
up to 2009:Q4, after this, TARP banks that did not repay early experience a decline in
market power to preceding levels or below, while TARP banks that repaid early maintain
or enhance their competitive advantage for market power up until the end of the sample
period. In sum, the competitive advantage effects of TARP last for TARP banks that repaid
early, and are only short-lived for TARP banks that did not.
4.8.8 Other Robustness Tests
In Appendix E, we conduct several additional analyses to see the types of banks for which
TARP offered most competitive advantages. We find that the impact of TARP increases
with bank size, and is robust to excluding involuntary participants and those subject to
stress tests (SCAP). We also find that only TARP banks with high capitalization ratios
obtain competitive advantages and TARP banks in more concentrated local markets gain
greater competitive advantages.
4.9 Conclusions
This paper investigates whether TARP may have given its recipients competitive
advantages and if so, which channel(s) brought about these changes. Our difference-indifference (DID) regression analysis yields several important results:
1. TARP recipients did get competitive advantages and increased both their market shares
and market power relative to non-TARP recipients, consistent with the empirical
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dominance of Hypothesis H1a over Hypothesis H1b and Hypothesis H2a over Hypothesis
H2b.
2. The positive market share and market power findings may be driven primarily by the
safety channel (TARP banks may be perceived as safer), which is partially offset by the
cost disadvantage channel (TARP funds may be relatively expensive). Thus, the safety
channel and the cost disadvantage channel are the most important to explain the results.
3. The competitive advantages are primarily or entirely due to TARP recipients that repaid
early, suggesting that these banks significantly reduced the importance of the cost
disadvantage channel and increased the importance of the safety channel, consistent with
Hypothesis H3.
Overall, our results suggest that TARP may have resulted in a possible distortion
in competition, which may have misallocated resources, and may help explain other
findings in the literature on the effects of TARP on bank risk and bank lending. First, our
findings may help explain the results in the literature that TARP increased risk for the large
banks (Black and Hazelwood (2013), Duchin and Sosyura (2014)) and decreased risk for
the small banks (Black and Hazelwood (2013)). As discussed above, results in the literature
suggest that a nonmonotonic effect of market power on risk may have been in effect during
the crisis period – higher market power may be associated with higher risk for banks at
high levels of market power, while higher market power may be associated with lower risk
at low levels of market power (Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), Berger, Imbierowicz,
and Rauch (2014)). Given that large (small) banks typically have higher (lower) levels of
market power, TARP may have led to an increase (decrease) in risk for large (small) banks.
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Our results also may help explain the findings in the literature that TARP resulted
in reduced or no change in lending by large banks (Black and Hazelwood (2013), Duchin
and Sosyura (2014)) and increased lending by small banks (Black and Hazelwood (2013),
Li (2013), Puddu, and Walchli (2013), Chang, Contessi, and Francis (2014)). According to
the standard structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, an increase in market power
should lead to a reduced supply of credit. However, for relationship borrowers, the supply
of credit may be increased by larger market share and larger market power because limits
on competition help banks force implicit contracts with relationship borrowers that result
in greater credit availability (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1995)). This may help explain the
increase in lending by small banks which tend to specialize in relationship lending, and the
decrease or no change in lending by the large banks, which more often engage in
transactional lending (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005)).
In terms of policy implications, determination about which, if any, banks to be
bailed out should rely on a comprehensive analysis of both benefits and costs. Some of
these costs and benefits – those for competition, risk taking, and lending – may be evaluated
based on our results and those in the literature. Based on the findings for these three effects,
any bailouts may be focused primarily on the small banks, where the effects seem to be
less distortionary and more toward the public interest, since the increase in market share
and market power is the least, risk may be decreased, and lending may be increased.
However, for one of the other major benefits of bailouts, increasing the stability of the
financial system, presumably the benefits would be greater for the large banks. However,
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also the distortions in competition may be greater, and risk taking and lending implications
may be less favorable. Policymakers may balance all these different effects.118

118

Some of the other benefits and costs, such as the net gains to the Treasury, recipient banks, and their
customers are also generally beneficial. However, in the literature, these effects are generally not
differentiated by bank size, so they do not give a guide as to which bank sizes, if any, should be bailed out.
Finally, in regards to effects on local economic conditions, TARP led to only economically insignificant
improvements in economic conditions in the local markets in which it was applied (Berger and Roman
(2015)).
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Figure 4.1: Channels and Indicators of Competitive Advantage
Graph A. TARP Banks that Did and Did Not Repay Early Considered Equally
Graph A of Figure 4.1 displays the eight channels which may influence market share
and market power of TARP banks in the same or opposite directions. The only
exceptions are the moral hazard channels, for which we only have predictions for
market power.
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Figure 4.1: Channels and Indicators of Competitive Advantage
Graph B. TARP Banks that Repaid Early
Graph B of Figure 4.1 displays the changes in the importance of the channels from early
TARP repayment. The decrease in the importance of a channel is shown with the
smaller arrows, while the increase in the importance of a channel is shown with larger
arrows.
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Figure 4.1: Channels and Indicators of Competitive Advantage
Graph C. Channels and Indicators of Competitive Advantage Considering the Empirical
Results
Graph C of Figure 4.1 displays which of the possible channels of TARP on competition
appear to be relatively important and unimportant for explaining the results. The shaded areas
surrounded by dotted lines illustrate the channels most consistent with our findings, while the
crossed-out areas illustrate the channels least consistent with our findings.
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Figure 4.2: The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share
and Market Power
Graph A. The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share (TARP Banks that
Did and Did Not Repay Early Considered Equally)
Graph A of Figure 4.2 plots the DID coefficients for the dynamic impact of TARP on
bank market share, adjusted for seasonality (represented by small circles), with their
95% confidence intervals (represented by the dashed lines) and trend (represented by
the solid straight line). We consider both TARP banks that repaid early and those that
did not repay early equally. DID coefficients are created by interacting the TARP
Recipient variable with quarter dummies for each of the time periods before and after
the TARP program.
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Figure 4.2: The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share
and Market Power
Graph B. The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share (TARP Banks that
Repaid Early vs. Those that Did Not)
Graph B of Figure 4.2 plots the DID coefficients for the dynamic impact of TARP on
bank market share, adjusted for seasonality (represented by small circles), with their
95% confidence intervals (represented by the dashed lines). We separate the TARP
recipients that repaid early (TARP Recipient_Repaid) from those that did not (TARP
Recipient_Not Repaid).
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Figure 4.2: The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share
and Market Power
Graph C. The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Power (TARP Banks that
Did and Did Not Repay Early Considered Equally)
Graph C of Figure 4.2 plots the DID coefficients for the dynamic impact of TARP on
bank market power, adjusted for seasonality (represented by small circles), with their
95% confidence intervals (represented by the dashed lines) and trend (represented by
the solid straight line). We consider all TARP banks equally. DID coefficients are
created by interacting the TARP Recipient variable with quarter dummies for each of
the time periods before and after the TARP program.
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Figure 4.2: The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share
and Market Power
Graph D. The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Power (TARP Banks that
Repaid Early vs. Those that Did Not)
Graph D of Figure 4.2 plots the DID coefficients for the dynamic impact of TARP on
bank market power, adjusted for seasonality (represented by small circles), with their
95% confidence intervals (represented by the dashed lines). We separate the TARP
recipients that repaid early (TARP Recipient_Repaid) from those that did not (TARP
Recipient_Not Repaid). DID coefficients are created by interacting the TARP
Recipient variable with quarter dummies for each of the time periods before and after
the TARP program.

Table 4.1: Definitions and Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the full US bank sample. This table reports summary statistics of the variables for the full US bank sample. All variables
are constructed via aggregation of all the banks in the BHC at the holding company level if the BHC has more than one commercial bank owned. Otherwise, the
data for the commercial bank is retained. All variables using dollar amounts are expressed in real 2012:Q4 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator.
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for the Full Sample (2005-2012)
Type
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Competition
Variables
(Source: Call
Reports and
Summary of
Deposits)

Variable
Local Market
Share Assets

Definition
Bank’s GTA local market share, measured as the bank’s average market share
given the weight of the bank deposits in each local market. GTA equals total
assets plus the allowance for loan and the lease losses and the allocated
transfer risk reserve.

Local Market
Share Loans

Bank’s total loans local market share, measured as the bank’s average market
share given the weight of the bank deposits in each local market.

Local Market
Share Deposits

Bank’s total deposits local market share, measured as the bank’s average
market share given the weight of the bank deposits in each local market.

Local Market
Share Uninsured
Deposits

Bank’s total uninsured deposits local market share, measured as the bank’s
average market share given the weight of the bank deposits in each local
market. Uninsured deposits are calculated as discussed in Footnote 25 in the
text.

Lerner GTA

A proxy for the bank level competition measured as the observed price-cost
margin for total assets. A bank in perfect price competition would have an
index value of 0 and thus no market power (as Price = MC) and a bank that
has market power will show a positive index value.

Price

A subcomponent of Lerner GTA, represents average price of bank activities
and is a proxy for market power in the loan market.

MC

A subcomponent of Lerner GTA, a proxy for the cost of funding (among other
costs).

Mean

Median

Std

N

0.049

0.014

0.099

178,604

0.048

0.014

0.094

178,604

0.027

0.009

0.060

178,604

0.040

0.009

0.095

178,278

0.051

0.098

0.358

178,604

0.015

0.015

0.003

178,604

0.014

0.013

0.005

178,604

Type

TARP
Variables
(Source: US
Department of
the Treasury)
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Control
Variables
(Source: Call
Reports,
Summary of
Deposits, Bank
List with
Corrective
Actions,
Federal
Housing
Finance
Agency website,
US Census
Bureau, FOIA
Request of the
Federal
Reserve)

Variable
TARP Recipient
TARP
Recipient_Not
Repaid
TARP
Recipient_Repaid
Bailout
Amount/GTA
Bailout
Amount/RiskWeighted Assets
Post TARP
CAMELS Proxy:
Capital Adequacy

CAMELS Proxy:
Asset Quality

CAMELS Proxy:
Management
Quality
CAMELS Proxy:
Earnings (ROA)
CAMELS Proxy:
Liquidity
CAMELS Proxy:
Sensitivity to
Market Risk
Bank Size

Definition
A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bank was provided TARP
capital support.
A dummy taking a value of 1 if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010.

Mean

Median

Std

N

0.097

0.000

0.297

178,604

0.079

0.000

0.270

178,604

0.018

0.000

0.133

178,604

0.003

0.000

0.009

178,604

0.003

0.000

0.014

178,604

0.501

1.000

0.500

178,604

0.109

0.099

0.048

178,604

0.003

0.000

0.008

178,604

-0.005

0.000

0.074

178,604

0.017

0.018

0.045

178,604

0.137

0.051

14.400

178,604

0.130
12.053

0.105
11.917

0.107
1.339

178,604
178,604

A dummy taking a value of 1 if the bank repaid in 2009-2010.
A ratio of the bank dollar bailout support over bank GTA; a larger value
indicates a higher degree of TARP support.
A ratio of the bank dollar bailout support over bank risk-weighted assets; a
larger value indicates a higher degree of TARP support.
An indicator equal to 1 in 2009 -2012 and 0 in 2005-2008. Similar to Sosyura
and Durchin(2012) but using an extended time period.
Capitalization ratio, defined as equity capital divided by GTA. Capital
adequacy refers to the amount of a bank’s capital relative to its assets.
Broadly, this criterion evaluates the extent to which a bank can absorb
potential losses.
Asset quality evaluates the overall condition of a bank’s portfolio and is
typically evaluated by a fraction of nonperforming assets and assets in
default. Noncurrent loans and leases are loans that are past due for at least
ninety days or are no longer accruing interest. Higher proportion of
nonperforming assets indicates lower asset quality.
A dummy taking a value of -1 if a bank had a corrective action by the
corresponding banking regulator (FED, FDIC, and OCC) during the quarter.
Return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of the annualized net income
to GTA.
Cash divided by bank total deposits.
The sensitivity to interest rate risk, defined as the ratio of the absolute
difference (gap) between short-term assets and short-term liabilities to GTA.
The log value of GTA.

Type

Variable
Bank Age
DWTAF
Merger
BHC

Control
Variables
(cont.)

Listed
Metropolitan
HHI Deposits
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Branches/GTA
Instrumental
Variables:
Political &
Regulatory
(Sources:
Center for
Responsive
Politics,
House of
Representatives,
Federal Reserve
Bank of
Philadelphia
website,
Execucomp,
SEC EDGAR
DEF14A
Filings, etc.)

Subcommittee on
Financial
Institutions or
Capital Markets
Democrat
Fed Director
CEO
Compensation
Excess CEO
Compensation
Coincident_Index
(weighted)

Definition
Age (in years) of the bank or the oldest bank owned by the bank holding
company.
A dummy that takes a value of 1 if a bank received discount window loans
and/or Term Auction Facility (TAF) funding during the crisis.
A dummy that takes a value of 1 from the time that the bank acquired
another institution and 0 otherwise.
A dummy that takes a value of 1 if the entity is a bank holding company
(BHC).
A dummy that takes a value of 1 if bank is listed on a stock exchange or is
part of a bank holding company that is listed on a stock exchange.
A dummy that takes a value of 1 when the majority of bank deposits (50%
or more) are in metropolitan areas and 0 otherwise.
A measure of bank concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Deposits Index determined using the bank deposit data from the FDIC
Summary of Deposits. Higher values show greater market concentration.
A measure of organizational complexity defined as the ratio of the number
of branches over GTA multiplied by 1000.
A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm is headquartered in a
district of a House member, who served
on the Capital Markets Subcommittee or the Financial Institutions
Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee in 2008 or
2009.
A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a bank's local Representative
was a Democrat in the 2007-2008 campaign election cycle.
A dummy that equals 1 if a bank's director sat on the board of directors of
a Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) or of a branch of a FRB in 2008 or 2009.
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if bank’s CEO had a total
compensation greater than $500,000 in 2008.
The log of the 1 plus the excess of $500,000 of CEO total compensation in
2008.
A state macro growth index calculated as a weighted average of the
changes in the Philadelphia Fed’s state coincident indexes from December
2007 to December 2010 with the share of the deposits of a given bank
taken as weights.

Mean

Median

Std

N

76.263

81.000

66.913

178,604

0.237

0.000

0.425

178,604

0.219

0.000

0.414

178,604

0.863

1.000

0.940

178,604

0.068

0.000

0.252

178,604

0.672

1.000

0.469

178,604

1162.678

1041.415

883.52
2

178,604

0.029

0.024

0.022

178,604

0.088

0.000

0.227

167,112

0.429

0.000

0.495

167,112

0.013

0.000

0.112

167,112

0.030

0.000

0.172

167,112

0.185

0.000

1.081

167,112

-0.771

-0.759

0.358

167,112

Table 4.2: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition: Main Results
This table reports estimates from difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for analyzing
the impact of TARP on competition in Panel A. The measures of competitive advantage are Market
Share (proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP
Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post
TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program initiation. TARP
Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not
Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time
fixed effects. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. Panel B shows the tests of equality for the
effects of TARP for two types of TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that
did not. All variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
level.
Panel A: Regression Parameters
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables:
TARP Recipient
Post TARP x TARP Recipient

Market Share
(1)

Market Power
(2)

(3)

-0.013***

-0.023***

(-15.283)

(-6.726)

0.005***

0.038***

(4.117)

(9.135)

TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
TARP Recipient_Repaid

(4)

-0.014***

-0.023***

(-16.485)

(-6.183)

-0.008***

-0.015**

(-3.162)

(-2.538)

Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

0.003***

0.029***

(2.998)

(6.007)

Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid

0.011***

0.083***

(3.240)

(10.703)

-0.051***

-0.052***

(-13.991)

(-14.205)

(36.809)

(36.744)

-0.043**

-0.049**

-0.811***

-0.837***

(-1.990)

(-2.251)

(-6.749)

(-6.956)

0.006**

0.006**

0.205***

0.204***

(2.510)

(2.393)

(14.955)

(14.864)

Earnings(ROA)

0.146***

0.145***

3.096***

3.093***

(25.974)

(25.831)

(39.949)

(39.916)

Liquidity

0.000***

0.000***

-0.000

-0.000

(5.944)

(6.065)

(-0.616)

(-0.614)

-0.019***

-0.019***

-0.155***

-0.155***

(-9.621)

(-9.641)

(-16.046)

(-16.068)

DWTAF

0.000

0.000

-0.020***

-0.020***

(0.468)

(0.597)

(-12.040)

(-11.910)

Bank Size

-0.006***

-0.006***

0.015***

0.014***

(-25.136)

(-26.357)

(16.147)

(15.341)

Bank Age

0.000***

0.000***

0.000***

0.000***

Merger

(21.847)
-0.011***
(-22.835)

(21.796)
-0.011***
(-22.587)

(29.573)
-0.002
(-1.440)

(29.499)
-0.002
(-1.105)

Capital Adequacy
Asset Quality
Management Quality/Regulatory Action

Sensitivity to Market Risk

196

2.008***

2.004***

BHC

-0.004***

Listed

(-21.702)

(-22.507)

(6.930)

(6.122)

Metropolitan

-0.035***

-0.035***

-0.049***

-0.048***

(-42.497)

(-42.440)

(-29.017)

(-28.851)

HHI Deposits

0.000***

0.000***

0.000***

0.000***

(65.261)

(65.270)

(3.674)

(3.645)

Branches/GTA

-0.737***

-0.741***

-0.923***

-0.936***

(-64.501)

(-64.685)

(-16.768)

(-16.964)

0.099***
(31.860)

0.101***
(33.128)

-0.845***
(-56.676)

-0.837***
(-55.667)

Constant

-0.004***

-0.019***

-0.019***

(-17.954)

(-17.980)

(-18.582)

(-18.512)

-0.015***

-0.015***

0.023***

0.020***

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

0.219

0.219

0.452

0.452

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks
t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early
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Market Share

Market Power

2.245**

6.141***

Table 4.3: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition: Lerner Index
Decomposition
This table reports estimates from difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for the impact
of TARP on Lerner GTA components: Price (price of bank GTA) and MC (marginal cost). The
regression estimates are reported in Panel A. TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if
the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012,
the period after TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the
bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy equal to one if the bank
did not repay in 2009-2010. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. All models include time fixed
effects. Panel B shows the tests of equality for the effects of TARP for two types of TARP banks:
TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. All variables are defined in Table 1.
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% level.
Panel A: Regression Parameters
Dependent Variable: Lerner Components
Price
Independent Variables:

MC

(1)

(2)

(3)

TARP Recipient

0.00024***
(12.085)

(15.126)

Post TARP x TARP Recipient

-0.00023***

-0.00068***

(-7.954)

(-13.665)
0.00029***

TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
TARP Recipient_Repaid
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid

(4)

0.00061***

0.00068***

(13.580)

(15.681)

0.00004

0.00021**

(0.874)

(2.437)

-0.00031***

-0.00068***

(-9.898)

(-12.352)

0.00011*

-0.00074***

(1.686)
Controls
Time Fixed Effects
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Yes

Yes

(-6.656)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

0.540

0.540

0.508

0.508

Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks
t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay
Early
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Price

MC

5.750***

0.469

Table 4.4: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition – Instrumental Variable
Analysis
This table shows difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for analyzing the impact of
TARP on competition using an instrumental variable approach as in Wooldridge Section 18.4.1. We
use as instruments several political and regulatory connections variables: Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions or Capital Markets, Democrat, Fed Director, CEO Compensation, and the
Coincident Index (weighted). Subcommittee on Financial Institutions or Capital Markets is a
dummy which takes a value of 1 if a firm is headquartered in a district of a House member, who
served on the Capital Markets Subcommittee or the Financial Institutions Subcommittee of the
House Financial Services Committee in 2008 or 2009. Democrat is a dummy which takes a value
of 1 if a bank's local Representative was a Democrat in the 2007-2008 campaign election cycle. Fed
Director is a dummy that equals 1 if a bank's director sat on the board of directors of a Federal
Reserve Bank (FRB) or of a branch of a FRB in 2008 or 2009. CEO Compensation is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if bank’s CEO had a total compensation greater than 500,000 in
2008. Coincident Index (weighted) is a state macro growth index calculated as a weighted average
of the changes in the Philadelphia Fed’s state coincident indexes from December 2007 to December
2010 with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. The measures of competitive
advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied
by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital
support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program
initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP
Recipient_Not Repaid, is a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models
include time fixed effects. Panel A reports first stage results. Panel B reports second stage regression
estimates. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. Panel C reports the tests of equality for the
effects of TARP on two types of TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that
did not. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: IV First Stage as in Wooldridge (Section

18.4.1)

First Stage (Probit Model)
Dependent Variable:

TARP Recipient

TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

TARP Recipient_Repaid

Independent Variables:
Subcommitee on
Financial Institutions or
Capital Markets

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.110***

0.098***

0.132***

(5.719)

(4.977)

(3.488)

Democrat

0.039***

0.035***

0.063***

(4.087)

(3.475)

(3.503)

FED Director

0.353***

-0.078**

0.466***

(11.338)
CEO Compensation
Coincident_Index
(weighted)
(state-level economic
conditions)
Controls

Yes

(-2.036)

(11.399)

-0.504***

0.741***

(-17.264)

(21.465)

-0.045***

0.105***

(-3.271)

(4.339)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

167,112

167,112

167,112

Pseudo R-squared

0.2469

0.1832

0.3444

Time Fixed Effects
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Panel B: IV Second Stage as in Wooldridge (Section

18.4.1)

Second Stage (IV 2SLS)
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables:
TARP Recipient
Post TARP x TARP Recipient

Market Share
(1)

(2)

Market Power
(3)

(4)

0.036***

0.090*

(4.191)

(1.933)

0.014***

0.062***

(4.471)

(4.854)
0.219***

-0.264**

(8.489)

(-2.385)

TARP Recipient_Repaid

0.102***

-0.093*

(6.840)

(-1.799)

Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

-0.028***

0.040

(-3.092)

(1.301)

Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid

0.037***

0.185***

TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

(3.468)
Controls
Time Fixed Effects
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
First Stage F-test

Yes

Yes

(7.643)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

167,112

167,112

167,112

167,112

0.205

0.090

0.450

0.435

349.545***

40.348***

349.545***

40.348***

Panel C: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks
Market Share

Market Power

3.900***

2.937***

t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay
Early
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Table 4.5: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition: Propensity Score Matched
Sample Analysis
This table reports difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for analyzing the impact of
TARP on competition in Panel A and Panel B. We use three different propensity score matched
samples: Nearest-neighbor Matching: N=1, Nearest-neighbor Matching: N=2, and Nearest-neighbor
Matching: N=3. The measures of competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market
Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy variable
equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one
in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal
to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy equal to
one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed effects. The estimation
results are for 2005-2012. Panel C reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP for two types
of TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. All variables are
defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: Market Share
Dependent Variable: Market Share
(1)
Independent Variables:
TARP Recipient
Post TARP x TARP Recipient

(2)

(3)

(5)

(6)

Nearest-neighbor

Nearest-neighbor

Nearest-neighbor

Matching: N=1

Matching: N=2

Matching: N=3

-0.014***

-0.014***

-0.014***

(-10.263)

(-12.685)

(-13.723)

0.004**

0.004**

0.004***

(2.347)

(2.464)

(2.930)

TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

TARP Recipient_Repaid
Post TARP x TARP
Recipient_Not Repaid
Post TARP x TARP
Recipient_Repaid
Yes

0.015***

-0.014***

-0.015***

(-10.985)

(-13.788)

-0.009***

-0.009***

(-15.066)
0.008***

(-3.699)

(-3.582)

(-3.324)

0.003

0.002*

0.003**

(1.587)

(1.649)

(2.062)

0.011***

0.010***

0.011***

(3.045)
Controls

(4)

Yes

(2.885)
Yes

Yes

(3.020)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

31,222

31,222

42,159

42,159

51,073

51,073

Adjusted R-squared

0.120

0.121

0.135

0.136

0.138

0.139

Time Fixed Effects

201

Panel B: Market Power
Dependent Variable: Market Power
(1)
Independent Variables:
TARP Recipient
Post TARP x TARP Recipient

(2)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Nearest-neighbor

Nearest-neighbor

Nearest-neighbor

Matching: N=1

Matching: N=2

Matching: N=3

-0.010**

-0.010**

(-2.160)

(-2.576)

(-3.222)

0.014**

0.017***

0.020***

(2.270)
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
TARP Recipient_Repaid
Post TARP x TARP
Recipient_Not Repaid
Post TARP x TARP
Recipient_Repaid
Controls

(3)

Yes

-0.012***

(3.245)

(4.180)

-0.011**

-0.012***

-0.014***

(-2.396)

(-2.809)

(-3.411)

0.000

0.001

-0.001

(0.055)

(0.127)

(-0.123)

0.007

0.011*

0.014***

(1.152)

(1.899)

(2.710)

0.046***

0.048***

0.050***

(5.169)

(5.772)

Yes

Yes

Yes

(6.190)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

31,222

31,222

42,159

42,159

51,073

51,073

Adjusted R-squared

0.489

0.490

0.495

0.496

0.497

0.497

Time Fixed Effects

Panel C: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks

Nearest-neighbor
Matching: N=1
Nearest-neighbor
Matching: N=2
Nearest-neighbor
Matching: N=3

t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early
t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early
t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early
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Market
Share

Market
Power

2.427**

4.484***

2.261**

4.310***

2.261**

4.110***

Table 4.6: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition: Placebo Experiments
This table reports difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for analyzing the impact of
TARP on competition in Panel A and Panel B. In Panel A, we use a placebo experiment, in which
we fictionally assume that the TARP participation took place four years earlier and we still
distinguish between banks that received TARP and those that did not and banks that repaid early
versus those that did not according to their “true" TARP program. Accordingly, we define Placebo
Post TARP as a dummy equal to one in 2005-2008, the period after the fictional TARP program
initiation. We run the regressions by using the placebo-sample (2001-2008). The measures of
competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power
(proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided
TARP capital support, Placebo Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2005-2008, the period after
the fictional TARP program initiation. In Panel B, we use a placebo experiment in ehich we allocate
the TARP treatment randomly to banks and report regression estimates with boot-strapped
confidence intervals using 1000 replications. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if
the bank repaid early in the true TARP program. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy
equal to one if the bank did not repay early in the true TARP program. All models include time fixed
effects. Panel C reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP for two types of TARP banks:
TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. Robust t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: Regression Parameters (TARP Assumed to Take Place Four Years Earlier)
Dependent Variable:

Market Share

Independent Variables:
TARP Recipient
Placebo Post TARP x TARP Recipient

(1)

(2)

Market Power
(3)

-0.001

-0.024***

(-1.609)

(-8.227)

-0.011***

0.003

(-10.112)
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
TARP Recipient_Repaid
Placebo Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
Placebo Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid

(0.860)
-0.001

-0.028***

(-1.167)

(-8.919)

-0.002

-0.007

(-1.318)

(-1.188)

-0.012***

0.004

(-10.235)

(0.979)

-0.009***

0.003

(-3.139)
Yes

Controls

Yes

(0.394)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

195,256

195,256

194,783

194,783

0.257

0.257

0.436

0.437

Time Fixed Effects
Observations

(4)

Adjusted R-squared
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Panel B: Regression Parameters (Random Assignment of the Banks to the TARP
Treatment)
Dependent Variable:

Market Share

Independent Variables:

(1)

TARP Recipient

Market Power

(2)

(3)

-0.001

0.001

(-0.781)

(0.208)

0.000

0.003

(0.029)

(0.633)

Placebo Post TARP x TARP Recipient
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
TARP Recipient_Repaid
Placebo Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
Placebo Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid

(4)

-0.001

-0.000

(-0.710)

(-0.087)

-0.001

0.005

(-0.323)

(0.716)

0.000

0.001

(0.050)

(0.288)

-0.000

0.009

(-0.036)

(0.959)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

0.218

0.218

0.452

0.452

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Panel C: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks
Placebo Experiment
(TARP Is Assumed to
Have Taken Place Four
Years Earlier)
Placebo Experiment
(Random Assignment of
the Banks to the TARP
Treatment)

t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid
Early =
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not
Repay Early
t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid
Early =
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not
Repay Early
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Market Share

Market Power

0.141

0.933

0.000

0.728

Table 4.7: Alternative Measures of TARP Support
This table reports estimates from difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for the impact of TARP on competition using an alternative measures for
TARP Support: Bailout Amount/GTA and Bailout Amount/ Risk-Weighted Assets in Panel A. The measures of competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied
by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP
capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if
the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed
effects. Estimation results are for 2005-2012. Panel B reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP on the two types of TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid
early and TARP banks that did not. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: Regression Parameters
Bailout Amount / GTA
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Dependent Variable:

Market Share
(1)

Bailout Amount / Risk-Weighted Assets

Market Power
(2)

(3)

Market Share
(4)

(5)

Market Power
(6)

(7)

(8)

Independent Variables:
TARP Recipient
Post TARP x TARP Recipient

-0.290***

-0.536***

-0.162***

-0.710***

(-13.064)

(-2.947)

(-7.984)

(-3.989)

0.156***

0.968***

0.109***

0.806***

(3.994)

(4.617)

(3.853)

(4.258)

TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
TARP Recipient_Repaid
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid
Controls

Yes

-0.279***

-0.528***

-0.163***

(-12.166)

(-2.644)

(-7.796)

(-3.686)

-0.327***

-0.444**

-0.105*

-0.506***

(-5.364)

(-2.080)

(-1.652)

(-3.057)

0.033

0.556**

0.046

0.603***

(0.818)

(2.304)

(1.482)

(2.811)

0.714***

2.774***

0.538***

2.200***

(6.909)

(9.081)

(5.433)

(9.427)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-0.716***

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

0.219

0.219

0.451

0.452

0.218

0.219

0.452

0.452

Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks
Market
Share

Market
Power

Bailout Amount / GTA

t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early

6.250***

5.829***

Bailout Amount / Risk-Weighted Assets

t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early

4.787***

5.175***
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Table 4.8: Alternative Measures of Market Share
This table reports difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for the impact of TARP on competition using an alternative measures for market share: Local
Market Share Loans, Local Market Share Deposits, and Local Market Share Uninsured Deposits. The regression estimates are reported in Panel A. The measures
of competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market Share Loans, Local Market Share Deposits, and Local Market Share Uninsured Deposits).
TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period
after TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy
equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed effects. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. Panel B reports the tests of
equality for the effects of TARP on two types of TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. All variables are defined in Table 1.
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: Regression Parameters
Dependent Variable:

Local Market Share Loans
(1)

(2)

Local Market Share Deposits
(3)

(4)

Local Market Share Uninsured Deposits
(5)

(6)

207

Independent Variables:
TARP Recipient

-0.012***
(-14.260)

-0.008***
(-18.247)

-0.010***
(-12.198)

Post TARP x TARP Recipient

0.003***

0.002***

0.002**

(3.027)

(3.958)

(2.143)

TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

-0.011***
(-12.816)

-0.007***
(-16.506)

-0.011***
(-13.586)

TARP Recipient_Repaid

-0.013***

-0.009***

-0.006**

(-8.083)

(-10.508)

(-2.254)

Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

0.001*

0.001*

0.002***

0.002***

0.000

(1.766)

(1.780)

(5.487)

(5.495)

(0.141)

0.001*

0.013***

0.002*

Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid

(1.721)

(1.728)

(3.285)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

178,603

178,603

178,604

178,604

178,278

178,278

0.215

0.215

0.298

0.298

0.211

0.212

Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks

t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early

Local Market Share
Loans

Local Market Share Deposits

Local Market Share Uninsured
Deposits

2.796***

4.549***

3.191***

208

Table 4.9: Alternative Econometric Models
This table reports difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for the impact of TARP on competition using alternative econometric models: bank fixed
effects, bank random effects, and a model with standard errors clustered at the bank level in Panel A. The measures of competitive advantage are Market Share
(proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided
TARP capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is equal to one if the
bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed
effects. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. Panel B reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP on two types of TARP banks: TARP banks that
repaid early and TARP banks that did not. All variables are defined in Table 1. For the bank fixed effects, (1)-(4), we report adjusted R-squared and for the bank
random effects, (5)-(8), R-squared. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: Regression Parameters
Bank Fixed Effects

Bank Random Effects
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Dependent Variable:

Market Share

Market Power

Independent Variables:

(1)

(3)

(2)

(4)

TARP Recipient
Post TARP x TARP Recipient

Market Share
(5)

Market Power
(7)

(8)

Market Share
(9)

(10)

Market Power
(11)

-0.027***

-0.043***

-0.013***

-0.023***

(-8.013)

(-5.714)

(-4.174)

(-3.557)

0.004***

0.024***

0.005***

0.038***

0.005***

0.038***

(9.949)

(5.706)

(3.862)

(4.753)

(2.662)

(5.438)

TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
TARP Recipient_Repaid
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not
Repaid
Post TARP x TARP
Recipient_Repaid

Controls

(6)

Clusters by Bank

Yes

(12)

-0.029***

-0.043***

-0.014***

0.023***

(-9.181)

(-5.504)

(-4.490)

(-3.386)

-0.017*

-0.034**

-0.008

-0.015

(-1.732)

(-2.284)

(-0.845)

(-1.197)

0.004***

0.012**

0.004***

0.026***

0.003*

0.029***

(7.465)

(2.533)

(2.877)

(2.803)

(1.691)

(3.551)

0.008***

0.078***

0.008***

0.094***

0.011***

0.083***

(9.677)

(10.178)

(4.161)

(7.361)

(3.398)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

(6.892)
Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Bank Random Effects
Observations
R-squared (or Adjusted R-squared)

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

0.882

0.882

0.610

0.610

0.257

0.257

0.419

0.4187

0.219

0.219

0.452

0.452

7333

7333

7333

7333

No. Clusters

Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks
Bank Fixed Effects

t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early

Market Share

Market Power

4.463***

7.625***

Bank Random Effects

t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early

1.789*

4.513***

Clusters by Bank

t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early

2.166**

3.839***
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CHAPTER 5
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation investigates corporate governance, internationalization, and government
bailouts in banking. The robust findings of three essays add to the banking and corporate
finance literatures.
In the first essay in Chapter 2, we use a unique hand-collected dataset on
shareholder activism (SEC Filings: 13D and DFAN14A) for all listed commercial banks
and bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US over the period 1994-2010, we explore
several the following research questions: 1) is there a role for shareholder activism for
banking?, and if so, 2) what do activists do to change the focus of the targeted banks, and
3) are they a stabilizing or destabilizing force?. We focus on three conflicts arising among
bank stakeholders: Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1 (managers take less risk than desired
by shareholders due to risk aversion), Shareholder-Manager Conflict 2 (managers take
more risk than desired by shareholders due to overconfidence and/or hubris), and
Shareholder-Creditor Conflict (activists induce managers to take higher risk to increase
returns at the expense of bank creditors (deposit insurers, taxpayers, regulators, etc.), given
creditors’ difficulty in monitoring and regulatory-induced incentives.
We find that activism is important in banking: about one third of our banks have
some form of activism during the sample period and activists appear to target banks with
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agency problems and growth potential that are easy in which to implement changes to
increase value. We find that shareholder activism creates value for shareholders but has
little impact on operating returns and increases bank default risk, consistent with the
Hypothesis 3, the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. This suggests that activism may be
generally a destabilizing force. However, we find that activism differs significantly during
financial crises, resulting in higher market value and no increase in risk, suggesting that
shareholder activism may not be a major source of risk during crises. From a public
standpoint, government loses during normal times, but not during financial crises.
The paper contributes primarily to two strands of research. First, it contributes to
the broader literature on shareholder activism by examining activism within one important
industry rather than across a number of very different industries, which reduces the concern
about confounding inter-industry differences. Although researchers point to the
shareholder return benefits resulting from activism, our results suggest that other additional
effects of activism, such the increase in risk, should not be neglected. Second, this paper
also adds to the literature on bank risk and performance by introducing shareholder
activism as a factor influencing risk and performance and sets the groundwork for further
research on shareholder activism in banking. The current topic is important especially from
a government policy perspective because poor governance may aggravate financial system
fragility to shocks and pose systemic risk to the real economy (Laeven and Levine (2009),
Kirkpatrick (2009), G30 Steering Committee on Corporate Governance (2011), Song and
Li (2012)) and is regarded as a possible important contributing factor to the recent financial
crisis. In addition, shareholder activism may be regarded with skepticism. Our findings
suggest that activists in banking may increase risk and market value at the expense of
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creditors and may be a threat to financial stability. These results have important
implications for policies targeting bank governance and regulation of activism in banking.
The second essay, in Chapter 3, offers the first assessment of the role of
internationalization on bank risk using US bank data. We find strong, robust evidence that
the more internationalized the bank, the higher the risk. We use a number of different
measures of internationalization and risk, employ various econometric procedures to
control for potential endogeneity and sample selection biases, and consider different
subsamples of the data. The data persistently suggest that internationalization is associated
with higher bank risk, consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk
hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis. This effect seems to be more pronounced
during financial crises, particularly market crises.
Our finding that internationalization is associated with higher risk raises the
question of why banks internationalize. One potential explanation is higher returns, but our
results seem to contradict this explanation, given that we find lower mean profitability for
internationalized banks. Second, banks may become international as part of a defensive
strategy to follow their important customers abroad by setting up offices in countries where
their home country customers have foreign affiliates to avoid losing their clients’ business
(e.g., Brimmer and Dahl, 1975; Goldberg and Saunders, 1981; Grosse and Goldberg, 1991;
Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996). This strategy might not translate into large enough financial
benefits to offset the costs of internationalization. A third potential explanation is empire
building by bank managers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986, Roll, 1986,
Stulz, 1990). Managers that grow the bank through international activities may gain higher
salaries and/or more prestige than domestic bank managers. This may occur if there are
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significant agency problems in banking, particularly if these agency problems are
intensified by international diversification (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007). We put this
last explanation to test and we find that the positive relation between internationalization
and bank risk is consistently stronger for banks that more likely to have severe agency
problems, supporting the empire-building explanation.
This paper contributes primarily to two related strands of research. First, it adds to
the literature on bank risk by introducing internationalization as a factor influencing risk
and sets the groundwork for further research on bank internationalization. Although some
policymakers, practitioners, and researchers point to the benefits of geographical risk
diversification resulting from the internationalization of banks, our results suggest that this
effect is dominated by other factors. Specifically, our results suggest that the additional
local market risks taken on following international expansion outweigh the benefits of
diversification. Second, this paper contributes to the broader internationalization literature
by examining risk within one important industry rather than across a number of very
different industries with their confounding differences. After controlling for endogeneity
and other possible explanations for our results, we continue to find that bank
internationalization is associated with a higher risk in an industry in which risk is highly
monitored by bank supervisors as well as shareholders and debt holders. These findings
suggest that authorities might consider internationalization as an additional factor in bank
supervision and regulation.
The third essay, in Chapter 4, conducts an empirical assessment of the TARP
injections on bank competition and investigates whether TARP may have given its
recipients competitive advantages. Our difference-in-difference (DID) regression analysis
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yields several important results: 1) TARP recipients did get competitive advantages and
increased both their market share and market power relative to non-TARP recipients,
consistent with the empirical dominance of Hypothesis H1a over Hypothesis H1b and
Hypothesis H2a over Hypothesis H2b. 2) Results point to the likelihood that the positive
market share and market power findings may be driven primarily by the safety channel
(TARP banks may be perceived as safer), which is partially offset by the cost disadvantage
channel (TARP funds may be relatively expensive). Thus, the safety channel and the cost
disadvantage channel are the most important to explain the results. 3). The competitive
advantages are primarily or entirely due to TARP recipients that repaid early, suggesting
that these banks significantly reduced the importance of the cost disadvantage channel and
increased the importance of the safety channel, consistent with Hypothesis H3.
Overall, our results suggest that TARP may have resulted in a possible distortion
in competition, which may have misallocated resources, and may help explain other
findings in the literature on the effects of TARP on bank risk and bank lending. First, our
findings may help explain the results in the literature that TARP increased risk for the large
banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming; Duchin and Sosyura, forthcoming) and
decreased risk for the small banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming). As discussed
above, results in the literature suggest that a nonmonotonic effect of market power on risk
may have been in effect during the crisis period – higher market power may be associated
with higher risk for banks at high levels of market power, while higher market power may
be associated with lower risk at low levels of market power (Martinez-Miera and Repullo,
2010; Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2013). Given that large (small) banks typically have

215

higher (lower) levels of market power, TARP may have led to an increase (decrease) in
risk for large (small) banks.
Our results also may help explain the findings in the literature that TARP resulted
in reduced or no change in lending by large banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming;
Duchin and Sosyura, forthcoming) and increased lending by small banks (Black and
Hazelwood, forthcoming; Li, forthcoming). According to the standard structure-conductperformance hypothesis, an increase in market power should lead to a reduced supply of
credit. However, for relationship borrowers, the supply of credit may be increased by larger
market share and larger market power because limits on competition help banks force
implicit contracts with relationship borrowers that result in greater credit availability (e.g.,
Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). This may help explain the increase in lending by
small banks which tend to specialize in relationship lending, and the decrease or no change
in lending by the large banks, which more often engage in transactional lending (Berger,
Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005).
In terms of policy implications, determination about which banks to be bailed out
should rely on a comprehensive analysis of both benefits and costs. Some but not all of
these costs and benefits, competition, risk taking, and lending, may be evaluated based on
our results and those in the literature. Based on the findings for these three effects, any
bailouts may be focused primarily on the small banks, where the effects seem to be less
distortionary and more toward the public interest, since the increase in market share and
market power is the least, risk may be decreased, and lending may be increased. However,
in regards to the other major benefit of bailouts, increasing the stability of the financial
system, presumably the benefits would be greater for the large banks. However, also the
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distortions in competition may be greater, and risk taking and lending implications may be
less favorable. Therefore, policymakers should balance all these different effects.
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APPENDIX A FOR CHAPTER 2
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
Variable
Definition
Panel A1. Dependent Variables
A1.1 Financial Performance
TOBIN's Q
A measure of financial performance determined as
market value of common stock over equity book
value.
BUY-AND-HOLD_RET
Buy-and-hold stock return over the previous 4
quarters.
BUY-AND-HOLD_AB_RET

Buy-and-hold abnormal stock return over the
previous 4 quarters.

SHARPE RATIO

Ratio of stocks returns over standard deviation of
stock returns over the previous 4 quarters.

A1.2 Operating returns
ROA

ROE

A1.3 Risk-taking
Z-SCORE

LLA RATIO

NPL RATIO

Return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of the
annualized net income to GTA.

Return on equity (ROE), measured as the ratio of
the annualized net income to total equity.

A measure of financial risk: the bank-level Z-index
determined as A(ROA)+ A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a
larger value indicates higher overall bank risk.
Averages of ROA and EQ/TA as well as the
standard deviation of ROA are computed over the
previous 4 quarters.
A Measure of bank risk defined as loan loss
allowance over GTA, with higher values indicating
more bank risk.
Fraction of nonperforming loans and loans in
default from GTA. Noncurrent loans and leases are
loans that are past due for at least ninety days or are
no longer accruing interest. Higher proportion of
nonperforming assets indicates lower asset quality.
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Source

Authors'
calculation based
on Compustat data
Authors'
calculation based
on CRSP data
Authors'
calculation based
on CRSP data
Authors'
calculation based
on CRSP data
Authors'
calculation based
on Call Report
data
Authors'
calculation based
on Call Report
data
Authors'
calculation based
on Call Report
data

As above

As above

Variable
A1.3 Risk-taking (cont.)
VOLATILITY ROA

VOLATILITY_STOCK_RET

Definition

Source

For each quarter, the standard deviation of ROA is
calculated as the quarterly standard deviation over
the previous 4 quarters. ROA is determined as the
ratio of net operating income over gross total assets
(GTA).
The volatility of daily returns for each calendar
year.

Authors'
calculation based
on CRSP data

Panel A2. Shareholder Activism Variables
ACTIVISM
A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if there
is shareholder activism targeting the bank during the
quarter.

NO_ACTIVISM_EVENTS
HF_ACTIVIST

Number of activism events for the bank during the
quarter.
A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 the
activist targeting the bank during the quarter is a
hedge fund.

Panel A2. Shareholder Activism Variables (cont.)
NON_HF_ACTIVIST
A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 the
activist targeting the bank during the quarter is not a
hedge fund.

13D

DFAN14A

A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if there
is 13D shareholder activism targeting the bank
during the quarter.
A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if there
is DFAN14A (proxy statements) shareholder
activism targeting the bank during the quarter.

Panel A3. Main Control Variables
BANK SIZE
The log value of bank GTA.

BANK AGE

Age (in years) of the oldest bank owned by the bank
holding company.

DEPOSITS / GTA

Measure of the composition of bank liabilities
determined as total total deposits over GTA.
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As above

Authors'
calculation based
on SEC EDGAR
13D and DFAN
14A Filings.
As above
Authors'
calculation based
on Bloomberg
Markets
Magazine,
Wikipedia,
individual Google
searches
Authors'
calculation based
on Bloomberg
Markets
Magazine,
Wikipedia,
individual Google
searches
As above

As above

Authors'
calculation based
on Call Report
data
As above
As above

Variable
Definition
Panel A3. Main Control Variables (cont.)
LOANS / GTA
Measure of the composition of bank assets side
determined as total total loans over GTA.

Source
As above

INCOME_DIVERSITY

Measure of diversity defined as 1 minus the absolute
value of the ratio between difference between net
interest income and other operating income and total
operating income.

As above

OVERHEAD_COSTS

A proxy of the bank’s cost structure determined as
the ratio of overhead expenses to assets.

As above

FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP

A dummy is equal to 1 when foreign shareholdings
exceed 50% of total bank ownership.

OCC SUPERVISOR

A dummy variable taking a value of 1 for national
banks that are supervised by OCC.

Authors'
calculation based
on Call Report
data
As above

FDIC SUPERVISOR

A dummy variable taking a value of 1 for state nonmember banks that are supervised by FDIC.

As above

A dummy variable taking a value of 1 for state
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System.
Panel A4. Instrumental Variable
% BUSY ACTIVISTS
Percent % busy activists, that is, activists with five
or more campaigns and/or 2 or more proxy fights at
the same time.

As above

FRS SUPERVISOR

Panel A5. Other Variables
TBTF

Too-big-to-fail, a dummy variable which takes a
value of 1 in all quarters when the banks has GTA
greater or equal to 100 Billion.

FINANCIAL_CRISES

A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for a
financial crisis period and 0 otherwise

GROWTH

The growth rate of real bank gross total assets
(GTA).

CAPITALIZATION RATIO

The bank level capitalization ratio measured as
equity capital over GTA. Capital adequacy refers to
the amount of a bank’s capital relative to its GTA.
Broadly, this criterion evaluates the extent to which
a bank can absorb potential losses.

DIVYLD

Dividend yield, defined as (common dividend +
preferred dividends)/(market value of common
stocks + book value of preferred).
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Authors'
calculation based
on SEC EDGAR
13D and DFAN
14A Filings.
Authors'
calculation based
on Call Report
data
Authors'
calculation based
on Call Report
data
Authors'
calculation based
on Call Report
data
Authors'
calculation based
on Call Report
data
Authors'
calculation based
on COMPUSTAT
data

Variable
Definition
Panel A5. Other Variables (cont.)
INST OWNERSHIP
The proportion of shares held by institutions.

AMIHUD

NUMBER OF ANALYSTS

BRANCHES / GTA

NO_STATES

METROPOLITAN

CASH_HOLDINGS

HHI DEPOSITS

INCORP_DE

BIG_4 AUDITOR

The Amihud (2002) measure of trading illiquidity
determined as the yearly average (using daily data)
of 1000*sqrt(|return|/dollar trading volume), with
lower values meaning more liquidity.
The number of analysts covering the company.

A measure of organizational complexity defined as
the ratio of total bank branches over GTA. Banks
that have more branches per dollar of assets are
more complex.
A measure of organizational structure defined as the
log of the number of states in which the bank has
branches. Banks that are active in multiple states
have more complex organizational structures that
cover longer distances.
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the
majority of bank deposits (50% or more) are in
MSA areas and 0 otherwise.
Cash holdings divided by GTA.

A measure of bank concentration, measured by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Deposits Index determined
using the bank deposit data. Higher values show
greater market concentration.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is
incorporated in the state of Delaware.

A dummy variable equal to one if the firm hires a
Big Four auditor, and zero otherwise.
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Source
Authors'
calculation based
on Thompson
Institutional
Dataset
Authors'
calculation based
on CRSP data
Authors'
calculation based
on I/B/E/S data
As above

As above

As above

Authors'
calculation based
on Call Report
data
Authors'
calculation based
on Summary of
Deposits data
Authors'
calculation based
on COMPUSTAT
data
As above

APPENDIX B FOR CHAPTER 2
OTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS
B.1 Other Potentially Omitted Correlated Variable
One potential concern is that unobserved determinants of market value, operating
performance, and bank risk would cause them to appear in the error term, and if these
omitted variables are correlated with our included explanatory variable, there is an
endogeneity problem which could bias our results. Although we saturate the main
regressions with several bank level controls to alleviate the concern of correlated omitted
variables, we examine whether our earlier results are sensitive to adding more controls for
other determinants of bank market value, operating performance, and risk. These controls
are BHC INDICATOR (a dummy which takes a value of 1 if bank is owned by a bank
holding company (BHC) or is a BHC itself), MERGERS (a dummy equal to one from the
moment that the bank itself or its immediate parent acquired another institution),
WRITEOFF_INDICATOR (a dummy variable which is equal to one if past acquisitions
and/or capital expenditures are written off as in Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012)),
MBS/GTA (ratio of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to GTA as reported on the balance
sheet as in Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014)), COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
LOANS (commercial real estate divided by GTA as in Berger and Bouwman (2013)),
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CASH_HOLDINGS (ratio of cash holding over GTA), and HHI DEPOSITS (HerfindahlHirschman deposits index, a proxy for the local market concentration). The results reported
in Table B.1 Panel A columns (1)-(3) indicate that adding the above controls does not
materially affect our previous findings.
In addition, to mitigate the concern that other governance indicators may influence
the effectiveness of shareholder activists in implementing changes in the target banks, we
conduct also tests in which we include four other governance controls. INST OWNERSHIP
is the ratio of the total institutional share holdings to total bank outstanding shares and
LONG-TERM INST OWNERSHIP is the ratio of total long-term holdings by institutions to
total bank outstanding shares. For both measures, a lower ownership ratio would indicate
less monitoring by institutions. NUMBER BLOCKHOLDERS is the number of institutions
holdings 5% or more ownership, and NUMBER OF ANALYSTS is a measure of analyst
coverage, which is the number of stock analysts providing earnings forecasts for the bank
in each quarter as per I/B/E/S and a lower number of analysts would indicate less
monitoring by analysts. 119 The results reported in Table B.1 Panel A models (4)-(6)
indicate that adding the above controls does not materially affect our previous findings.
B.2 Including LexisNexis News
Our activism data presented in the analysis covers all SEC registrants who have either filed
an Schedule 13D 120 – often referred to as a “beneficial ownership report and its
amendments Schedule 13D/A (if there is any material change in the facts disclosed in the

119

Because a large number of banks do not have information reported in I/B/E/S, we include in the estimation
also the variable NUMBER OF ANALYSTS NOT IN IBES to account for this.

120

Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Rule §240.13d provides details on the SEC registrants and
requirements.
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initial SC 13D (shares owned, discussions with management, etc.) – or DFAN 14A for
proxy fights with management. These are generally including shareholders who acquire
greater than a 5% stake in the company.
Given the amount of capital that is needed to acquire a 5% stake in a large-cap
company, the previously collected filings could bias the sample toward smaller targets. At
very large firms, some pension funds could have engaged in activism with a less than 5%
stake in the company.121 To incorporate activism events that were not accompanied by
Schedule 13D or DFAN 14A, we collect information about such events through news
searches in LexisNexis for our top 100 banks in each time period in terms of total assets
using a general search with the company current name and any previous names (where
information is available) and any and various combinations of the following keywords:
“activism” or “activist investor” or “dissident investor” or “activist shareholder” or “group
of concerned shareholders” or “shareholder activism” or “hedge fund activist” or “hedge
fund activism” or “institutional activism” or “activist campaign” or “investor campaign.”
The searches were limited to the sample period of 1994 to 2010. This retrieves news articles
for 140 unique entities. Results vary and range from 2 pages to 3,415 pages of news for
one single entity. We manually look at each of the cases to check the relevance of the
results and exclude news that include the company, but contain activism about a different
company in the article, that are only social activists pleading for several social causes and
not investor activists, and any others that are not true activists and cannot be deemed to be
an event. In some cases, we further check the completeness of the news searches using the

121

A recent article in The New York Times (November 28, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/
some-big-public-pension-funds-are-behaving-like-activist-investors/) shows that some of the biggest public
pension funds, which have sought to influence companies for years, are now starting to emulate the activist
investors by engaging with, and sometimes seeking to oust, directors of companies whose stock they own.
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DEF 14A report to check if the investor appears in the shareholder proposals section. Our
analysis deems 98 news results as not relevant and finds 42 with new relevant results that
sometimes belong to several companies as some of the pension funds may target several
banks at the same time. This generates 96 events the majority (~85%) of which has a
pension fund as an activist such as California Public Employees' Retirement System
(CalPERS), American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME),
several pension funds in the New York State Retirement System, Connecticut Retirement
Plans and Trust Funds (CRPTF), United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
Pension Fund, The Laborers' International Union of North America (LIUNA), American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).122
We add these new events to our sample and incorporate them in our ACTIVISM
variable and re-estimate our results to understand whether our results may be impacted by
these investors with stake less than 5% that may behave as activists. We present the results
in Table B.2 Panels A-C. Panel A and Panel B show that our main results and the results
for financial crises versus normal times continue to hold and are not affected by the addition
of these new events. Panel C provides a more detailed view of the effects of these events
from LexisNexis compared to SC 13D and DFAN14A filings. It shows that effects of these
activists are generally weaker and potentially more negative on performance, which may
be due to both the fact that many of the proposals that pension funds put forward may not
be successful and also due to their limited power because of their small stake in the
companies. Our results are consistent with Wahal (1996), which studies the efficacy of

122

We impose no limitation to the percentage of shares owned as many times this information is not available
in the LexisNexis news. In few cases, we are able to retrieve the ownership from the DEF 14A report when
the shareholder appears in the Shareholder Proposals section and for those cases the share ownership is small,
many times < 1%.
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pension fund activism and impact on performance and find no evidence of long-term
improvements in either stock price or accounting measures of performance in the posttargeting period. However, these events do not tend to increase risk, so the ShareholderCreditor Conflict is potentially not in effect for them.
B.3 Channels of Activism Based on Demands
Table B.3 details the effects of activism by channels of action. Thus, the ACTIVISM
measure is broken down into the seven different demands that activists declare in the13D
filing. We create dummies for each of these demands and include them in our regression
analysis to better understand channels of action based on activist demands. In this context,
activist demands for a particular event are being represented by the most predominant
objective. Secondary objectives are ignored.
First, we look at the effect of activism on market value, represented by TOBIN’s Q.
We find that activists increase bank market performance via an array of actions ranging
from capital structure changes (e.g., financing, stock repurchases), operating and corporate
strategic structure changes (spin-off, divestiture, M&A) to internal corporate governance
changes (changes in board composition, CEO, compensation, removal of poison pill,
declassified board etc.). In addition, market tends to perceive proxy fights filed by
shareholders positively as we tend to see a boost in the value of the firm due to expected
improvements within the firm once shareholders may win these conflicts.
Second, we look at the impact of activism on operating returns, as measured by
ROA. The minimal impact found in the main analysis is consistent across the various
channels. The one exception is proxy fights, which show a negative impact on operating
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returns. Results indicate that proxy fights initiated by activists may be costly for the firm
and may consume resources, which may be materialized in poor accounting results.
Third, we analyze the impact on bank risk. As expected, almost all of the activism
channels generate an increase in risk consistent with Manager-Shareholder Conflict 1 and
Shareholder-Creditor Conflict, but to a lesser extent engage management and strategic
changes actions (insignificant). The most severe decreases in Z-score come from proxy
fights.
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Table B.1: Other Potentially Omitted Correlated Variables
This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and financial performance (TOBIN’s Q),
operating returns (ROA), and risk taking (Z-SCORE) using several models that include additional possible omitted variables to account for the potential omitted
correlated variables bias. We define the main activism measure (ACTIVISM) as a dummy, which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material
activist events. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk and it is determined as A (ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower
overall bank risk. ROA is operating net income over GTA. We use an OLS model with time and bank FE. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. The
sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions.
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

TOBIN'S Q

ROA

Z-SCORE

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

ACTIVISM

0.005***
(3.099)

-0.000
(-1.506)

-4.421***
(-3.029)

0.004**
(2.418)

-0.000
(-1.469)

-4.181***
(-2.865)

BHC INDICATOR

0.028***

0.001***

-4.013

0.026***

0.001***

-3.097

MERGERS

(6.395)
0.009

(2.758)
-0.001

(-1.459)
5.312

(5.639)
0.008

(3.003)
-0.001

(-1.132)
5.564

WRITEOFF_INDICATOR

(1.594)
-0.034

(-1.428)
-0.001**

(1.546)
-10.497***

(1.446)
-0.034

(-1.533)
-0.001**

(1.600)
-10.515***

MBS/GTA

(-1.448)
0.100***

(-2.222)
0.002***

(-4.959)
4.943

(-1.456)
0.097***

(-2.198)
0.002***

(-4.948)
6.062

COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOANS

(3.791)
0.050***

(3.063)
0.000

(0.791)
-28.212***

(3.735)
0.051***

(3.084)
0.000

(0.971)
-28.518***

CASH_HOLDINGS

(3.177)
0.109**

(0.182)
-0.000

(-4.147)
-13.978

(3.176)
0.109**

(0.179)
-0.000

(-4.188)
-13.018

HHI DEPOSITS

(2.450)
-0.009

(-0.226)
0.001

(-1.298)
28.813***

(2.428)
-0.005

(-0.207)
0.001

(-1.203)
27.761***

(-0.448)

(1.142)

(3.751)

(-0.257)

(0.866)

(3.588)

0.013
(1.269)

0.001***
(3.656)

6.328**
(2.170)

Independent Variables
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INST OWNERSHIP

-0.047***
(-2.829)
0.003
(1.413)

-0.002***
(-3.202)
-0.000***
(-3.536)

15.773**
(2.230)
-1.422***
(-3.224)

NUMBER OF ANALYSTS

-0.003***
(-2.799)

0.000
(0.777)

0.678***
(5.105)

NUMBER OF ANALYSTS_NOT_IN_IBIS

-0.004**
(-2.037)

0.000
(1.042)

2.460***
(2.966)

LONG-TERM INST OWNERSHIP
NUMBER BLOCKHOLDERS

Previous Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

22,128

22,584

22,514

22,094

22,549

22,479

R-squared

0.878

0.608

0.473

0.879

0.609

0.474
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Table B.2: Shareholder Activism during Normal Times and Financial Crises (including LexisNexis News)
This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and financial performance (TOBIN’s Q),
operating returns (ROA), and risk taking (Z-SCORE) during normal times and during crises versus normal times. We define the main activism measure (ACTIVISM)
as a dummy, which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk and it
is determined as A (ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall bank risk. ROA is operating net income over GTA. We use an OLS
model with time and bank FE. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. FINANCIAL_CRISES variable construction follows Berger and Bouwman (2013).
FINANCIAL_CRISES 123 is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for a crisis period and it includes both market (those originated in the capital markets) and
banking crises (those originated in the banking sector). Panel A reports effects of activism during financial crises. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t =
2010. Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Independent Variables
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ACTIVISM
Controls
Time fixed effects
Bank Fixed effects
Observations
R-squared

123

Panel A: Main Effects (including LexisNexis News)
TOBIN'S Q
ROA
(1)
(2)
0.004**
(2.521)
Yes
Yes
Yes
22,832
0.875

-0.000
(-1.349)
Yes
Yes
Yes
23,976
0.604

Z-SCORE
(3)
-3.571***
(-2.700)
Yes
Yes
Yes
23,812
0.472

Banking crisis is the recent subprime lending crisis and market crises are the Russian debt crisis plus LTCM bailout in 1998, and the bursting of the dot.com
bubble plus September 11. Normal times is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for all time periods that are not financial crises.

Independent Variables

Panel B: Effects during Financial Crises (including LexisNexis News)
TOBIN'S Q
ROA
(1)
(2)

ACTIVISM
ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES
(ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES)
t-stat (ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES = 0)
Controls
Time fixed effects
Bank Fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
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Independent Variables
LexisNexis News
DFAN14A
13D
Controls
Time Fixed Effects
Bank Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

0.001
(0.358)
0.008**
(2.449)
0.009***
3.292
Yes
Yes
Yes
22,821
0.875

-0.000
(-1.347)
0.000
(0.443)
0.000
0.566
Yes
Yes
Yes
23,965
0.604

Panel C: Effects by Filing Type
TOBIN'S Q
ROA
(1)
(2)

Z-SCORE
(3)
-8.385***
(-5.252)
10.542***
(4.505)
2.157
1.118
Yes
Yes
Yes
23,801
0.472

Z-SCORE
(3)

-0.022***
(-2.996)
0.005
(0.987)
0.008***
(4.928)

-0.001*
(-1.931)
0.000
(0.625)
-0.000
(-0.494)

8.133
(1.577)
-14.962***
(-4.157)
-4.798***
(-3.883)

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,821
0.875

Yes
Yes
Yes
23,965
0.604

Yes
Yes
Yes
23,801
0.472

t-test for equality of coefficients
DFAN14A = 13D
t-test for equality of coefficients
LexisNexis News = DFAN14A
t-test for equality of coefficients
LexisNexis News = 13D

0.574

0.748

2.793***

3.017***

1.895*

3.670***

3.999***

1.772*

2.443***

261

Table B.3: Channels of Action for Activists (Based on Demands)
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and their financial performance, operating
returns, and risk. ACTIVISM is a dummy which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. We show models in which we broke
down ACTIVISM into its seven activist demands to understand the channels through which activists work: ENGAGE MANAGEMENT, CAPITAL STRUCTURE,
INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ASSE SALE (STRATEGIC), LITIGATION/BANKRUPTCY, PROXY FIGHT, and STRATEGIC CHANGES. We consider
the categories to be exclusive, by keeping the most important reason of the filing and ignoring the secondary reasons. We use an OLS model with time and bank
fixed effects. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A, for details on the definitions
and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Independent Variables
ENGAGE MANAGEMENT
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STRATEGIC CHANGES
INTERNAL GOVERNANCE
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
PROXY FIGHT
ASSET SALE (STRATEGIC)
LITIGATION/BANKRUPTCY
Controls
Time fixed effects
Bank Fixed effects
Observations
R-squared (or Pseudo)

TOBIN'S Q
(1)

ROA
(2)

Z-SCORE
(3)

0.003
(1.066)
0.031***
(4.491)
0.019***
(4.520)
0.012**
(2.444)
0.014***
(2.748)
0.006
(1.070)
0.000
(0.024)
Yes
Yes
Yes
22,819
0.875

0.000
(0.622)
-0.000
(-1.219)
0.000
(0.627)
0.000
(0.448)
-0.001**
(-2.566)
0.000
(0.618)
-0.000
(-0.693)
Yes
Yes
Yes
23,963
0.604

-1.925
(-0.861)
2.269
(0.876)
-4.676*
(-1.904)
-9.942**
(-2.375)
-33.054***
(-4.904)
-15.808***
(-4.300)
-5.553***
(-2.742)
Yes
Yes
Yes
23,799
0.473

APPENDIX C FOR CHAPTER 3
MODEL DETAILS
We assess the impact of internationalization on risk, that is, the effect of the foreign
assets ratio, w, on the Z-score, that is:
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the impact of the foreign assets ratio ( ) on the Z of the international bank is:
∂Z/ ∂w =

X

Y

.

(C.4)

Equation (C.4) is equivalent to:
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After taking the derivatives, we obtain:
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which is the same as equation (3.7) in Section 3.2.
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APPENDIX D FOR CHAPTER 4
LERNER INDEX CALCULATION
We proxy market power by the Lerner Index for GTA, and calculate it as observed pricecost margin divided by price (e.g., Lerner,1933; Brucker, 1970, 1972; Benston, 1972;
Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos, and Perez, 2005; Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss, 2009;
Jimenez, Lopez, and Saurina, 2010). The Lerner GTA is calculated as
Lerner GTAit =

Priceit − MCit

(D.1)

Priceit

A firm in perfect competition has an index value of 0 and thus no market power (as Price
= MC), while a firm with market power has a positive index.
We consider Priceit as the price of GTA proxied by the ratio of total revenues
(interest and non-interest income) to GTA for a bank i at a time t and MCit represents
marginal cost of total assets for a bank i at time t. In order to get MCit for each bank for
each point in time, we take the derivative from the following estimated translog cost
function:
ln(Cost it ) = θ 0 + θ 1 ln GTAit +
3

θ2
2

3

3

k =1

k =1

ln GTAit 2 + ∑ γ k ln W k ,it + ∑ φ k ln GTAit ln W k ,it

(D .2)

3

+ ∑ ∑ γ kj ln W k ,it ln W j ,it + θ 3Timet + µ it
k =1 j =1

where i represents banks and t represents time in quarters, Costit is total operating plus
financial costs, Wk,it represents input prices: W1,it is the ratio of personnel expenses to GTA
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(proxy for input price of labor), W2,it is the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and
money market funding (proxy for input price of all funds) and W3,it is the ratio of other
operating and administrative expenses to GTA (proxy for input price of fixed capital), and
Timet is a vector of time fixed effects. The Wk,it are average prices in the market because
we want to allow individual banks to have different prices to reflect their individual market
power. To construct the input prices Wk,it, we calculate the weighted average of the input
prices for all local markets in which the bank operates, where the weights are the ratios of
the deposits of bank i in the local markets over the bank total deposits.1 Marginal cost for
GTA is finally determined as:

MCit =

Costit
GTAit

3
ˆ ˆ

θ
+
θ
ln
GTA
+
φˆk ln Wk ,it 
∑
it
 1 2
k =1



(D.3)

where the ^’s indicate estimated coefficients.

1

As an alternative method in unreported results, we construct the weighted average of the input prices using
as weights the proportions of branches that banks have in the local markets in which they operate. Results
are robust to this alternative method.
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APPENDIX E FOR CHAPTER 4
OTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS
E.1 Effects by Size Classes
As discussed above, size may be a source of economic strength for a bank and could offer
a better competitive position on the market, and thus effects of TARP may differ by bank
size. We split the banks according to their size in GTA into three different classes: small
banks (GTA ≤ $1 billion), medium banks ($1 billion ≤ GTA < $3 billion) and large banks
(GTA > $3 billion) and create the following three size dummies: SMALL, MEDIUM, and
LARGE. We interact these size dummies with the TARP Recipient dummy and obtain the
following interaction terms: SMALL*TARP Recipient, MEDIUM*TARP Recipient,
LARGE*TARP Recipient. We then create interaction terms between the previously
obtained variables and our Post TARP dummy: SMALL * TARP Recipient * Post TARP,
MEDIUM * TARP Recipient * Post TARP, LARGE * TARP Recipient * Post TARP. We
similarly create variables for the two types of TARP banks.
We rerun our regressions using these new variables to understand the impact of
various class sizes on our results. Table E.1 Panel A, columns (1)-(2) present the results
for the market share regressions and Table E.1 Panel A, columns (3)-(4) show the results
for market power. Table E.1 Panel B reports results from a test for the equality of
coefficients for the two types of TARP recipients. The regressions show that the greater
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the bank size, the higher the competitive advantage the TARP banks can obtain in terms of
both market share and market power. When splitting between TARP banks that repaid and
those that did not, we find that for those banks that did not repay, again the greater the bank
size the higher the competitive advantage of TARP banks. For banks that repaid, the results
are again stronger for the large banks than for the small banks, but the results for the
medium banks are mixed.
E.2 Excluding Involuntary Participants
Most of the banks voluntarily participated in the TARP program, however there are a few
that were involuntary – they were required to participate in the program at its inception.
We classify the following eight banks as involuntary participants: Citigroup, JP Morgan,
Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Bank of New York, Bank of America, and
State Street Bank.1 Since we would like to ensure that our results are not driven by the
involuntary participants, we rerun our analysis using a sample that excludes them in Table
E.2 Panel A, columns (1) - (4), and report the tests of equality between the two types of
TARP groups in Panel E. The results are qualitatively similar to our main findings.
E.3 Excluding Banks Subject to Stress Tests (SCAP and CCAR)
The US Banks 2009 Stress Tests aka Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)
was a mandatory program applied to 19 banking organizations with assets exceeding $100
billion that cover about 2/3 of U.S banking assets and about half of loans.2 It was conducted

1

We exclude Merrill Lynch from the original 9 involuntary recipients because it is not a bank.

2

These were 19 banks, including Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan
Stanley, Wells Fargo, Bank of NY Mellon, BB&T, Fifth Third Bancorp, Keycorp, PNC Financial, Regions
Financial, SunTrust Banks, US Bancorp, Ally Financial, American Express Company, Capital One Financial,
Metlife, and State Street.
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by Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies (FED, FDIC, OCC) from February 25, 2009 to late
April 2009 and it was designed to ensure that large banking organizations had enough
capital to withstand the recession and a more adverse scenario that might occur over the
rest of 2009 and 2010. These organizations had to have or raise enough capital to meet
capital requirements under a more adverse scenario, or else the Treasury would provide the
capital. A possible consequence of the SCAP program was to essentially publicize that the
19 biggest banking organizations were too-big-to-fail (TBTF) to assure the public of the
safety of the financial system. Given this special treatment of banks under SCAP, we worry
that our competitive advantage for TARP banks might be driven by this subsample of
banks. These same banking organizations were also subject to the Comprehensive Capital
Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress tests in 2011 and 2012, which may also impact their
competitive advantages. Therefore, we reestimate our regressions by using a sample which
excludes banks that were subject to the SCAP and CCAR stress tests. Table E.2 Panel B,
columns (1) - (4) report the estimation results and Panel E reports the tests of equality
between the two types of TARP groups. We find that our main results continue to hold.
E.4 Capitalization Ratio
The level of capital a bank has prior to infusion can impact the competitive advantage that
the TARP recipients can get. Banks with a higher level of capital prior to infusion may
have a better ability to use the extra capital to expand and acquire less well capitalized
peers (e.g., Berger and Bouwman (2013)). We group banks according to whether they had
low equity to assets ratio (EQCAP_08Q3 ≤ 7%) or high capital (EQCAP_08Q3 > 7%)
before the TARP program started (2008:Q3) and regression estimates are shown in Table
E.2 Panel C, columns (1)-(8) and Panel E reports the tests of equality between the two
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types of TARP groups. Looking at the regression results, we find that only banks with a
higher capitalization ratio gained competitive advantages in terms of market share and
market power as indicated by the positive coefficients for the DID terms.
E.5 HHI
We also group banks according to their local market concentration. This is proxied by HHI
Deposits for the local markets in which the bank is present. We consider three groups for
the bank concentration: unconcentrated (HHI ≤ 1,000), moderately concentrated (1000 <
HHI ≤ 1,800), and highly concentrated (HHI >1,800).
Our results for the three subsamples are reported in Table E.2 Panel D, columns
(1)-(12) and Panel E reports the tests of equality between the two types of TARP groups.
Results suggest that the most competitive advantages given by TARP were gained by the
banks in the highly concentrated category, followed by the moderately concentrated
category. Therefore, the more concentrated the local banking market, the higher increase
in competitive advantage a bank gets.
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Table E.1: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition by Size Class
This table shows tests for the impact of TARP on competition by bank size classes. We report differenceindifference (DID) regression estimates for banks with interactions of the key terms with different bank sizes:
small (GTA ≤ 1 Billion), medium (1 Billion < GTA ≤ 3 Billion) and large (GTA > 3 Billion). The measures
of competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power
(proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP
capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program initiation.
TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not
Repaid, which is a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed
effects. Panel C reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP on two types of TARP banks: TARP
banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. All variables
are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: Regression parameters
Dependent Variable:

Market Share

Independent Variables:
SMALL x TARP Recipient
MEDIUM x TARP Recipient
LARGE x TARP Recipient
SMALL x Post TARP x TARP Recipient

(1)

(2)

Market Power
(3)

-0.013***

-0.025***

(-13.318)

(-6.497)

-0.012***

0.001

(-10.216)

(0.133)

-0.005*

0.010

(-1.821)

(1.205)

0.001

0.022***

(0.563)

(4.264)

MEDIUM x Post TARP x TARP Recipient

0.007***

0.031***

(5.388)

(3.450)

LARGE x Post TARP x TARP Recipient

0.017***

0.111***

(4.671)

(4)

(11.467)

SMALL x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

-0.013***

-0.025***

(-13.120)

(-5.808)

MEDIUM x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

-0.011***

0.001

(-8.601)

(0.192)

LARGE x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
SMALL x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
MEDIUM x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
LARGE x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
SMALL x TARP Recipient_Repaid
MEDIUM x TARP Recipient_Repaid
LARGE x TARP Recipient_Repaid
SMALL x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid
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-0.017***

-0.003

(-11.323)

(-0.283)

-0.000

0.016***

(-0.096)

(2.837)

0.008***

0.026**

(5.344)

(2.568)

0.020***

0.130***

(9.026)

(8.944)

-0.013***

-0.029***

(-4.182)

(-3.745)

-0.015***

-0.000

(-8.624)

(-0.033)

0.007

0.022**

(1.609)

(2.100)

0.009*

0.075***

MEDIUM x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid
LARGE x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid

(1.705)

(6.449)

0.003

0.056***

(1.303)

(3.103)

0.013**

0.093***

(2.081)

(7.361)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

178,604

178,604

178,604

178,604

0.219

0.220

0.453

0.453

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks
t-stat:
Effect for Small TARP Banks (GTA ≤ 1 Billion) that Repaid Early =
Effect for Small TARP Banks (GTA ≤ 1 Billion) that Did Not Repay
Early
t-stat:
Effect for Medium TARP Banks (1 Billion < GTA ≤ 3 Billion) that
Repaid Early = Effect for Medium TARP Banks (1 Billion < GTA ≤
3 Billion) that Did Not Repay Early
t-stat:
Effect for Large TARP Banks (GTA > 3 Billion) that Repaid Early =
Effect for Large TARP Banks (GTA > 3 Billion) that Did Not Repay
Early
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Market Share

Market Power

1.685*

4.657***

1.828*

1.435

0.959

1.936*

Table E.2: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition: Subsamples Analysis
This table shows additional subsample tests for analyzing the impact of TARP on competition. Panel A columns (1)-(4) report difference-in-difference (DID)
regression estimates from a sample that excludes involuntary participants. Panel B columns (1)-(4) report difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates from
a sample that excludes banks subject to stress-tests (SCAP and CCAR).Panel C columns (1)-(8) report difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for
banks with low capitalization (EQCAP_08Q3 ≤ 7%) and high capitalization (EQCAP_08Q3 > 7%). Panel D columns (1)-(12) report difference-in-difference (DID)
regression estimates for banks with different local concentration: Unconcentrated, which represents banks for which HHI is below 1,000 points, Moderately
Concentrated, which covers banks for which HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800 points, and Highly Concentrated, those for which the HHI is in excess of 1,800
points. The measures of competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP
Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after
TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy equal
to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed effects. Panel E reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP on two types of
TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Panel A: Excluding TARP Involuntary Participants
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables:
TARP Recipient
Post TARP x TARP Recipient

Market Share
(1)

Market Power
(2)

(3)

-0.013***

-0.022***

(-16.679)

(-6.518)

0.004***

0.037***

(4.324)

(8.801)

TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
TARP Recipient_Repaid
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid

(4)

-0.013***

-0.023***

(-16.035)

(-6.195)

-0.013***

-0.012**

(-7.299)

(-1.997)

0.003***

0.029***

(3.023)

(6.006)

0.010***

0.080***
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(4.160)

(10.051)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

178,408

178,408

178,408

178,408

0.223

0.223

0.452

0.452

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Panel B: Excluding Banks Subject to the Stress Tests (SCAP and CCAR)
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables:
TARP Recipient
Post TARP x TARP Recipient

Market Share
(1)

Market Power
(2)

-0.013***

(3)

(4)

-0.022***

(-16.529)

(-6.463)

0.004***

0.036***

(4.075)

(8.410)

TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

-0.013***
(-15.921)

(-6.138)

TARP Recipient_Repaid

-0.013***

-0.012**

(-7.107)

(-2.099)

0.003***

0.028***

(2.920)

(5.768)

0.009***

0.079***

(3.774)

(9.753)

Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid

-0.023***
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Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

178,101

178,101

178,101

178,101

0.223

0.223

0.452

0.452

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Yes

Panel C: Subsamples by Capitalization Level (EQCAP_08Q3)
Dependent Variable:

Market Share
(1)

(2)

Poorly Capitalized
Independent Variables:
TARP Recipient
Post TARP x TARP Recipient

EQCAP _08Q3 ≤ 7%
0.029***

(3)

(4)

Highly Capitalized
EQCAP _08Q3 > 7%

(5)

(6)

Poorly Capitalized
EQCAP _08Q3 ≤ 7%

(7)

EQCAP _08Q3 > 7%

0.040***

(4.483)

(-20.133)

(3.476)

(-7.599)

0.009

0.005***

-0.019

0.040***

(0.832)

(5.068)

(-1.206)

(9.285)

TARP Recipient_Repaid
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Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid
Yes

(8)

Highly Capitalized

-0.016***

TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

Controls

Market Power

-0.026***

-0.005

-0.015***

0.043***

-0.027***

(-1.383)

(-16.907)

(3.278)

(-7.223)

0.122***

-0.021***

0.031

-0.013**

(6.133)

(-18.753)

(1.615)

(-2.131)

0.003

0.003***

-0.014

0.030***

(0.679)

(3.112)

(-0.794)

(6.212)

0.039

0.012***

-0.034

0.087***

(1.159)

(7.723)

(-1.166)

(10.829)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

7,176

7,176

171,428

171,428

7,176

7,176

171,428

171,428

Adjusted R-squared

0.144

0.187

0.225

0.225

0.575

0.575

0.447

0.447

Time Fixed Effects

Panel D: Subsamples by Local Concentration (HHI)
Dependent Variable:

Market Share
(1)

Independent Variables:
TARP Recipient

Post TARP x TARP Recipient

(2)

Unconcentrated

(3)
(4)
Moderately
Concentrated

HHI ≤ 1000

1000 < HHI ≤ 1,800

Market Power
(5)

(6)

Highly
Concentrated

(7)

(8)

Unconcentrated
HHI ≤ 1000
0.021***

(9)
(10)
Moderately
Concentrated

(12)
Highly
Concentrated

0.007***

-0.016***

HHI > 1800
0.033***

(-7.489)

(-15.421)

(-8.646)

(-3.717)

(-5.074)

(-5.915)

0.001

0.006***

0.027***

0.022***

0.049***

0.075***

(4.279)

(5.870)

(8.324)

(6.310)

(0.847)
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid

TARP Recipient_Repaid

0.008***

(3.097)

1000 < HHI ≤ 1,800

(11)

-0.024***

HHI > 1800
0.056***

-0.015***

0.040***

0.023***

-0.027***

0.033***

(-10.668)

(-13.752)

(-10.455)

(-3.682)

(-5.350)

0.002

-0.017***

-0.005

-0.009

0.001

(-2.949)
0.125***

(0.386)

(-7.739)

(-0.595)

(-0.869)

(0.143)

(-9.626)
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Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not
Repaid

0.004***

0.003*

0.024***

0.018**

0.042***

0.039***

(1.929)

(4.936)

(2.281)

(6.278)

(2.704)

Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid

(3.642)
0.015***

0.020***

0.046***

0.049***

0.082***

0.196***

(-2.834)
Controls
Time Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

(4.951)
Yes

Yes

(4.485)
Yes

Yes

(3.524)
Yes

Yes

(7.519)
Yes

Yes

(12.085)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

84,627

84,627

68,181

68,181

25,796

25,796

84,627

84,627

68,181

68,181

25,796

25,796

Adjusted R-squared

0.095

0.096

0.073

0.074

0.252

0.253

0.526

0.527

0.398

0.398

0.436

0.436

Panel E: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for Different Types of TARP Recipients

Excluding Involuntary Participants

Excluding Banks Subject to the Stress Tests
Poorly Capitalized
EQCAP _08Q3 ≤ 7%
Highly Capitalized
EQCAP _08Q3 > 7%
Unconcentrated
HHI ≤ 1000

278

Moderately Concentrated
1000 < HHI ≤ 1,800
Highly Concentrated
HHI > 1800

t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay
Early
t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay
Early
t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay
Early
t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay
Early
t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay
Early
t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay
Early
t-stat:
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay
Early

Market Share

Market Power

2.604***

5.673***

2.328**

5.559***

1.068

0.600

4.691***

6.133***

3.393***

2.007**

4.140***

3.162***

2.019**

7.288***

